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Wittgenstein on Private Language, Sensation and Perception [Kõva köide]

(Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia)
Wittgenstein's critique of private language in the Philosophical Investigations does not attempt to refute the possibility of a private sensation-language, let alone in any one argument, as has often been thought. Nor does it aim to establish that language is intrinsically social. Instead, PI §§243315 presents a series of arguments, suggestions, questions, examples and thought-experiments whose purpose is to undermine the temptation to think of sensations and perceptual experiences as private objects occupying a private phenomenal space. These themes are clear developments of Wittgenstein's earlier critique of sense-datum theories (19291936) and his insight that naming is more complex than he had assumed in the Tractatus.

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This Element traces Wittgenstein's critique of private language to his 19291933 discussions of perception, sensation and phenomenal space.
1. Introduction;
2. Methodological and exegetical commitments;
3.
Privacy and the objectification of sensation and perception;
4. Private
language;
5. Solitary speakers;
6. Ontological privacy, epistemic privacy and
first-person authority;
7. Avowals;
8. The first wave: verification and
memory;
9. The second wave: ostensive definition;
10. The third wave: rules;
11. The fourth wave: stage-setting;
12. The human manometer;
13. The beetle;
14. Epilogue; Abbreviations; References.