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Handbook of Market Design [Kõva köide]

Edited by (, Associate Professor of Economics, Saïd Business School, University of Oxford), Edited by (, Professor of Economics, Stanford University and Nobel Laureate in Economics 2012), Edited by (, Associate Professor, Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv Univer)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 706 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 253x180x44 mm, kaal: 1390 g, 62 Figures, 54 Tables
  • Ilmumisaeg: 29-Aug-2013
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199570515
  • ISBN-13: 9780199570515
  • Formaat: Hardback, 706 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 253x180x44 mm, kaal: 1390 g, 62 Figures, 54 Tables
  • Ilmumisaeg: 29-Aug-2013
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199570515
  • ISBN-13: 9780199570515
Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature.

The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges

Arvustused

The breadth of innovative research on market designs should open the readers imagination to the vast possibilities in this exciting subject area. * Mark S. Rzepczynski, CFA Institute Publications *

Muu info

Winner of Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012.
List of Figures
x
List of Tables
xiii
List of Contributors
xvi
Introduction
Nir Vulkan
Alvin E. Roth
Zvika Neeman
PART I GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1 What Have We Learned From Market Design?
7(44)
Alvin E. Roth
2 Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior
51(11)
Gary E. Bolton
3 Using and Abusing Auction Theory
62(31)
Paul Klemperer
PART II CASES
Section II.A Matching Markets
4 Market Design for Kidney Exchange
93(45)
Tayfun Sonmez
M. Utku Unver
5 School Choice
138(32)
Atila Abddlkadiroolu
6 Improving Efficiency in School Choice
170(19)
Aytek Erdil
Haluk Ergin
7 Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?
189(33)
Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay
Fedor Iskhakov
Terence Johnson
Soohyung Lee
David Mcarthur
John Rust
Joel Watson
John Watson
8 Designing Markets for Ideas
222(27)
Joshua S. Gans
Scott Stern
9 Redesigning Microcredit
249(20)
Ashok Rai
Tomas Sostrom
Section II.B Auctions
10 The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods
269(13)
Paul Klemperer
11 Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions
282(17)
Robert Day
Paul Milgrom
12 Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds
299(26)
Peter Cramton
Samuel Dinkin
Robert Wilson
Section II.C E-Commerce
13 Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior
325(20)
Axel Ockenfels
Alvin E. Roth
14 Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents
345(18)
Andrew Byde
Nir Vulkan
15 The Design of Online Advertising Markets
363(16)
Benjamin Edelman
16 Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing
379(34)
Tuomas Sandholm
17 Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwidth
413(24)
Nir Vulkan
Chris Preist
Section II.D Law Design
18 A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems
437(19)
Alon Klement
Zviica Neeman
19 Legislation with Endogenous Preferences
456(33)
Aviad Heifetz
Ella Segev
Eric Talley
PART III EXPERIMENTS
20 Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction
489(66)
Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Emel Filiz-Ozbay
Nathaniel Higgins
Erkut Y. Ozbay
Andrew Stocking
21 Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment
555(18)
Martin Dupwenberg
Uri Gneezy
22 Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
573(14)
Elena Katok
23 The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill
587(22)
Uri Gneezy
Ernan Haruvy
Hadas Y-Ape
PART IV COMPETING DESIGNS
24 Competing Mechanisms
609(20)
Michael Peters
25 Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets
629(32)
Nir Vulkan
Zvika Neeman
Index 661
Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998-2012, and he now teaches at Stanford.



Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Said Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of 'The Economics of E- Commerce' (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world.



Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.