A Note on Citations, Translations, and Abbreviations |
|
xxi | |
Representation of Frege's Logical Symbols |
|
xxv | |
|
PART I NATURAL LANGUAGE AND THEORIES OF MEANING |
|
|
|
1 Language and the Standard Interpretation |
|
|
3 | (31) |
|
I Reportage and the Theory of Meaning |
|
|
4 | (6) |
|
Ia Reportage and the Treatment of the Logical Language in Basic Laws |
|
|
6 | (2) |
|
Ib Reportage and "On Sinn and Bedeutung" |
|
|
8 | (2) |
|
II Some General Remarks about Interpretation |
|
|
10 | (3) |
|
III The Standard Interpretation and "On Sinn and Bedeutung" |
|
|
13 | (7) |
|
IIIa Dummett and Truth-values as Objects |
|
|
13 | (3) |
|
IIIb Logical Language and Natural Language |
|
|
16 | (4) |
|
IV A Theory of Meaning for What Language? |
|
|
20 | (12) |
|
|
20 | (4) |
|
IVb Must the Improved Version of Natural Language be Free of Logical Imperfections? |
|
|
24 | (4) |
|
IVc Could Frege Want a Theory of Natural Language as it Is? |
|
|
28 | (1) |
|
IVd Why Should Ambiguity be a Problem? |
|
|
29 | (1) |
|
IVe Why Does Frege Analyze (some) Imperfect Parts of Natural Language? |
|
|
30 | (2) |
|
|
32 | (2) |
|
2 Frege's New Logic and the Function/Argument Regimentation |
|
|
34 | (39) |
|
I Why Does Frege Need a Microscope? |
|
|
34 | (5) |
|
Ia What Are Logical Truths? The Begriffsschrift Answer |
|
|
36 | (3) |
|
II The First Version of Frege's Microscope |
|
|
39 | (9) |
|
IIa The Begriffsschrift Notion of Function |
|
|
40 | (1) |
|
IIb Functions and How We Regard an Expression |
|
|
41 | (2) |
|
IIc Do Functions and Arguments Differ in Kind? |
|
|
43 | (2) |
|
IId Some Problems with the Linguistic-expression View of Function |
|
|
45 | (3) |
|
III Two Problems with the Begriffsschrift Account of Identity |
|
|
48 | (5) |
|
IIIa The First Identity Problem |
|
|
49 | (2) |
|
IIIb A Second Identity Problem |
|
|
51 | (2) |
|
IV Frege's Introduction of Sinn and Bedeutung as a Solution to the Identity Problems |
|
|
53 | (7) |
|
IVa The Modified Begriffsschrift View of Identity |
|
|
54 | (2) |
|
IVb The New View of Identity |
|
|
56 | (4) |
|
V Functions, Arguments, and Objects |
|
|
60 | (2) |
|
VI Frege's View of Sentences as Truth-value Names |
|
|
62 | (11) |
|
VIa Sentences in Begriffsschrift |
|
|
62 | (2) |
|
VIb Sentences in "On Sinn and Bedeutung" |
|
|
64 | (9) |
|
PART II METAPHYSICS AND THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION |
|
|
|
3 Metaphysics and the Standard Interpretation |
|
|
73 | (42) |
|
I Frege's Logical Notion of Function |
|
|
74 | (11) |
|
Ia Familiar Function-expressions and Functions |
|
|
74 | (4) |
|
Ib Unsaturatedness and some Unfamiliar Function-names and Functions |
|
|
78 | (2) |
|
|
80 | (5) |
|
II Function and Object as Metaphysical or Ontological Categories |
|
|
85 | (30) |
|
IIa Functions and the Problem of Predication |
|
|
87 | (5) |
|
IIb Platonism and Frege: Burge's "Literal" Interpretation |
|
|
92 | (1) |
|
IIb.i What Does Frege Say about Non-spatio-temporal Entities? |
|
|
93 | (2) |
|
IIb.ii Does Frege Qualify these Remarks? |
|
|
95 | (2) |
|
IIb.iii Can There be a Literal Statement that Functions Are Atemporal? |
|
|
97 | (3) |
|
IIc What Work Does Frege's Function/Object Distinction Do? |
|
|
100 | (2) |
|
IId "Function" and "Object" in Statements of Literal Truths |
|
|
102 | (2) |
|
IIe Elucidation, its Uses and Evaluation |
|
|
104 | (5) |
|
IIf The Concept Horse Revisited |
|
|
109 | (6) |
|
PART III METATHEORY AND THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION |
|
|
|
4 Soundness, Epistemology, and Frege's Project |
|
|
115 | (55) |
|
I Logical Laws and Metatheory |
|
|
117 | (5) |
|
Ia Quine's Argument for Semantic Ascent |
|
|
117 | (2) |
|
Ib Schemata and Logical Laws |
|
|
119 | (3) |
|
II Modus Ponens, Logical Laws, and Metatheory |
|
|
122 | (13) |
|
IIa The Justification of Modus Ponens |
|
|
122 | (1) |
|
IIb Concepts as Functions; Why "is the True" Is not a Truth Predicate |
|
|
123 | (5) |
|
IIc Metalinguistic Variables |
|
|
128 | (2) |
|
IId Modus Ponens: Metatheory and Elucidation |
