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Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence [Pehme köide]

(Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA)
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 158 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 270 g
  • Sari: Studies in Intelligence
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Nov-2016
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 1138942146
  • ISBN-13: 9781138942141
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  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 158 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 270 g
  • Sari: Studies in Intelligence
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Nov-2016
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 1138942146
  • ISBN-13: 9781138942141
Teised raamatud teemal:

This volume comprises a selection of essays by Prof. James Wirtz on the theory of surprise in intelligence studies.

The theory of surprise offers an explanation for why weak parties in a nascent conflict are attracted to the prospect of confronting stronger opponents with a fait accompli to achieve strategic objectives that they cannot realistically expect to achieve through attritional engagements. It also explains why stronger parties are likely to be surprised by these initiatives. It links a structural explanation for surprise (the military imbalance in a conflict diad), with differences in perceptual frameworks that create the strategic, bureaucratic and cognitive conditions for surprise to occur.

The parts of the volume explore various ramifications of the theory outlined in Chapter 1. In PART I, the theory of surprise is used to generate insights into the way various state and non-state actors utilize surprise to obtain strategic objectives. This section contains material that explores 9/11, Pearl Harbor, the Kargil crisis, and the way non-state actors rely on strategic surprise as a key operational enabler. In PART II, the theory of surprise is used to explain why deterrence failure occurs in situations where strong actors are attempting to deter weaker opponents, while also identifying policy and operationally relevant indicators of impending deterrence failure. In other words, this section expands on the theory by exploring its relevance to the theory and practice of deterrence. PART III describes various ways to minimize or block the pathways to strategic surprise and deterrence failure identified by the theory of surprise.

Bringing these previously published articles and book chapters together in a single volume, makes it possible to draw the reader's attention to the theoretical and practical connections between strategic surprise and deterrence failure, and to introduce practical techniques for avoiding strategic surprise.

This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, military studies and IR, in general.

Arvustused

'Warning of threats to the Republic before they occur is the most important of all the many intelligence duties---and the main reason why America spends a fortune each year trying to understand where dangers lurk in this complex and uncertain world. The warning responsibility places an understanding of intelligence failure directly at the heart of U.S. national security considerations. Only a handful of people in the world can address this subject with authority and deep insight; James J. Wirtz is one of them. In this gracefully written and absorbing volume, he makes a strong case for a greater synergism and integration of this nation's intelligence efforts as a means for reducing the likelihood of failure. This book is one of the "must reads" for anyone interested in intelligence and national security as we enter an era of growing nuclear threats and ongoing global terrorism.' -- Loch K. Johnson, University of Georgia, USA

'This characteristically erudite and thought-provoking volume from one of the leading figures in both Intelligence Studies and Strategic Studies is required reading for those seeking to understand, and minimise the occurrence of, strategic surprise.' -- Mark Phythian, University of Leicester, UK

'This book, a premier in the field, distinguishes itself by skillfully merging theory of strategic surprise with theory of coercion. Wirtz diagnoses the main pathologies in the art of intelligence, and offers the most innovative doctrinal solution to deal with them, for the age of uncertainty and instability. As such, the book takes theoreticians and practitioners of intelligence and strategy a quantum leap forward.' -- Dima Adamsky, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel

'In this fascinating and absorbing account Professor Wirtz masterfully explores the interconnectedness between risk, intelligence, and warning. His clear analysis and identification of the lessons of the past make this essential reading for scholars, analysts and policy-makers alike.' -- Michael S. Goodman, King's College London, UK

'Intelligence failure and surprise attacks are flip sides of the same coin, though all too frequently studied separately. In Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response, and Deterrence James J. Wirtz effectively integrates the two sides together by exploring how knowledge and power interact to improve our understanding of surprise in international affairs. In doing so, he makes a significant contribution to both intelligence studies and security studies by providing a holistic theory of surprise which explains the planning and implementation of surprise attacks as well as practical suggestions for what can be done to prevent them. Written in an easily digestible fashion, this insightful exposition of the dynamics that underlie surprise attack will provide much knowledge and insight for those interested in intelligence and security.' -- Stephen Marrin, James Madison University, USA

Preface xi
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction 1(8)
1 Theory of surprise
9(16)
PART I The theory of surprise applied
25(38)
2 Surprise at the top of the world
27(19)
3 Surprise and the non-state actor
46(10)
4 Deja vu? Comparing Pearl Harbor and 9/11
56(7)
PART II Surprise and deterrence failure
63(38)
5 The balance of power paradox
65(18)
6 Deterring the weak: problems and prospects
83(18)
PART III Avoiding surprise: toward a new intelligence doctrine
101(52)
7 Red teaming surprise
103(10)
8 Indications and warning in an age of uncertainty
113(11)
9 From combined arms to combined intelligence: philosophy, doctrine and operations
124(18)
10 Conclusion
142(11)
Index 153
James J. Wirtz is Professor and Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, and author/editor of numerous books, including, most recently, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies, 4th edition (ed., with Loch Johnson, 2015).