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Taking Frege at his Word [Kõva köide]

(Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Indiana University)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 346 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 240x165x28 mm, kaal: 690 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Dec-2020
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198865473
  • ISBN-13: 9780198865476
  • Formaat: Hardback, 346 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 240x165x28 mm, kaal: 690 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Dec-2020
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198865473
  • ISBN-13: 9780198865476
Frege is widely regarded as having set much of the agenda of contemporary analytic philosophy. As standardly read, he meant to introduce--and make crucial contributions to--the project of giving an account of the workings of (an improved version of) natural language. Yet, despite the great admiration most contemporary philosophers feel for Frege, it is widely believed that he committed a large number of serious, and inexplicable, blunders. For, if Frege really meant to be constructing a theory of the workings of (some version of) natural language, then a significant number of his stated views--including views that he claimed to be central to his philosophical picture--are straightforwardly wrong. But did Frege mean to be giving an account of the workings of language? He himself never actually claimed to be doing this, and, indeed, never even described such a project.

Taking Frege at his Word offers an interpretation that is based on a different approach to his writings. Rather than using the contributions he is taken to have made to contemporary work in the philosophy of language to infer what his projects were, Joan Weiner gives priority to Frege's own accounts of what he means to be doing. She provides a very different view of Frege's project. One might suspect that, on such a reading, Frege's writings would have purely antiquarian interest, but this would be a mistake. The final two chapters show that Frege offers us new ways of addressing some of the philosophical problems that worry us today.

Arvustused

There is much that is interesting, thought-provoking, and original in Taking Frege at his Word. Weiner's rejection of the four claims that make up the Standard Interpretation is sophisticated and insightful. * Roy T. Cook, Philosophia Mathematica * offers an important correction to conclusions that one may be too willing to draw about Frege ... useful to anyone interested in the history of analytic philosophy. * Gregory Lavers, Metascience *