|
|
130 | (3) |
|
IIe Elucidation and the Justification of Modus Ponens and Basic Law I |
|
|
133 | (2) |
|
III Soundness and Frege's Epistemological Project |
|
|
135 | (29) |
|
IIIa Does Frege Need a Soundness Proof? |
|
|
135 | (2) |
|
IIIb Epistemology, Best Proof, and Generality |
|
|
137 | (6) |
|
IIIc What is Required of a Primitive Logical Law? |
|
|
143 | (4) |
|
IIId Basic Law V, Epistemology, and Semantic Proof |
|
|
147 | (7) |
|
IIIe An Alternative Epistemological-semantic Story: Analyticity as Truth by Virtue of Meaning |
|
|
154 | (4) |
|
IIIf But did Frege Give a Semantic Proof of Basic Law V? |
|
|
158 | (2) |
|
IIIg Is Basic Law V a Primitive Logical Law? |
|
|
160 | (4) |
|
IV Soundness and the New Science: Did Frege Envision a Soundness Proof? |
|
|
164 | (4) |
|
|
168 | (2) |
|
5 Reference, the Context Principle, and the Significance of Sentential Priority |
|
|
170 | (41) |
|
I Realism and Extra-linguistic Entities |
|
|
170 | (3) |
|
II The Metaphysical Requirement, the Context Principle, and the Sentential Priority View |
|
|
173 | (15) |
|
IIa Identity and the Metaphysical Requirement |
|
|
173 | (5) |
|
IIb The Context Principle and the Sentential Priority View in Foundations |
|
|
178 | (3) |
|
IIe The Sentential Priority View and Basic Laws |
|
|
181 | (4) |
|
IId §10 and the Significance of Identity Statements |
|
|
185 | (3) |
|
III §§28-31 of Basic Laws |
|
|
188 | (12) |
|
|
188 | (5) |
|
IIIb The Inductive Proof Interpretation and §29 |
|
|
193 | (2) |
|
IIIc §§28-31 and the Circularity Puzzle |
|
|
195 | (4) |
|
IIId The VR (value-range) Function-name |
|
|
199 | (1) |
|
|
200 | (11) |
|
IVa §10 and the Standard Interpretation: Three Difficulties |
|
|
200 | (2) |
|
IVb Solving the Three Difficulties of §10 |
|
|
202 | (4) |
|
IVc The Sentential Priority View, Realism, and Personal Epistemology |
|
|
206 | (5) |
|
6 The Context Principle, Sentential Priority, and the Pursuit of Truth |
|
|
211 | (28) |
|
I Changing the Subject and the Logicist Project: What makes Logicism about our Arithmetic? |
|
|
213 | (26) |
|
Ia Why Define the Number One and Concept Number? |
|
|
216 | (4) |
|
Ib Why Frege Would Reject the Apparently Obvious Faithfulness Requirement |
|
|
220 | (6) |
|
Ic What Are Frege's Actual Faithfulness Requirements? |
|
|
226 | (2) |
|
II How Does this Square with the View that the Sentences Expressing the "Well Known Properties of the Numbers" are True? |
|
|
228 | (1) |
|
IIa The Sentential Priority View Revisited |
|
|
228 | (6) |
|
IIb Methodology: Natural Language and Inquiry |
|
|
234 | (5) |
|
PART IV PUTTING FREGE'S LESSONS TO WORK |
|
|
|
7 Why Frege's Apparently Absurd View Is not Absurd at All |
|
|
239 | (31) |
|
|
239 | (8) |
|
Ia Vagueness and Deference to Experts |
|
|
240 | (3) |
|
Ib Vague Predicates, Semantics, and Empirical Investigation |
|
|
243 | (4) |
|
|
247 | (15) |
|
IIa Supervaluationism, Precisification, and the "Homophonic" Objection |
|
|
247 | (3) |
|
IIb "Obese": A Case Study |
|
|
250 | (1) |
|
IIb.i Is "Obese" a Technical Scientific Term? |
|
|
250 | (1) |
|
IIb.ii Precisification and Empirical Studies |
|
|
251 | (3) |
|
IIb.iii The Binaries Objection |
|
|
254 | (3) |
|
IIb.iv Changing the Subject---the Homophonic Objection Revisited |
|
|
257 | (5) |
|
III Explication and Vagueness as a Logical Defect |
|
|
262 | (8) |
|
8 Mathematical Knowledge and Sentential vs. Subsentential Priority |
|
|
270 | (27) |
|
I The Logical Notion of Objecthood |
|
|
271 | (5) |
|
II Metaphysical Objecthood and Subsentential vs. Sentential Priority |
|
|
276 | (8) |
|
IIa Predicates and Carving Nature at the Joints |
|
|
277 | (3) |
|
IIb Another Example: The Case Definition of AIDS |
|
|
280 | (4) |
|
|
284 | (8) |
|
IIIa Benacerraf's Problem and Subsentential Priority |
|
|
284 | (1) |
|
IIIb Frege's Realism and the Significance of Sentential Priority |
|
|
285 | (4) |
|
IIIc Sentential vs. Subsentential Priority |
|
|
289 | (3) |
|
|
292 | (5) |
Bibliography |
|
297 | (8) |
Index |
|
305 | |