Preface |
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xv | |
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PART 1: THE NEED FOR A GUIDE |
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1 | (22) |
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2 | (21) |
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3 | (2) |
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5 | (1) |
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Reasons for the Existence of Profit |
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6 | (1) |
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Managerial Interests and the Principal-Agent Problem |
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6 | (1) |
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Demand and Supply: A First Look |
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7 | (2) |
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The Demand Side of a Market |
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9 | (2) |
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The Supply Side of a Market |
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11 | (2) |
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13 | (2) |
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15 | (1) |
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What if the Demand Curve Shifts? |
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15 | (2) |
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What if the Supply Curve Shifts? |
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17 | (2) |
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19 | (1) |
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20 | (3) |
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PART 2: THE NATURE OF MARKETS |
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23 | (70) |
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24 | (36) |
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25 | (4) |
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Industry and Firm Demand Functions |
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29 | (2) |
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The Own-Price Elasticity of Demand |
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31 | (3) |
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Point and Arc Elasticities |
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34 | (2) |
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Using the Demand Function to Calculate the Price Elasticity of Demand |
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36 | (1) |
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The Effect of Price Elasticity on the Firm's Revenue of Demand |
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37 | (1) |
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38 | (1) |
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Determinants of the Own-Price Elasticity of Demand |
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39 | (2) |
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The Strategic Use of the Price Elasticity of Demand |
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41 | (2) |
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Total Revenue, Marginal Revenue, and Price Elasticity |
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43 | (5) |
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The Income Elasticity of Demand |
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48 | (2) |
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Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand |
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50 | (2) |
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The Advertising Elasticity of Demand |
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52 | (2) |
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The Constant-Elasticity and Unitary Demand Function |
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54 | (1) |
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55 | (1) |
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56 | (4) |
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Consumer Behavior and Rational Choice |
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60 | (33) |
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61 | (2) |
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The Marginal Rate of Substitution |
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63 | (2) |
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65 | (1) |
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66 | (2) |
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The Equilibrium Market Bundle |
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68 | (3) |
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Maximizing Utility: A Closer Look |
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71 | (1) |
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71 | (3) |
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How Managers Can Strategically Influence Consumer Choices |
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74 | (5) |
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Deriving the Individual Demand Curve |
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79 | (4) |
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Deriving the Market Demand Curve |
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83 | (2) |
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85 | (3) |
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88 | (1) |
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89 | (4) |
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PART 3: PRODUCTION AND COST |
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93 | (74) |
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94 | (33) |
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The Production Function with One Variable Input |
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95 | (6) |
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The Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns |
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101 | (1) |
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The Production Function with Two Variable Inputs |
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101 | (2) |
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103 | (3) |
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The Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution |
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106 | (2) |
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The Optimal Combination of Input |
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108 | (3) |
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111 | (1) |
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111 | (4) |
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115 | (2) |
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Estimations of Production Functions |
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117 | (3) |
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120 | (1) |
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120 | (3) |
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Lagrangian Multipliers and Optimal Input Combinations |
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123 | (4) |
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127 | (40) |
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128 | (1) |
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129 | (3) |
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Average and Marginal Costs |
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132 | (7) |
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139 | (5) |
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Managerial Use of Scale of Economics |
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144 | (2) |
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Managerial Use of Scope Economics |
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146 | (2) |
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Managerial Use of Break-Even Analysis |
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148 | (2) |
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Profit Contribution Analysis |
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150 | (1) |
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151 | (1) |
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152 | (4) |
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Break-Even Analysis and Operating Leverage |
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156 | (4) |
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Measurement of Short-Run Cost Functions: The Choice of a Mathematical Form |
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160 | (7) |
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PART 4: MARKET STRUCTURE AND SIMPLE PRICING STRATEGIES |
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167 | (74) |
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168 | (30) |
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169 | (3) |
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Market Price in Perfect Competition |
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172 | (1) |
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Shifts in Supply and Demand Curves |
