Klienditugi: 7440010 (E-R 10-18)

Public Law and Economics [Kõva köide]

Robert Cooter (Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law), Michael Gilbert (Vice Dean and Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law)

Formaat: Hardback, 610 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 178x254x37 mm, kaal: 1207 g
Ilmumisaeg: 09-Mar-2023
Kirjastus: Oxford University Press Inc
ISBN-10: 0197655874
ISBN-13: 9780197655870

Teised raamatud teemal:

Constitutional & administrative law - (Hetkel poes: 1 nimetust)
Political economy - (Hetkel poes: 2 nimetust)
Comparative politics

Kõva köide
Hind: 168,18 €
Raamatu kohalejõudmiseks kirjastusest kulub orienteeruvalt 2-4 nädalat
Kogus:
- - 1
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5
  - 6
  - 7
  - 8
  - 9
  - 10
Lisa ostukorvi
Tasuta tarne
Tellimisaeg 2-4 nädalat
Lisa soovinimekirja

Formaat: Hardback, 610 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 178x254x37 mm, kaal: 1207 g
Ilmumisaeg: 09-Mar-2023
Kirjastus: Oxford University Press Inc
ISBN-10: 0197655874
ISBN-13: 9780197655870

Teised raamatud teemal:

Constitutional & administrative law - (Hetkel poes: 1 nimetust)
Political economy - (Hetkel poes: 2 nimetust)
Comparative politics

Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780197655870.html

Märksõnad:

This comprehensive textbook applies economic analysis to public law. The economic analysis of law has revolutionized legal scholarship and teaching in the last half-century, but it has focused mostly on private law, business law, and criminal law. This book extends the analysis to fundamental topics in public law, such as the separation of government powers, regulation by agencies, constitutional rights, and elections. Every public law involves six fundamental processes of government: bargaining, voting, entrenching, delegating, adjudicating, and enforcing. The book devotes two chapters to each process, beginning with the economic theory and then applying the theory to a wide range of puzzles and problems in law. Each chapter concentrates on cases and legal doctrine, showing the relevance of economics to the work of lawyers and judges. Featuring lucid, accessible writing and engaging examples, the book addresses enduring topics in public law as well as modern controversies,
including gerrymandering, voter identification laws, and qualified immunity for police.

List of Figures

xvii

List of Tables

xxi

List of Boxes:
Chapter

xxiii

Acknowledgments

xxvii

1 Introduction to Public Law and Economics

(10)

I Positive Law and Economics

(2)

II Normative Law and Economics

(1)

III Interpretive Law and Economics

(1)

IV Making Economics Relevant to Public Law

(1)

V Organization of the Book

(4)

2 Theory of Bargaining

(42)

I Positive Theory of Bargaining

(14)

A Conflict versus Cooperation

(2)

B Mixed Bargains

(2)

Box: Settle or Litigate?

(1)

C Vote Trading

(1)

D Sphere of Cooperation

(1)

E Private Coase Theorem

(3)

Box: Bargaining and Norms

(1)

F Public Coase Theorem

(2)

Box: Everyday Politics?

(1)

G Coase Theorem as a Rule of Thumb versus Law of Nature

(1)

II Normative Theory of Bargaining

(5)

A Efficiency

(1)

B Representation

(1)

Box: Majority Rule and Minority Rights

(1)

C Distribution and Social Welfare

(1)

Box: Efficient Redistribution

(1)

III Bargaining Failures

(13)

A Externalities, Public Goods, and Free Riding

(2)

Box: The Prisoner's Dilemma

(2)

Box: The Articles of Confederation

(1)

B Information Asymmetry

(4)

Box: Optimism: A Menace in Court

(1)

C Monopoly

(4)

Box: Madison and the Sphere of Democracy

(1)

IV Interpretive Theory of Bargaining

(9)

A The Problem of Legislative Intent

(1)

B The Bargain Theory of Interpretation

(4)

Box: The Hierarchy of Legislative History

(1)

Conclusion

(2)

3 Bargaining Applications

(38)

I On Regulation

(11)

A Congestion and Externalities

(2)

Box: Marginal Costs and Benefits

(1)

B Regulation and Information

(1)

Box: Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Administrative State

(1)

C The Market Mechanism

(2)

Box: Collusion and Conservation

(1)

D Coase or Hobbes?

