Classical social choice theory relies heavily on the assumption that all individuals have fixed preference orderings. This highly original book presents a new theory of social preferences that explicitly accounts for important social phenomena such as coordination, compromise, negotiation and altruism. Drawing on cybernetics and network theory, it extends classical social choice theory by constructing a framework that allows for dynamic preferences that are modulated by the situation-dependent social influence that they exert on each other. In this way the book shows how members of a social network may modulate their preferences to account for social context. This important expansion of social choice theory will be of interest to readers in a wide variety of disciplines, including economists and political scientists concerned with choice theory as well as computer scientists and engineers working on network theory.
Drawing on cybernetics and network theory, this highly original book presents an alternative to classical social choice theory by constructing a framework that allows for dynamic preferences that are modulated by the situation-dependent social influence that they exert on each other.
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This highly original book challenges social choice theory by arguing for the importance of dynamic preferences and context in understanding important social phenomena.
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x | |
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xii | |
Preface and Acknowledgments |
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xv | |
Introduction |
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xix | |
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1 | (31) |
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1.1 Categorical Preferences |
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5 | (5) |
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1.2 Reactive vis-a-vis Responsive Models |
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10 | (7) |
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17 | (12) |
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1.3.1 Conditional Preferences |
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17 | (7) |
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24 | (5) |
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29 | (2) |
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31 | (1) |
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32 | (42) |
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2.1 Classical Aggregation |
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33 | (4) |
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2.2 Coordinated Aggregation |
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37 | (2) |
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39 | (12) |
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2.3.1 Democratic Social Choice |
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40 | (4) |
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2.3.2 An Order Isomorphism |
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44 | (1) |
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2.3.3 Operational Democracy |
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45 | (6) |
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2.4 Epistemology vis-a-vis Praxeology |
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51 | (6) |
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57 | (5) |
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58 | (1) |
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2.5.2 The Aggregation Theorem |
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59 | (3) |
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62 | (7) |
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69 | (2) |
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71 | (3) |
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74 | (22) |
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3.1 Dynamic Influence Models |
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75 | (7) |
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3.2 Closed-Loop Collaboration |
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82 | (7) |
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89 | (6) |
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3.3.1 Graphs with Sub-Cycles |
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89 | (2) |
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91 | (4) |
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95 | (1) |
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96 | (19) |
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4.1 Coordination Concepts |
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96 | (2) |
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4.2 A Mathematical Characterization of Coordination |
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98 | (10) |
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102 | (4) |
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106 | (2) |
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4.3 Coordinatability for Networks |
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108 | (5) |
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113 | (2) |
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115 | (18) |
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5.1 Social Choice with Stochastic Agents |
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116 | (6) |
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5.2 Social Choice with Randomized Preferences |
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122 | (9) |
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123 | (1) |
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5.2.2 Expected Utility on Networks |
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124 | (7) |
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131 | (2) |
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133 | (25) |
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133 | (4) |
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6.2 A Change in Perspective |
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137 | (8) |
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138 | (4) |
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142 | (3) |
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6.3 The Neo-Satisficing Model |
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145 | (11) |
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6.3.1 Single-Agent Satisficing |
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145 | (3) |
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148 | (3) |
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6.3.3 Satisficing Social Choice |
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151 | (5) |
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6.4 Satisficing Coordinatability |
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156 | (1) |
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157 | (1) |
Appendix A Dutch Book Theorem |
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158 | (5) |
Appendix B Bayesian Networks |
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163 | (6) |
Appendix C Probability Concepts |
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169 | (5) |
Appendix D Markov Convergence Theorem |
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174 | (4) |
Appendix E Entropy and Mutual Information |
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178 | (8) |
Bibliography |
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186 | (10) |
List of Authors |
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196 | (3) |
Index |
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199 | |
Wynn C. Stirling is Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, as well as Dean of Graduate Studies at Brigham Young University, Utah. He is the author of Satisficing Games and Decision Making (Cambridge, 2003) and Theory of Conditional Games (Cambridge, 2012). He is also a co-author, with Todd Moon, of Mathematical Methods and Algorithms for Signal Processing (2000).