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173 | (1) |
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The Output Decision of a Perfectly Competitive Firm |
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174 | (4) |
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Setting the Marginal Cost Equal to the Price |
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178 | (5) |
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Another Way of Viewing the Price Equals Marginal Cost Profit-Maximizing Rule |
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183 | (3) |
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Producer Surplus in the Short Run |
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186 | (2) |
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Long-Run Equilibrium of the Firm |
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188 | (2) |
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The Long-Run Adjustment Process: A Constant-Cost Industry |
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190 | (2) |
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The Long-Run Adjustment Process: An Increasing-Cost Industry |
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192 | (2) |
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How a Perfectly Competitive Economy Allocates Resources |
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194 | (1) |
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195 | (1) |
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196 | (2) |
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Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition |
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198 | (43) |
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Pricing and Output Decisions in Monopoly |
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201 | (8) |
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209 | (2) |
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Cost-Plus Pricing at Therma-Stent |
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211 | (1) |
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Cost-Plus Pricing at Internet Companies and Government-Regulated Industries |
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212 | (1) |
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Can Cost-Plus Pricing Maximize Profit? |
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212 | (2) |
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The Multiple-Product Firm: Demand Interrelationships |
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214 | (1) |
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Pricing of Joint Products: Fixed Proportions |
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215 | (5) |
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Output of Joint Products: Variable Proportions |
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220 | (2) |
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222 | (2) |
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224 | (2) |
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Advertising Expenditures: A Simple Rule |
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226 | (2) |
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Using Graphs to Help Determine Advertising Expenditure |
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228 | (1) |
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Advertising, Price Elasticity, and Brand Equity: Evidence on Managerial Behavior |
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229 | (1) |
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230 | (2) |
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232 | (4) |
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Appendix: Allocation of Output among Plants |
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236 | (5) |
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PART 5: SOPHISTICATED MARKET PRICING |
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241 | (92) |
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The Managerial Use of Price Discrimination |
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242 | (46) |
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Motivation for Price Discrimination |
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243 | (1) |
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244 | (13) |
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Using Coupons and Rebates for Price Discrimination |
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257 | (3) |
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260 | (6) |
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266 | (11) |
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277 | (1) |
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277 | (5) |
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Two-Part Tariff with Intersecting Demands |
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282 | (6) |
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Bundling and Intrafirm Pricing |
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288 | (45) |
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The Mechanics of Bundling |
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289 | (19) |
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308 | (3) |
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Bundling as a Preemptive Entry Strategy |
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311 | (3) |
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Tying at IBM, Xerox, and Microsoft |
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314 | (3) |
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317 | (4) |
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Transfer Pricing: A Perfectly Competitive Market for the Upstream Product |
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321 | (3) |
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The Global Use of Transfer Pricing |
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324 | (3) |
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327 | (1) |
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327 | (6) |
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PART 6: THE STRATEGIC WORLD OF MANAGERS |
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333 | (96) |
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334 | (34) |
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335 | (2) |
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The Breakdown of Collusive Agreements |
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337 | (1) |
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338 | (2) |
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Possible Behavior in Markets with Few Rivals |
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340 | (16) |
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Duopolists and Price Competition with Differentiated Products |
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356 | (4) |
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The Sticky Pricing of Managers |
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360 | (1) |
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361 | (1) |
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362 | (6) |
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368 | (35) |
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Making Strategy and Game Theory |
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368 | (1) |
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369 | (2) |
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371 | (4) |
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375 | (1) |
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375 | (1) |
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376 | (4) |
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380 | (3) |
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Strategic Foresight: The Use of Backward Induction |
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383 | (5) |
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388 | (2) |
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Incomplete Information Games |
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390 | (3) |
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393 | (1) |
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394 | (4) |
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Strictly Competitive Games |
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398 | (1) |
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399 | (1) |
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400 | (3) |
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403 | (26) |
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A Short History of Auctions |
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404 | (1) |
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Types of Auction Mechanisms |
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404 | (2) |
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Auction Mechanism and Revenue Generation |
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406 | (2) |
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408 | (3) |
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411 | (5) |
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416 | (4) |
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420 | (1) |
