| Preface |
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iii | |
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xiii | |
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xv | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xvii | |
| Abbreviations |
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xix | |
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1 | (8) |
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1 | (2) |
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Overview: What Went Wrong? |
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3 | (4) |
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Organization of This Document |
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7 | (2) |
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The U.S. Quest for Technology Reciprocity |
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9 | (40) |
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9 | (2) |
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Japan's Defense Build-Up and the Concept of Burden-Sharing |
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11 | (4) |
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Developing a Legal Framework for Access to Japanese Defense Technology |
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15 | (16) |
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15 | (2) |
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New Initiatives from the Reagan Administration |
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17 | (2) |
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Japanese Resistance---And Eventual Compromise |
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19 | (5) |
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The Exchange of Notes and the Establishment of the Joint Military Technology Commission |
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24 | (3) |
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The U.S. Demands for ``Free and Automatic Flowback'' of Derived Technology |
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27 | (2) |
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Negotiating the Implementation Arrangements |
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29 | (2) |
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In Search of a Technology |
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31 | (15) |
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Of Gallium Arsenide, Integrated Circuits, and Military Radars |
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34 | (2) |
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The First TAT Visit to Japan |
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36 | (3) |
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A Brief Glimpse at Japan's New Military Radar Technologies |
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39 | (4) |
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Taking a Second Look at Japanese Defense-Related Technologies |
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43 | (2) |
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Going After the Keiko Surface-to-Air Missile |
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45 | (1) |
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Pentagon Frustration on the Eve of FS-X |
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46 | (3) |
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Japan's Postwar Quest for a National Fighter |
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49 | (24) |
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49 | (2) |
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Development of Japan's Postwar Defense Industry |
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51 | (8) |
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51 | (4) |
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Reviving the Postwar Military Aircraf Industry |
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55 | (1) |
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Fighters Versus Commercial Aircraft |
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56 | (3) |
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The Push Toward Indigenous Military Aircraft in the 1970s |
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59 | (4) |
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Inception of the Rising Sun Fighter |
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63 | (10) |
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Building the Fighter Technology Base |
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73 | (24) |
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73 | (3) |
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Learning from Licensed Production |
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76 | (5) |
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The Unique Nature of the F-15 Program |
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76 | (3) |
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Military Versus Commercial Spin-Offs from the F-15 |
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79 | (2) |
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Gaining Experience in System Integration |
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81 | (3) |
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82 | (1) |
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82 | (1) |
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83 | (1) |
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Targeting Development of Key Technologies for the Future Fighter |
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84 | (13) |
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Advanced Flight-Control Technology |
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85 | (3) |
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Composite Materials and Aircraft Structures |
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88 | (6) |
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The MELCO Active Phased-Array Radar |
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94 | (3) |
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The Battle Joined: Stopping the Rising Sun Fighter |
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97 | (32) |
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97 | (2) |
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Background: U.S. Industry Confronts a Shrinking Global Market |
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99 | (6) |
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The U.S. Government Enters the Fray |
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105 | (6) |
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Military and Strategic Reasons Behind the Pentagon's Opposition |
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106 | (1) |
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Weinberger Rejects High-Pressure Tactics |
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107 | (3) |
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Japan Stresses Its Advanced Fighter Technologies |
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110 | (1) |
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The Pentagon Proposes Modification of a U.S. Fighter |
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111 | (4) |
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Japanese Working-Level Resistance Stiffens |
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115 | (1) |
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U.S. Contractors' Initial Modification Proposals |
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116 | (4) |
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New U.S. Design Proposals Offer Extensive Modification |
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120 | (9) |
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129 | (42) |
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129 | (1) |
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Japanese Technology Unveiled |
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130 | (21) |
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The U.S. Side Regroups: Delaying the Final Japanese Decision |
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133 | (2) |
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DoD Criticizes Japanese Assumptions on Technology and R&D Costs |
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135 | (2) |
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Preparing for the Final Showdown: Linking Trade and Security Issues |