(1)

E On Liability

(1)

II Federalism

(14)

A Legal Externalities

(1)

B The Internalization Principle

(1)

C Introduction to Article I, Section 8

(4)

D Collective Action Federalism

(4)

E Commerce Revisited

(2)

Box: The Dormant Commerce Clause

(1)

III Separation of Powers

(13)

A Forms of Separated Powers

(1)

B Separation and Competition

(1)

C Checks and Balances

(2)

Box: The Line-Item Veto

(1)

D Bargaining across Branches

(2)

E Take It or Leave It

(2)

F A Cooling Saucer?

(2)

Conclusion

(2)

4 Theory of Voting

(36)

I Positive Theory of Voting

(16)

A Why Vote?

(2)

B Why Abstain?

(1)

C Representing a Voter's Preferences

(1)

D Aggregating Votes: Majority Rule

(3)

E The Median in Governing Bodies

(1)

Box: The Median Justice

(1)

F Intransitivity

100

(2)

G The Chaos Theorem

102

(2)

H Why So Much Stability?

104

(4)

I Alternative Voting Procedures

108

(2)

Box: Five Voting Rules, Five Winners

109

(1)

II Normative Theory of Voting

110

(5)

A Pareto Efficiency

111

(1)

B Social Welfare

111

(3)

C No Equilibrium

114

(1)

III Interpretive Theory of Voting

115

(12)

A Median and Bargain Democracy

115

(3)

Box: The Unbundled Executive

118

(1)

B Intentionalism and Intransitivity

119

(2)

C The Median Theory of Interpretation

121

(2)

Box: The Highest Vote Rule

123

(1)

Conclusion

124

(1)

Appendix: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

125

(2)

5 Voting Applications

127

(50)

I The Right to Vote

127

(20)

A Inclusive Voting

128

(2)

Box: Election Administration

130

(1)

B Exclusive Voting and Externalities

131

(2)

C Offsetting Errors

133

(2)

D The Optimal Political Community

135

(1)

Box: The Twenty-Sixth Amendment

136

(1)

E Voter Information

137

(1)

Box: Heuristics on the Ballot

138

(1)

F Disclosure

139

(2)

Box: Disclosure and Corruption

141

(2)

G Voter Fraud

143

(4)

II Structures of Representation

147

(18)

A The Size of Legislatures

147

(2)

B Bicameralism

149

(2)

C Plurality Rule and Proportional Representation

151

(3)

Box: Minor Parties and Stability

154

(1)

D One Person, One Vote

155

(2)

Box: One Person or One Voter?

157

(1)

E Gerrymandering

158

(4)

Box: Term Limits

162

(1)

F The Electoral College

163

(2)

III Government Competition

165

(12)

A Direct Democracy

165

(2)

B What's a Subject?

167

(4)

Box: Prescription or Description?

171

(1)

C Mobility

171

(2)

D Local Governments and Home Rule

173

(2)

Conclusion

175

(2)

6 Theory of Entrenchment

177

(36)

I Positive Theory of Entrenchment

178

(13)

A Credible Commitments

178

(3)

Box: Parchment Barriers

181

(1)

B Entrenchment and Equilibria

182

(2)

C Entrenchment and Incrementalism

184

(1)

D Generalizing from Supermajority Rule

185

(2)

Box: Unpopular Constitutionalism

187

(1)

E Entrenchment and Instability

187

(2)

Box: Amend or Convene?

189

(2)

II Normative Theory of Entrenchment

191

(15)

A Welfare and Democracy

191

(2)

B Welfare and Minorities

193

(2)

Box: Voting Externalities

195

(1)

Box: "Peculiarly Narrow" Governments

196

(1)

C Stability and Transition Costs

197

(1)

Box: The Paradox of Compensation

198

(2)

D Stability and Rationality

200

(2)

E On Optimal Entrenchment

202

(4)

III Interpretive Theory of Entrenchment

206

(7)

A On Precedent

206

(2)

B The Transitions Theory of Interpretation

208

(2)

Box: Statutory Stare Decisis

210

(1)

Conclusion

211

(2)

7 Entrenchment Applications

213

(52)

I Rights

214

(18)

A Definitions of Rights

214

(1)

B Rights and Entrenchment

215

(2)

C Transaction Costs and Rights

217

(1)

Box: Democracy and Distrust

218

(2)

D Coase versus Hobbes Revisited

220

(2)

Box: "Proportionate Interest Representation"

222

(1)

E Rights for Sale

223

(2)

F Unconstitutional Conditions

225

(2)

Box: "A Gun to the Head"

227

(1)

G Local or Universal Rights

228

(2)

H Balancing Rights

230

(2)

II Equality

232

(11)

A Discrimination by the State

233

(1)