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421 | (1) |
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422 | (2) |
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Concerns in Auction Design |
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424 | (1) |
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425 | (1) |
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425 | (4) |
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PART 7: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND INCENTIVES |
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429 | (104) |
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430 | (31) |
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431 | (3) |
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Probability Distributions and Expected Values |
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434 | (1) |
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Comparisons of Expected Profit |
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435 | (1) |
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436 | (4) |
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The Expected Value of Perfect Information |
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440 | (4) |
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Measuring Attitudes toward Risk: The Utility Approach |
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444 | (3) |
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Attitudes toward Risk: Three Types |
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447 | (2) |
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The Standard Deviation and Coefficient of Variation: Measures of Risk |
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449 | (2) |
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Adjusting the Valuation Model for Risk |
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451 | (2) |
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Certainty Equivalence and the Market for Insurance |
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453 | (3) |
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456 | (1) |
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457 | (4) |
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Principal-Agent Issues and Managerial Compensation |
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461 | (44) |
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461 | (2) |
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The Diverging Paths of Owners and Managers |
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463 | (1) |
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The Principal-Agent Situation |
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464 | (2) |
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The Effect of Risk, Information, and Compensation on Principal-Agent Issues |
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466 | (9) |
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Resolving the Incentive Conflict When Output is Risky and Effort is not Observable |
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475 | (6) |
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Some Refinements to Managerial Compensation |
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481 | (6) |
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Principal-Agent Issues in Other Contexts |
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487 | (9) |
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Product Liability and the Safety of Consumer Goods |
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496 | (4) |
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500 | (1) |
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501 | (4) |
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505 | (28) |
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The Market for ``Lemons'' |
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506 | (2) |
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Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance |
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508 | (4) |
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512 | (8) |
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Resolving Adverse Selection through Self-Selection |
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520 | (3) |
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Using Education as a Signal: Adverse Selection in the Job Market |
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523 | (3) |
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Using Warranties as Signals: Adverse Selection in the Product Market |
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526 | (3) |
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529 | (1) |
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530 | (3) |
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PART 8: GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR |
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533 | (64) |
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534 | (63) |
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Competition versus Monopoly |
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536 | (1) |
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537 | (3) |
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The Lone Star Gas Company: A Case Study |
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540 | (3) |
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Effects of Regulation and Efficiency |
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543 | (1) |
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The Concentration of Economic Power |
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543 | (6) |
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549 | (1) |
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The Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act |
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550 | (2) |
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Interpretation of the Antitrust Laws |
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552 | (2) |
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554 | (3) |
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557 | (13) |
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Government Price Ceilings and Price Floors |
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570 | (3) |
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The Welfare Impacts of Taxes |
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573 | (1) |
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Regulation of Enviornmental Pollution |
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574 | (11) |
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585 | (5) |
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590 | (2) |
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592 | (5) |
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APPENDIX A OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES |
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597 | (30) |
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597 | (1) |
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598 | (2) |
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Relationships among Total, Marginal, and Average Values |
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600 | (3) |
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The Concept of a Derivative |
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603 | (4) |
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607 | (6) |
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Using Derivatives to Solve Maximization and Minimization Problems |
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613 | (4) |
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Marginal Cost Equals Marginal Revenue and the Calculus of Optimization |
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617 | (2) |
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Partial Differentiation and the Maximization of Multivariable Functions |
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619 | (1) |
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620 | (3) |
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623 | (2) |
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Comparing Incremental Costs with Incremental Revenues |
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625 | (2) |
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APPENDIX B DISCOUNTING AND PRESENT VALUES |
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627 | (8) |
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Present Value of a Series of Payments |
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629 | (1) |
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The use of Periods Other Than a Year |
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630 | (2) |
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Determining the Internal Rate of Return |
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632 | (3) |
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APPENDIX C ANSWERS TO SELECT END-OF-CHAPTER PROBLEMS |
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635 | (24) |
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659 | (16) |
Index |
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675 | |