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137 | (3) |
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Updated Design Proposals to Meet Japanese Technology Requirements |
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140 | (7) |
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The Sullivan Visit: Discounting Japanese Fighter Technology |
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147 | (4) |
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Trade Frictions and the Toshiba Incident Doom an Indigenous FS-X |
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151 | (10) |
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Japan Moves to Preserve Technology Objectives on a Collaborative Program |
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154 | (2) |
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DoD's New Offensive Against Foreign Fighter Programs |
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156 | (2) |
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Elimination of the SX-4 Proposal |
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158 | (3) |
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Transforming the SX-3 to Serve Japan's Technology Objectives |
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161 | (10) |
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U.S. Acceptance of Japanese Changes to the SX-3 |
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164 | (2) |
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Japan Agrees to Cooperative Development of the SX-3 Upgrade |
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166 | (5) |
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The Struggle Over Program Control |
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171 | (34) |
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A Divided U.S. Government Confronts the Kokusanka Supporters |
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171 | (3) |
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Initial Discussions on a Program Framework |
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174 | (12) |
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Early Signs of Technology Flowback as a Central Problem |
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178 | (2) |
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Forging a Consensus Position on U.S. Negotiating Objectives |
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180 | (5) |
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Countering the Japanese Proposals |
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185 | (1) |
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Negotiating a Formal Memorandum of Understanding |
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186 | (7) |
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The Growing Problem of Technology Flowback |
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188 | (5) |
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The Conflict Over Derived Versus Indigenous Technology |
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193 | (5) |
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The Problem of U.S. Participation on Development of the Wing |
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195 | (1) |
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The Illusion of a Compromise ``Working Agreement'' |
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196 | (2) |
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198 | (4) |
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The Japanese Yield to U.S. Pressure |
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202 | (3) |
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The Storm breaks in Congress |
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205 | (34) |
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A Political-Military Agreement Attacked on Economic Grounds |
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205 | (4) |
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Origins of the Attack on the Pentagon's FS-X Agreement |
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209 | (4) |
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Production Workshare and the Two-Way Transfer of Technology |
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213 | (7) |
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Debating the Value of Access to Japanese Technology |
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215 | (5) |
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The Interagency Battle: Commerce Versus Defense |
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220 | (5) |
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Victories for the Department of Commerce |
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223 | (2) |
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Imposing New Conditions on the Japanese |
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225 | (9) |
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Clarifying U.S. Access to Japanese Technologies |
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228 | (3) |
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Japanese Frustration, Anger, and Resistance |
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231 | (3) |
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The Illusion of a Final Settlement |
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234 | (5) |
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The Showdown Over FS-X and its Aftermath |
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239 | (40) |
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239 | (3) |
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Selling FS-X Technology Benefits to Congress |
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242 | (13) |
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GAO Questions the Value of Japanese FS-X Technology |
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245 | (2) |
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Passage of the Byrd Resolution and Conditional Approval of FS-X |
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247 | (2) |
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Experts Challenge Commercial Value of F-16 Data for Japan |
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249 | (6) |
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Continuing Congressional Opposition, Growing Japanese Anger |
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255 | (6) |
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The Campaign to Override the Bush Veto of the Byrd Resolution |
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258 | (3) |
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Aftermath of the FS-X Dispute: Japan Moves to Transform FS-X |
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261 | (18) |
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261 | (1) |
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Japan's Decision to Develop the Flight-Control Computer Software |
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262 | (1) |
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The Japanese Move Toward a Unique National Wing Design |
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263 | (4) |
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Renewal of the Dispute Over U.S. Access to Wing Technology |
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267 | (3) |
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Japanese Complaints About the Transfer of F-16 Data |
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270 | (3) |
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Japanese Control over FS-X Design Formally Confirmed |
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273 | (6) |
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The Rising Sun Fighter Reborn? |
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279 | (40) |
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279 | (2) |
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Controversy Over Cost and Schedule |
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281 | (29) |
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Reports of Cost Growth and Schedule Slippage |
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282 | (1) |
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Japan Blames U.S. Government and Contractors for Cost Growth |
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283 | (2) |
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More Extensive Modifications as a Cause of Cost Growth |
