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Status in Law and Morality [Kõva köide]

(Professor of the Philosophy of the Law, Faculty of Laws, University College London)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 192 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm
  • Sari: Oxford Legal Philosophy
  • Ilmumisaeg: 26-May-2026
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198936699
  • ISBN-13: 9780198936695
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  • Hind: 144,75 €
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  • Formaat: Hardback, 192 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm
  • Sari: Oxford Legal Philosophy
  • Ilmumisaeg: 26-May-2026
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198936699
  • ISBN-13: 9780198936695
The idea of status has long puzzled philosophers. Some people have higher social status than others, and some have distinct legal statuses, such as being an employee, a tenant, or a refugee. But why should that be the case? Why should some enjoy more esteem than others? And why should law pick out a class of persons, give it a label, and treat it differently?

Status in Law and Morality provides a philosophical account of status, arguing that it is a moral, and not just a legal or social, idea. The point of status is to protect the weaker party in social relations - the employee, or the tenant - through social recognition of their role as well as through legal regulation. Tracing the origins of the idea of status in law and in moral philosophy, this book challenges the commonly held view that status is an inherently inegalitarian idea that should have no place in modern law. It instead distinguishes between 'rank' and 'role' based statuses and argues that law ought to boost the self-esteem of those who hold vulnerable social roles.

Thought-provoking and pioneering, this book aims to revive the progressive character of status to work towards regulating unequal social relations and protecting vulnerable groups.

Arvustused

The concept of status is both central to contemporary moral and political life and radically under theorized. In this important new book, George Letsas shows its deep roots in Western legal and political culture and makes a compelling case for making its place explicit in contemporary thought. His positive account of status will be the starting point for all future discussions of this important topic. * Arthur Ripstein, University of Toronto * Status in Law and Morality is a wonderful contribution to our understanding of, well, status in law and morality. From the careful distinction between rank-status and role-status (alongside the interesting claims about the relations between the two), to the provocative claim that the function of current norms surrounding status is actually to guard equality and protect the weak, through historical claims about the development of status, and all the way to a general discussion of role morality, Letsas's arguments and insights are rich and important, and they are plausible even when highly surprising. * David Enoch, University of Oxford * This absorbing study of the idea of status offers a compelling challenge to the standard picture. Distinguishing between rank-status and role-status, George Letsas rejects both the idea that legal status was traditionally attached to rank or social status and also Maine's idea that legal development has consisted in the transition from status to contract. He argues instead that role-status is the critical legal and moral concept, which recognises the power imbalance implicit in certain kinds of enduring relationship and justifies the attribution of pertinent rights and duties. The book is a very fine contribution to legal and moral philosophy, obliging us urgently to reexamine some of our existing ideas and assumptions. * Trevor Allan, University of Cambridge *

George Letsas holds the Chair in the Philosophy of Law at University College London (UCL). He is the Co-Director of the UCL Human Rights Institute and Deputy Director of the UCL Quain Centre for Jurisprudence. His main research interests are in legal philosophy and human rights. He has written widely on the interpretation of human rights, theory of European law, philosophy of contract law, and general jurisprudence. He is known for his defence of the evolutive interpretation of human rights, and his critique of the use of consensus by human rights courts as an interpretive method.