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E-raamat: Troubled Partnership: History of US-Japan Collaboration on the FS-X Fighter

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  • ISBN-13: 9781000664638
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  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781000664638
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During World War II, Japanese fighters, such as the famed Zero, were among the most respected and feared combat aircraft in the world

During World War II, Japanese fighters, such as the famed Zero, were among the most respected and feared combat aircraft in the world. But for decades following the defeat of Japan in 1945, a variety of political and economic factors prevented Japan from developing its own modern national fighter.

This changed in the 1980s. Japan began independently developing its first world-class fighter since World War II. After several years of contentious negotiations, the Japanese agreed to work with the United States to cooperatively develop a minimally modified F-16, the FS-X. The new fighter, however, has evolved into a world-class aircraft developed largely by Japanese industry primarily due to errors committed by the U.S. side. By the fall of 1995, fifty years after the end of World War II, the Zero for the 1990s will have made its first flight, catapulting Japan into the elite ranks of nations capable of developing the most advanced weapon systems.

In Troubled Partnership, Mark Lorell traces the evolution of the FS-X, disclosing the conflicting economic and security objectives advanced by U.S. officials, the flawed U.S. policy of technology reciprocity, and the challenges of international collaboration. Its deep intimacy with the interplay of policy and economy will make this volume of intense interest to political scientists, military studies specialists, historians, and government officials.