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285 | (8) |
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The 1989 Debate and the Evolution of the FS-X Design |
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293 | (4) |
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The Politics of Cost Growth |
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297 | (4) |
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The Continuing Question of Cost Growth |
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301 | (3) |
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The Effects of Cost Growth on ``Quality Workshare'' |
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304 | (3) |
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Dropping the Maneuvering Canards |
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307 | (1) |
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Scaling Back Other Work Tasks to Save Costs |
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308 | (2) |
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Indigenization of FS-X Components and Related Technologies |
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310 | (9) |
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The Debate over Japanese Licensed Production of U.S. Components |
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312 | (2) |
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The U.S. Adopts a Hard-Line Position |
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314 | (1) |
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The Japanese Response: Even More Indigenous Development |
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315 | (4) |
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The First Three Years of R&D: Gaining Access to Japanese FS-X Technologies |
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319 | (38) |
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319 | (1) |
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Transferring the Wing Technology |
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320 | (9) |
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A Poor Start: The Initial Coupon-Test Failure |
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322 | (2) |
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Steady Improvement: The Integral Tank Test |
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324 | (2) |
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GAO Confirms Transfer of the Wing Data |
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326 | (3) |
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Access to the Four Japanese Avionics Systems |
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329 | (17) |
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Focus on the MELCO APA Radar |
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330 | (1) |
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U.S. Radar Specialists Visit Japan |
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331 | (1) |
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U.S. Concerns Over Technology Transfer |
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332 | (3) |
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Efforts to Interest U.S. Industry in MELCO Radar Technology |
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335 | (3) |
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Negotiating to Purchase T/R Modules for Testing in the United States |
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338 | (5) |
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The FS-X Radar Technology Symposium in Washington |
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343 | (1) |
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A Purchase Agreement for T/R Modules Is Sealed |
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344 | (2) |
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Other Nonderived Systems and the JAEI Technology Scandal |
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346 | (6) |
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The MELCO Mission Computer and Integrated Electronic Warfare System |
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346 | (1) |
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The JAEI Scandal and Its Effects on the IRS and Flight-Control Computer System |
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347 | (2) |
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Japan Reacts to U.S. Sanctions |
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349 | (3) |
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Derived Technology and the Question of Categorization |
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352 | (5) |
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An Interim Technology Balance Sheet |
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357 | (40) |
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357 | (1) |
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Transferring U.S. Technology to Japan |
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358 | (3) |
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Benefits to U.S. Industry |
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361 | (10) |
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362 | (2) |
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Flowback and Access to Japanese Technology |
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364 | (7) |
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A Technology Transfer Draw? |
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371 | (1) |
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Military R&D: Long-Term Benefits for Japan |
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372 | (17) |
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The Enduring Pentagon Goal: Stopping Indigenous Development |
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373 | (4) |
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Pentagon Goals for Cooperative Development of the FS-X |
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377 | (2) |
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An Extensive Modification Program Approaching Indigenous Development |
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379 | (8) |
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The FS-X Program Contradicts Many Original Pentagon Objectives |
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387 | (2) |
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389 | (8) |
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Benefits of Production for the United States |
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390 | (1) |
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391 | (2) |
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393 | (4) |
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397 | (32) |
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397 | (1) |
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398 | (20) |
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399 | (1) |
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The Lack of U.S. Influence over the Technological Evolution of the FS-X |
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400 | (6) |
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Japanese Military R&D Capabilities Underestimated |
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406 | (3) |
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Conflicting U.S. Policy Goals |
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409 | (5) |
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Misguided Policy on Technology Transfer and Flowback |
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414 | (4) |
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Gaining Access to Foreign Technologies |
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418 | (6) |
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Lessons Learned from FS-X |
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418 | (2) |
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The Case of the X-31 Fighter Technology Demonstrator |
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420 | (4) |
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Codevelopment Proliferates Military R&D Capabilities |
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424 | (5) |
| References |
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429 | (24) |
| Index |
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453 | |