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Theory of Social Choice on Networks: Preference, Aggregation, and Coordination [Pehme köide]

(Brigham Young University, Utah)
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 226 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 229x152x10 mm, kaal: 350 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Jan-2020
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1316616886
  • ISBN-13: 9781316616888
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 226 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 229x152x10 mm, kaal: 350 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Jan-2020
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1316616886
  • ISBN-13: 9781316616888
Teised raamatud teemal:
Classical social choice theory relies heavily on the assumption that all individuals have fixed preference orderings. This highly original book presents a new theory of social preferences that explicitly accounts for important social phenomena such as coordination, compromise, negotiation and altruism. Drawing on cybernetics and network theory, it extends classical social choice theory by constructing a framework that allows for dynamic preferences that are modulated by the situation-dependent social influence that they exert on each other. In this way the book shows how members of a social network may modulate their preferences to account for social context. This important expansion of social choice theory will be of interest to readers in a wide variety of disciplines, including economists and political scientists concerned with choice theory as well as computer scientists and engineers working on network theory.

Drawing on cybernetics and network theory, this highly original book presents an alternative to classical social choice theory by constructing a framework that allows for dynamic preferences that are modulated by the situation-dependent social influence that they exert on each other.

Muu info

This highly original book challenges social choice theory by arguing for the importance of dynamic preferences and context in understanding important social phenomena.
List of Figures
x
List of Tables
xii
Preface and Acknowledgments xv
Introduction xix
1 Preference
1(31)
1.1 Categorical Preferences
5(5)
1.2 Reactive vis-a-vis Responsive Models
10(7)
1.3 Influence Networks
17(12)
1.3.1 Conditional Preferences
17(7)
1.3.2 Social Models
24(5)
1.4 Related Research
29(2)
1.5 Summary
31(1)
2 Aggregation
32(42)
2.1 Classical Aggregation
33(4)
2.2 Coordinated Aggregation
37(2)
2.3 Social Coherence
39(12)
2.3.1 Democratic Social Choice
40(4)
2.3.2 An Order Isomorphism
44(1)
2.3.3 Operational Democracy
45(6)
2.4 Epistemology vis-a-vis Praxeology
51(6)
2.5 Coherent Aggregation
57(5)
2.5.1 Bayesian Networks
58(1)
2.5.2 The Aggregation Theorem
59(3)
2.6 Solution Concepts
62(7)
2.7 Reframing
69(2)
2.8 Summary
71(3)
3 Deliberation
74(22)
3.1 Dynamic Influence Models
75(7)
3.2 Closed-Loop Collaboration
82(7)
3.3 Non-Simple Cycles
89(6)
3.3.1 Graphs with Sub-Cycles
89(2)
3.3.2 Embedded Cycles
91(4)
3.4 Summary
95(1)
4 Coordination
96(19)
4.1 Coordination Concepts
96(2)
4.2 A Mathematical Characterization of Coordination
98(10)
4.2.1 Entropy
102(4)
4.2.2 Mutual Information
106(2)
4.3 Coordinatability for Networks
108(5)
4.4 Summary
113(2)
5 Randomization
115(18)
5.1 Social Choice with Stochastic Agents
116(6)
5.2 Social Choice with Randomized Preferences
122(9)
5.2.1 Expected Utility
123(1)
5.2.2 Expected Utility on Networks
124(7)
5.3 Summary
131(2)
6 Satisficing
133(25)
6.1 Solution Concepts
133(4)
6.2 A Change in Perspective
137(8)
6.2.1 Error Avoidance
138(4)
6.2.2 Failure Avoidance
142(3)
6.3 The Neo-Satisficing Model
145(11)
6.3.1 Single-Agent Satisficing
145(3)
6.3.2 Multiple Selves
148(3)
6.3.3 Satisficing Social Choice
151(5)
6.4 Satisficing Coordinatability
156(1)
6.5 Summary
157(1)
Appendix A Dutch Book Theorem 158(5)
Appendix B Bayesian Networks 163(6)
Appendix C Probability Concepts 169(5)
Appendix D Markov Convergence Theorem 174(4)
Appendix E Entropy and Mutual Information 178(8)
Bibliography 186(10)
List of Authors 196(3)
Index 199
Wynn C. Stirling is Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, as well as Dean of Graduate Studies at Brigham Young University, Utah. He is the author of Satisficing Games and Decision Making (Cambridge, 2003) and Theory of Conditional Games (Cambridge, 2012). He is also a co-author, with Todd Moon, of Mathematical Methods and Algorithms for Signal Processing (2000).