B Tiers of Scrutiny

234

(2)

C Discrimination in a Perfect Market

236

(1)

D Discrimination in an Imperfect Market

237

(2)

E Discriminatory Signals

239

(3)

Box: Ban the Box

242

(1)

III Speech

243

(13)

A Speech and Monopoly

243

(3)

B Speech and Positive Externalities

246

(1)

C Speech and Congestion

247

(2)

D Harmful Speech

249

(3)

Box: The Captive Audience Doctrine

252

(1)

E Commercial Speech

252

(2)

F Defamation

254

(1)

Box: Fake News and the First Amendment

255

(1)

IV Constitutional Updating

256

(9)

A Updates Constrain Amendments

257

(2)

B Institutional Advantage and Constitutional Change

259

(3)

C Entrenchment and Updating

262

(1)

Conclusion

263

(2)

8 Theory of Delegation

265

(40)

I The Delegation Game

266

(16)

A Principals and Agents

266

(2)

B The Strategic Game

268

(1)

C When to Delegate

269

(1)

D How Much to Delegate

270

(2)

Box: The President's Removal Power

272

(2)

E Accountability versus Expertise

274

(1)

Box: Delegation and Courts

275

(1)

F Unilateral Oversight

276

(2)

G Multiple Principals

278

(2)

Box: The Legislative Veto

280

(2)

II Rule Game

282

(9)

A Rules, Standards, and Delegation

282

(1)

B Strategic Game

283

(2)

C When to Use Rules and Standards

285

(1)

Box: Does Vagueness Cause Litigation?

286

(1)

D Continuous Precision

287

(1)

E Drafting and Applying---Invest Now or Later?

288

(2)

Box: Vagueness or Ambiguity?

290

(1)

III Normative Analysis of Delegation

291

(6)

A Delegation as Offer or Command

291

(2)

B Externalization and Allies

293

(1)

Box: Is Your Lawyer Your Ally?

294

(1)

C Delegation and Representation

295

(2)

IV Interpretive Theory of Delegation

297

(8)

A The Canons of Construction

297

(2)

B The Delegation Canon

299

(1)

C Applying the Delegation Canon

300

(4)

Conclusion

304

(1)

9 Delegation Applications

305

(52)

I Agencies and Administrative Law

306

(13)

A The Chevron Doctrine

306

(2)

B What Do Agencies Maximize?

308

(2)

Box: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms

310

(1)

C Institutional Competence

311

(3)

D Chevron Revisited

314

(4)

Box: Entrench Chevron?

318

(1)

II Legal Limits on Delegation

319

(7)

A The Nondelegation Doctrine

319

(2)

Box: Void for Vagueness

321

(1)

B The Cost of Prohibiting Delegation

322

(1)

C Nondelegation and Representation

323

(3)

III Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and Agency Capture

326

(13)

A Subsidies and Regulations

327

(2)

Box: Professionalism or Monopoly?

329

(1)

B Lobbying

330

(2)

Box: Unions and Free Riding

332

(2)

C Lochnerism

334

(5)

IV Corruption and Campaign Finance

339

(18)

A Bribery Law

340

(1)

B Bargaining and Bribes

341

(2)

Box: "Bob's for Jobs"? Or for Bribes?

343

(2)

C Campaign Contributions

345

(3)

Box: Aggregate Corruption

348

(1)

D Independent Expenditures

349

(4)

Box: Public Financing of Elections

353

(2)

Conclusion

355

(2)

10 Theory of Adjudication

357

(58)

I Positive Theory of the Legal Process

358

(26)

A The Value of a Legal Claim

359

(3)

Box: Who Pays the Lawyers?

362

(2)

B Settlement Bargaining

364

(1)

C No Settlement

365

(4)

Box: Discovery

369

(1)

D Litigation Externalities

370

(3)

Box: Playing for the Rule

373

(1)

E Trial

374

(4)

Box: Juries and the Wisdom of the Crowd

378

(2)

F Appeal

380

(4)

II Judicial Behavior

384

(13)

A The Legal Model

384

(2)

Box: What Sustains Judicial Independence?

