Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Cooperative Lot Sizing Games in Supply Chains 2010 ed. [Pehme köide]

  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 167 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 590 g, 10 Illustrations, black and white; XIV, 167 p. 10 illus., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sari: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 644
  • Ilmumisaeg: 03-Sep-2010
  • Kirjastus: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
  • ISBN-10: 3642137245
  • ISBN-13: 9783642137242
  • Pehme köide
  • Hind: 48,70 €*
  • * hind on lõplik, st. muud allahindlused enam ei rakendu
  • Tavahind: 57,29 €
  • Säästad 15%
  • Raamatu kohalejõudmiseks kirjastusest kulub orienteeruvalt 2-4 nädalat
  • Kogus:
  • Lisa ostukorvi
  • Tasuta tarne
  • Tellimisaeg 2-4 nädalat
  • Lisa soovinimekirja
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 167 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 590 g, 10 Illustrations, black and white; XIV, 167 p. 10 illus., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sari: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 644
  • Ilmumisaeg: 03-Sep-2010
  • Kirjastus: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
  • ISBN-10: 3642137245
  • ISBN-13: 9783642137242
Thisbookresultsfrommyworkasaresearchassistant attheUniversitiesofFreiberg and Duisburg-Essen. Starting this research was very challenging due to the highly mathematically coined literature regarding game theoretical topics. The literature shows that cooperativegame theory is well studied from a theoretical point of view, but that ?elds of application are fairly limited up to now. Hence, the following researchquestion arose: What can be doneto make conceptsfrom cooperativegame theory more applicable to practical problems? The ?eld of supply chain management is predestined for many kinds of co- eration because companies will be more successful if they consider relationships to suppliers, customers, and/or competitors. Therefore, this work focuses on co- erations in supply networks (horizontal and vertical cooperation) concerning joint ordering and/or joint production. Problems of ordering and production for single decision makers are well studied in operations research and are used as a basis to develop cooperative models that display situations of cooperative decision making. Being one of the most essential problems in cooperations, the allocation of joint pro ts or costs is the fundamental question in cooperativegame theory and will be the basic question answered by this work as well. Inbothplacesofmy doctorialstudies,FreibergandDuisburg,I hadvaluables- port without which this work would not have been possible. First of all, I thank Alf Kimms for providingme the chance to work on this topic, his guidance,challenging discussions, and the possibility to continue my work in Duisburg.
1 Introduction
1(4)
2 Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory
5(36)
2.1 History of Game Theory
5(3)
2.2 Basics in Cooperative Game Theory
8(9)
2.2.1 A Cooperative Game
9(2)
2.2.2 Properties of Cooperative Games
11(2)
2.2.3 Variants and Fundamental Applications of the Classical Cooperative Game
13(2)
2.2.4 Interval-Valued Games
15(2)
2.3 Allocating Cooperative Costs
17(24)
2.3.1 Motivation and Classification of Allocation Methods
17(1)
2.3.2 Properties of Cost Allocations
18(2)
2.3.3 Non-Game-Theoretical Cost Allocation Methods
20(2)
2.3.4 The Core
22(4)
2.3.5 Additive Core Varints
26(3)
2.3.6 Multiplicative Core Variants
29(3)
2.3.7 The Subcoalition-Perfect Core
32(4)
2.3.8 The Interval Core
36(1)
2.3.9 The Shapley Value
37(1)
2.3.10 Conclusions
38(3)
3 Algorithmic Game Theory
41(14)
3.1 Literature
42(1)
3.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations
43(2)
3.3 Theoretical Background
45(1)
3.4 Including Fairness Criteria
46(3)
3.5 Computing Core Variants
49(2)
3.6 Computing Interval Core Elements
51(1)
3.7 Conclusions
52(3)
4 Cooperation in Supply Chains
55(8)
4.1 Horizontal versus Vertical Cooperation
56(3)
4.2 Supply Chain Games in the Literature
59(4)
5 An Economic Lot Sizing Game
63(18)
5.1 Cooperative Ordering Situations
63(2)
5.1.1 The Underlying Problem
63(2)
5.1.2 Properties of the ELS Game
65(1)
5.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the ELS Game
65(8)
5.2.1 The Row Generation Procedure
66(3)
5.2.2 A Numerical Example
69(4)
5.3 Computational Study for the ELS Game
73(6)
5.4 Extensions for the ELS Game
79(2)
6 A Lot Sizing Game with Uncertain Demand
81(6)
6.1 The Underlying Problem
81(1)
6.2 Special Phenomena of Interval Cores
82(1)
6.3 A New Definition of the Interval Core and Its Computation
83(2)
6.4 Computational Study for the Interval ELS Game
85(2)
7 A Capacitated Lot Sizing Game with Transshipments, Scarce Capacities, and Player-Dependent Cost Coefficients
87(32)
7.1 Cooperative Production Situations
87(7)
7.1.1 The Underlying Problem
87(2)
7.1.2 The CLSP Game
89(4)
7.1.3 Properties of the CL-SP Game
93(1)
7.2 Solving the Cooperative CLSP
94(7)
7.2.1 A Lagrangean Relaxation Based Heuristic
94(4)
7.2.2 A Fix-and-Optimize Heuristic
98(3)
7.3 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the CLSP Game
101(5)
7.3.1 The Row Generation Procedure
101(3)
7.3.2 Computing the Subcoalition-Perfect Core
104(2)
7.3.3 Computing the Minmax Core
106(1)
7.4 Computational Study for the CLSP Game
106(11)
7.4.1 Computational Study: Lagrangean Relaxation Based Heuristic
107(2)
7.4.2 Computational Study: Fix-and-Optimize Heuristic
109(5)
7.4.3 Computational Stydy: Subcoalition-Prefect Core
114(1)
7.4.4 Computational Study: Minmax Core
115(2)
7.5 Extensions for the CLSP Game
117(2)
8 A Multilevel Lot Sizing Game with Restricted Cooperation
119(22)
8.1 Cooperative Supply Situations
119(10)
8.1.1 The Underlying Problem
119(5)
8.1.2 Games with Restricted Cooperation
124(5)
8.1.3 Properties of the MLCLSP Game
129(1)
8.2 Computing Core Cost Allocations for the MLCLSP Game
129(7)
8.2.1 The Row Generation Procedure
130(3)
8.2.2 A Numerical Example
133(2)
8.2.3 Computing Core Variants
135(1)
8.3 Computational Stduy for the MLCLSP Game
136(5)
9 Conclusions and Future Research
141(4)
A Computational Study CLSP Game
145(6)
A.1 Computational Study: Lagrangean Relaxation Based Heuristic
145(4)
A.2 Computational Study: Fix-and-Optimize Heuristic
149(2)
B Computational Study MLCLSP Game
151(4)
Bibliography 155
Julia Drechsel worked as research assistant at the universities of Freiberg and Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2005-2009. Since 2009 she is Senior Process Specialist for Supply Chain Optimization with Bayer Technology Services.