| Foreword |
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xi | |
| Preface |
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xiii | |
| Authors |
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xv | |
| 1 What Is Cryptoeconomics? |
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1 | (16) |
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1.1 The Basics of Cryptography |
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1 | (9) |
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2 | (4) |
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6 | (1) |
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7 | (3) |
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10 | (3) |
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11 | (1) |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (4) |
| 2 Mechanisms of Consensus |
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17 | (22) |
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2.1 The Byzantine Generals Problem |
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19 | (3) |
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22 | (2) |
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2.3 PoW (Proof-of-Work) Mechanism |
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24 | (11) |
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2.3.1 Problem of PoW 1: Waste of Resources |
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26 | (2) |
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2.3.2 Problem of PoW 2: Environmental Problem |
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28 | (2) |
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2.3.3 Problem of PoW 3: Centralization of Computing Power |
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30 | (5) |
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2.4 PoS (Proof-of-Stake) Mechanism |
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35 | (1) |
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2.5 LPoS (Leased Proof-of-Stake) Mechanism |
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36 | (1) |
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2.6 DPoS (Delegated Proof-of-Stake) Mechanism |
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37 | (2) |
| 3 Optimized Consensus Mechanism |
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39 | (40) |
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3.1 Optimized Versions of PoW Mechanism |
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39 | (12) |
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3.1.1 Litecoin's SCRYPT Algorithm |
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40 | (1) |
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41 | (1) |
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3.1.3 Parallel Algorithm and Heavycoin |
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42 | (2) |
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44 | (3) |
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3.1.5 Ethash and Ethereum |
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47 | (2) |
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49 | (2) |
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51 | (19) |
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3.2.1 Byzantine General and Byzantine Fault-Tolerance Algorithm |
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51 | (2) |
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3.2.2 Algorithm for Realizing Proof-of-Stake |
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53 | (11) |
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1 Tendermint and PoS Based on BTF |
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54 | (4) |
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58 | (4) |
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62 | (2) |
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3.2.3 Trap of Proof-of-Stake |
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64 | (30) |
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1 Relations with No Interest |
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64 | (2) |
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66 | (2) |
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68 | (1) |
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69 | (1) |
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3.3 PBFT Optimized Version: Federal Byzantine Agreement (FBA) |
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70 | (6) |
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3.4 Other: Algorand Agreement |
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76 | (3) |
| 4 Game Theory and Cryptoeconomics |
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79 | (14) |
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79 | (3) |
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82 | (2) |
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84 | (1) |
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4.4 Bounded Rationality Model |
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85 | (1) |
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4.5 Game Theory Mechanism Design and Consensus Mechanism |
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86 | (1) |
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4.6 Game Theory Mechanism Design and Blockchain Security |
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87 | (3) |
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4.7 Prospect of Game Theory-Based Consensus Mechanism - Ethereum's Casper Consensus Algorithm |
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90 | (3) |
| 5 Behavioral Economics and Cryptoeconomics |
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93 | (22) |
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5.1 Behavioral Economics vs. Traditional Economics: Irrational vs. Rational |
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93 | (1) |
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5.2 Behavioral Economics in the Blockchain World |
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94 | (19) |
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5.2.1 How to Introduce Blockchain to Friends? |
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94 | (3) |
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5.2.2 Why Are You Completely Indifferent to $10,000 Bitcoin, While Some People Are Crazy for it? |
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97 | (3) |
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5.2.3 Why Do So Many Projects Like Airdrops? |
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100 | (3) |
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5.2.4 DAO Is Really the Main Form of Organization in the Future? |
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103 | (4) |
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5.2.5 How to Control Our Impulses? Maybe You Need a Smart Contract |
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107 | (4) |
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5.2.6 Dilemma of Multiple Choices: Why Do We Want to Participate in All Projects? |
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111 | (2) |
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5.3 The Intersection of Behavioral Economics and Cryptoeconomics |
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113 | (2) |
| 6 Cryptoeconomics and the Security of Blockchain |
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115 | (24) |
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116 | (4) |
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6.1.1 Cost of Sybil Attacks on Traditional and Blockchain Networks |
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118 | (2) |
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6.2 Fork: Soft Fork and Hard Fork |
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120 | (5) |
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6.2.1 Fork, Soft Fork, and Hard Fork Concepts |
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120 | (3) |
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6.2.2 Main Characteristics of Soft Fork and Hard Fork |
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123 | (1) |
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6.2.3 The Importance of Forks |
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123 | (2) |
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125 | (4) |
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6.3.1 What Is P + e Attack |
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126 | (2) |
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6.3.2 Protection from P + e Attacks |
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128 | (1) |
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129 | (4) |
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6.4.1 The Significance of The DAO Cryptoeconomics |
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131 | (2) |
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133 | (2) |
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135 | (4) |
| 7 Blockchain in China |
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139 | (14) |
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7.1 The Power of Blockchain in Real Life |
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139 | (1) |
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7.2 Real Use Cases of Blockchain in China |
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140 | (8) |
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7.2.1 Financial Solutions |
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140 | (5) |
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7.2.2 Police and Other Governmental Solutions |
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145 | (2) |
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7.2.3 Food Safety and Supply Chain |
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147 | (1) |
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7.3 Secret of Chinese Success |
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148 | (5) |
| 8 The Future of Cryptoeconomics |
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153 | (5) |
| Conclusion |
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158 | (3) |
| Index |
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161 | |