A Note on Citations, Translations, and Abbreviations xxi
Representation of Frege's Logical Symbols xxv
PART I NATURAL LANGUAGE AND THEORIES OF MEANING
1 Language and the Standard Interpretation
3(31)
I Reportage and the Theory of Meaning
4(6)
Ia Reportage and the Treatment of the Logical Language in Basic Laws
6(2)
Ib Reportage and "On Sinn and Bedeutung"
8(2)
II Some General Remarks about Interpretation
10(3)
III The Standard Interpretation and "On Sinn and Bedeutung"
13(7)
IIIa Dummett and Truth-values as Objects
13(3)
IIIb Logical Language and Natural Language
16(4)
IV A Theory of Meaning for What Language?
20(12)
IVa Natural Language
20(4)
IVb Must the Improved Version of Natural Language be Free of Logical Imperfections?
24(4)
IVc Could Frege Want a Theory of Natural Language as it Is?
28(1)
IVd Why Should Ambiguity be a Problem?
29(1)
IVe Why Does Frege Analyze (some) Imperfect Parts of Natural Language?
30(2)
V So Where Are We Now?
32(2)
2 Frege's New Logic and the Function/Argument Regimentation
34(39)
I Why Does Frege Need a Microscope?
34(5)
Ia What Are Logical Truths? The Begriffsschrift Answer
36(3)
II The First Version of Frege's Microscope
39(9)
IIa The Begriffsschrift Notion of Function
40(1)
IIb Functions and How We Regard an Expression
41(2)
IIc Do Functions and Arguments Differ in Kind?
43(2)
IId Some Problems with the Linguistic-expression View of Function
45(3)
III Two Problems with the Begriffsschrift Account of Identity
48(5)
IIIa The First Identity Problem
49(2)
IIIb A Second Identity Problem
51(2)
IV Frege's Introduction of Sinn and Bedeutung as a Solution to the Identity Problems
53(7)
IVa The Modified Begriffsschrift View of Identity
54(2)
IVb The New View of Identity
56(4)
V Functions, Arguments, and Objects
60(2)
VI Frege's View of Sentences as Truth-value Names
62(11)
VIa Sentences in Begriffsschrift
62(2)
VIb Sentences in "On Sinn and Bedeutung"
64(9)
PART II METAPHYSICS AND THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION
3 Metaphysics and the Standard Interpretation
73(42)
I Frege's Logical Notion of Function
74(11)
Ia Familiar Function-expressions and Functions
74(4)
Ib Unsaturatedness and some Unfamiliar Function-names and Functions
78(2)
Ic Concept and Object
80(5)
II Function and Object as Metaphysical or Ontological Categories
85(30)
IIa Functions and the Problem of Predication
87(5)
IIb Platonism and Frege: Burge's "Literal" Interpretation
92(1)
IIb.i What Does Frege Say about Non-spatio-temporal Entities?
93(2)
IIb.ii Does Frege Qualify these Remarks?
95(2)
IIb.iii Can There be a Literal Statement that Functions Are Atemporal?
97(3)
IIc What Work Does Frege's Function/Object Distinction Do?
100(2)
IId "Function" and "Object" in Statements of Literal Truths
102(2)
IIe Elucidation, its Uses and Evaluation
104(5)
IIf The Concept Horse Revisited
109(6)
PART III METATHEORY AND THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION
4 Soundness, Epistemology, and Frege's Project
115(55)
I Logical Laws and Metatheory
117(5)
Ia Quine's Argument for Semantic Ascent
117(2)
Ib Schemata and Logical Laws
119(3)
II Modus Ponens, Logical Laws, and Metatheory
122(13)
IIa The Justification of Modus Ponens
122(1)
IIb Concepts as Functions; Why "is the True" Is not a Truth Predicate
123(5)
IIc Metalinguistic Variables
128(2)
IId Modus Ponens: Metatheory and Elucidation
130(3)
IIe Elucidation and the Justification of Modus Ponens and Basic Law I
133(2)
III Soundness and Frege's Epistemological Project
135(29)
IIIa Does Frege Need a Soundness Proof?
135(2)
IIIb Epistemology, Best Proof, and Generality
137(6)
IIIc What is Required of a Primitive Logical Law?
143(4)
IIId Basic Law V, Epistemology, and Semantic Proof
147(7)
IIIe An Alternative Epistemological-semantic Story: Analyticity as Truth by Virtue of Meaning
154(4)
IIIf But did Frege Give a Semantic Proof of Basic Law V?
158(2)
IIIg Is Basic Law V a Primitive Logical Law?
160(4)
IV Soundness and the New Science: Did Frege Envision a Soundness Proof?
164(4)
V Conclusion
168(2)
5 Reference, the Context Principle, and the Significance of Sentential Priority
170(41)
I Realism and Extra-linguistic Entities
170(3)
II The Metaphysical Requirement, the Context Principle, and the Sentential Priority View
173(15)
IIa Identity and the Metaphysical Requirement
173(5)
IIb The Context Principle and the Sentential Priority View in Foundations
178(3)
IIe The Sentential Priority View and Basic Laws
181(4)
IId §10 and the Significance of Identity Statements
185(3)
III §§28-31 of Basic Laws
188(12)
IIIa §31 and Metatheory
188(5)
IIIb The Inductive Proof Interpretation and §29
193(2)
IIIc §§28-31 and the Circularity Puzzle
195(4)
IIId The VR (value-range) Function-name
199(1)
IV §10 of Basic Laws
200(11)
IVa §10 and the Standard Interpretation: Three Difficulties
200(2)
IVb Solving the Three Difficulties of §10
202(4)
IVc The Sentential Priority View, Realism, and Personal Epistemology
206(5)
6 The Context Principle, Sentential Priority, and the Pursuit of Truth
211(28)
I Changing the Subject and the Logicist Project: What makes Logicism about our Arithmetic?
213(26)
Ia Why Define the Number One and Concept Number?
216(4)
Ib Why Frege Would Reject the Apparently Obvious Faithfulness Requirement
220(6)
Ic What Are Frege's Actual Faithfulness Requirements?
226(2)
II How Does this Square with the View that the Sentences Expressing the "Well Known Properties of the Numbers" are True?
228(1)
IIa The Sentential Priority View Revisited
228(6)
IIb Methodology: Natural Language and Inquiry
234(5)
PART IV PUTTING FREGE'S LESSONS TO WORK
7 Why Frege's Apparently Absurd View Is not Absurd at All
239(31)
I Vagueness
239(8)
Ia Vagueness and Deference to Experts
240(3)
Ib Vague Predicates, Semantics, and Empirical Investigation
243(4)
II Precisification
247(15)
IIa Supervaluationism, Precisification, and the "Homophonic" Objection
247(3)
IIb "Obese": A Case Study
250(1)
IIb.i Is "Obese" a Technical Scientific Term?
250(1)
IIb.ii Precisification and Empirical Studies
251(3)
IIb.iii The Binaries Objection
254(3)
IIb.iv Changing the Subject---the Homophonic Objection Revisited
257(5)
III Explication and Vagueness as a Logical Defect
262(8)
8 Mathematical Knowledge and Sentential vs. Subsentential Priority
270(27)
I The Logical Notion of Objecthood
271(5)
II Metaphysical Objecthood and Subsentential vs. Sentential Priority
276(8)
IIa Predicates and Carving Nature at the Joints
277(3)
IIb Another Example: The Case Definition of AIDS
280(4)
III Frege's Alternative
284(8)
IIIa Benacerraf's Problem and Subsentential Priority
284(1)
IIIb Frege's Realism and the Significance of Sentential Priority
285(4)
IIIc Sentential vs. Subsentential Priority
289(3)
IV Conclusion
292(5)
Bibliography 297(8)
Index 305
Joan Weiner is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Indiana University.