386

(1)

B The Attitudinal Model

387

(1)

C The Strategic Model: Separation of Powers

388

(3)

Box: Strategic Interpretation

391

(1)

D The Strategic Model: Judicial Hierarchy

392

(4)

Box: Panel Effects

396

(1)

III Normative Theory of Adjudication

397

(11)

A Accuracy in Fact-Finding

398

(2)

Box: Procedural Due Process

400

(1)

B Accuracy in Interpretation

401

(3)

C Indeterminacy and Default Rules

404

(3)

Box: Optimal Independence

407

(1)

IV Interpretive Theory of Adjudication

408

(7)

A Purposivism

409

(2)

B The Incentive Principle of Interpretation

411

(3)

Conclusion

414

(1)

11 Adjudication Applications

415

(46)

I Methods of Interpretation

416

(18)

A Text versus Intent

416

(4)

B Law and Coordination

420

(2)

Box: A High Bar for Scriveners Errors

422

(1)

Box: Finding the Common Law

423

(1)

C Communication in the Long Run

424

(3)

Box: Who Reads the Law?

427

(1)

D Transition Costs

427

(2)

E Justice and Exceptions

429

(3)

Box: Minimizing Errors, Maximizing Justice

432

(1)

F Epilogue on Interpretation

433

(1)

II Legal Doctrine

434

(15)

A Revisiting Rules versus Standards

435

(2)

B Cycles in Doctrine

437

(2)

Box: Cycles of Interpretation

439

(1)

C Prophylactic Rules

439

(4)

D On Precedent and "Slippery Slopes"

443

(3)

Box: The End Game

446

(1)

E Acquiescence to Precedent

447

(2)

III Puzzles and Paradoxes

449

(12)

A The Marks Rule

449

(4)

B The Doctrinal Paradox

453

(3)

C Intransitivity in Court

456

(3)

Box: Bargaining among Judges

459

(1)

Conclusion

460

(1)

12 Theory of Enforcement

461

(42)

I Positive Theory of Enforcement

462

(16)

A The Costs and Benefits of Lawbreaking

462

(4)

Box: Why Punish?

466

(1)

B The "Law" of Deterrence

466

(2)

C Law in Books and Law in Action

468

(3)

D Enforcement through Settlements

471

(3)

Box: Agency Costs in Enforcement

474

(1)

E Irrationality and Discounting

475

(3)

II Normative Theory of Enforcement

478

(12)

A Enforcement and Social Welfare

478

(2)

Box: Enforcement and the Rule of Law

480

(1)

B Social Welfare and Deterrence

481

(2)

C Optimal Deterrence

483

(3)

Box: The Excessive Fines Clause

486

(1)

D Fines versus Imprisonment

487

(2)

Box: Economics and Animus

489

(1)

III Interpretive Theory of Enforcement

490

(13)

A On Remedies

490

(2)

B Introduction to Contempt

492

(2)

C Economic Theory of Contempt

494

(5)

Box: A License for Crime?

499

(1)

D Contempt in Public Law

500

(2)

Conclusion

502

(1)

13 Enforcement Applications

503

(53)

I The Law of Enforcement

504

(13)

A Introduction to the Fourth Amendment

504

(3)

Box: "Shoot First and Think Later"

507

(1)

B Economic Analysis of Search

508

(4)

C Exclusion and Immunity Revisited

512

(5)

II Enforcement and Legal Design

517

(11)

A Enforcing Rules and Standards

517

(2)

B Insincere Rules

519

(5)

Box: Proxy Crimes

524

(1)

C Standards of Proof

525

(3)

III Beyond Deterrence

528

(19)

A Law as Information

528

(2)

Box: Enforcement as Information

530

(1)

B Law and Reputation

531

(2)

Box: Enforcing International Law

533

(1)

C Law and Coordination

534

(4)

Box: Coordinating against the State

538

(2)

D Re-Coordination and Corner Equilibria

540

(4)

E Preference Change

544

(3)

IV Judicial Legitimacy

547

(9)

A Defining Legitimacy

548

(1)

B The Passive Virtues

549

(2)

C Modeling Compliance

551

(3)

Box: Active Virtues

554

(2)

Conclusion

556

(1)

Index

557

Robert Cooter is the Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. He is a pioneer in the field of law and economics and has received various awards and fellowships, including the Ronald H. Coase Medal and the Humboldt Research Prize. He was a founding director of the American Law and Economics Association and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Michael Gilbert is the Vice Dean and Martha Lubin Karsh and Bruce A. Karsh Bicentennial Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, where he teaches classes on election law, legislation, and law and economics. His research applies economic theory to topics in public law, including elections, entrenchment, corruption, and constitutional rights. He is the inaugural director of UVA's Center for Public Law and Political Economy.

Public Law and Economics [Kõva köide]

Konto & seaded

Otsing

Otsingu andmebaas

Filtreeri tulemusi

Teemad Ingliskeelsed raamatud

Vali ostukorv