Preface iii
Figures
xiii
Tables
xv
Acknowledgments xvii
Abbreviations xix
Introduction
1(8)
Background
1(2)
Overview: What Went Wrong?
3(4)
Organization of This Document
7(2)
The U.S. Quest for Technology Reciprocity
9(40)
Introduction
9(2)
Japan's Defense Build-Up and the Concept of Burden-Sharing
11(4)
Developing a Legal Framework for Access to Japanese Defense Technology
15(16)
Early U.S. Initiatives
15(2)
New Initiatives from the Reagan Administration
17(2)
Japanese Resistance---And Eventual Compromise
19(5)
The Exchange of Notes and the Establishment of the Joint Military Technology Commission
24(3)
The U.S. Demands for ``Free and Automatic Flowback'' of Derived Technology
27(2)
Negotiating the Implementation Arrangements
29(2)
In Search of a Technology
31(15)
Of Gallium Arsenide, Integrated Circuits, and Military Radars
34(2)
The First TAT Visit to Japan
36(3)
A Brief Glimpse at Japan's New Military Radar Technologies
39(4)
Taking a Second Look at Japanese Defense-Related Technologies
43(2)
Going After the Keiko Surface-to-Air Missile
45(1)
Pentagon Frustration on the Eve of FS-X
46(3)
Japan's Postwar Quest for a National Fighter
49(24)
Introduction
49(2)
Development of Japan's Postwar Defense Industry
51(8)
First Steps
51(4)
Reviving the Postwar Military Aircraf Industry
55(1)
Fighters Versus Commercial Aircraft
56(3)
The Push Toward Indigenous Military Aircraft in the 1970s
59(4)
Inception of the Rising Sun Fighter
63(10)
Building the Fighter Technology Base
73(24)
Introduction
73(3)
Learning from Licensed Production
76(5)
The Unique Nature of the F-15 Program
76(3)
Military Versus Commercial Spin-Offs from the F-15
79(2)
Gaining Experience in System Integration
81(3)
The F-4EJkai Fighter
82(1)
The XSH-60J Helicopter
82(1)
The T-4 Jet Trainer
83(1)
Targeting Development of Key Technologies for the Future Fighter
84(13)
Advanced Flight-Control Technology
85(3)
Composite Materials and Aircraft Structures
88(6)
The MELCO Active Phased-Array Radar
94(3)
The Battle Joined: Stopping the Rising Sun Fighter
97(32)
Introduction
97(2)
Background: U.S. Industry Confronts a Shrinking Global Market
99(6)
The U.S. Government Enters the Fray
105(6)
Military and Strategic Reasons Behind the Pentagon's Opposition
106(1)
Weinberger Rejects High-Pressure Tactics
107(3)
Japan Stresses Its Advanced Fighter Technologies
110(1)
The Pentagon Proposes Modification of a U.S. Fighter
111(4)
Japanese Working-Level Resistance Stiffens
115(1)
U.S. Contractors' Initial Modification Proposals
116(4)
New U.S. Design Proposals Offer Extensive Modification
120(9)
Collaboration Imposed
129(42)
Introduction
129(1)
Japanese Technology Unveiled
130(21)
The U.S. Side Regroups: Delaying the Final Japanese Decision
133(2)
DoD Criticizes Japanese Assumptions on Technology and R&D Costs
135(2)
Preparing for the Final Showdown: Linking Trade and Security Issues
137(3)
Updated Design Proposals to Meet Japanese Technology Requirements
140(7)
The Sullivan Visit: Discounting Japanese Fighter Technology
147(4)
Trade Frictions and the Toshiba Incident Doom an Indigenous FS-X
151(10)
Japan Moves to Preserve Technology Objectives on a Collaborative Program
154(2)
DoD's New Offensive Against Foreign Fighter Programs
156(2)
Elimination of the SX-4 Proposal
158(3)
Transforming the SX-3 to Serve Japan's Technology Objectives
161(10)
U.S. Acceptance of Japanese Changes to the SX-3
164(2)
Japan Agrees to Cooperative Development of the SX-3 Upgrade
166(5)
The Struggle Over Program Control
171(34)
A Divided U.S. Government Confronts the Kokusanka Supporters
171(3)
Initial Discussions on a Program Framework
174(12)
Early Signs of Technology Flowback as a Central Problem
178(2)
Forging a Consensus Position on U.S. Negotiating Objectives
180(5)
Countering the Japanese Proposals
185(1)
Negotiating a Formal Memorandum of Understanding
186(7)
The Growing Problem of Technology Flowback
188(5)
The Conflict Over Derived Versus Indigenous Technology
193(5)
The Problem of U.S. Participation on Development of the Wing
195(1)
The Illusion of a Compromise ``Working Agreement''
196(2)
The Japanese Backpedal
198(4)
The Japanese Yield to U.S. Pressure
202(3)
The Storm breaks in Congress
205(34)
A Political-Military Agreement Attacked on Economic Grounds
205(4)
Origins of the Attack on the Pentagon's FS-X Agreement
209(4)
Production Workshare and the Two-Way Transfer of Technology
213(7)
Debating the Value of Access to Japanese Technology
215(5)
The Interagency Battle: Commerce Versus Defense
220(5)
Victories for the Department of Commerce
223(2)
Imposing New Conditions on the Japanese
225(9)
Clarifying U.S. Access to Japanese Technologies
228(3)
Japanese Frustration, Anger, and Resistance
231(3)
The Illusion of a Final Settlement
234(5)
The Showdown Over FS-X and its Aftermath
239(40)
Introduction
239(3)
Selling FS-X Technology Benefits to Congress
242(13)
GAO Questions the Value of Japanese FS-X Technology
245(2)
Passage of the Byrd Resolution and Conditional Approval of FS-X
247(2)
Experts Challenge Commercial Value of F-16 Data for Japan
249(6)
Continuing Congressional Opposition, Growing Japanese Anger
255(6)
The Campaign to Override the Bush Veto of the Byrd Resolution
258(3)
Aftermath of the FS-X Dispute: Japan Moves to Transform FS-X
261(18)
Lingering Suspicions
261(1)
Japan's Decision to Develop the Flight-Control Computer Software
262(1)
The Japanese Move Toward a Unique National Wing Design
263(4)
Renewal of the Dispute Over U.S. Access to Wing Technology
267(3)
Japanese Complaints About the Transfer of F-16 Data
270(3)
Japanese Control over FS-X Design Formally Confirmed
273(6)
The Rising Sun Fighter Reborn?
279(40)
Introduction
279(2)
Controversy Over Cost and Schedule
281(29)
Reports of Cost Growth and Schedule Slippage
282(1)
Japan Blames U.S. Government and Contractors for Cost Growth
283(2)
More Extensive Modifications as a Cause of Cost Growth
285(8)
The 1989 Debate and the Evolution of the FS-X Design
293(4)
The Politics of Cost Growth
297(4)
The Continuing Question of Cost Growth
301(3)
The Effects of Cost Growth on ``Quality Workshare''
304(3)
Dropping the Maneuvering Canards
307(1)
Scaling Back Other Work Tasks to Save Costs
308(2)
Indigenization of FS-X Components and Related Technologies
310(9)
The Debate over Japanese Licensed Production of U.S. Components
312(2)
The U.S. Adopts a Hard-Line Position
314(1)
The Japanese Response: Even More Indigenous Development
315(4)
The First Three Years of R&D: Gaining Access to Japanese FS-X Technologies
319(38)
Introduction
319(1)
Transferring the Wing Technology
320(9)
A Poor Start: The Initial Coupon-Test Failure
322(2)
Steady Improvement: The Integral Tank Test
324(2)
GAO Confirms Transfer of the Wing Data
326(3)
Access to the Four Japanese Avionics Systems
329(17)
Focus on the MELCO APA Radar
330(1)
U.S. Radar Specialists Visit Japan
331(1)
U.S. Concerns Over Technology Transfer
332(3)
Efforts to Interest U.S. Industry in MELCO Radar Technology
335(3)
Negotiating to Purchase T/R Modules for Testing in the United States
338(5)
The FS-X Radar Technology Symposium in Washington
343(1)
A Purchase Agreement for T/R Modules Is Sealed
344(2)
Other Nonderived Systems and the JAEI Technology Scandal
346(6)
The MELCO Mission Computer and Integrated Electronic Warfare System
346(1)
The JAEI Scandal and Its Effects on the IRS and Flight-Control Computer System
347(2)
Japan Reacts to U.S. Sanctions
349(3)
Derived Technology and the Question of Categorization
352(5)
An Interim Technology Balance Sheet
357(40)
Introduction
357(1)
Transferring U.S. Technology to Japan
358(3)
Benefits to U.S. Industry
361(10)
Revenue and Jobs
362(2)
Flowback and Access to Japanese Technology
364(7)
A Technology Transfer Draw?
371(1)
Military R&D: Long-Term Benefits for Japan
372(17)
The Enduring Pentagon Goal: Stopping Indigenous Development
373(4)
Pentagon Goals for Cooperative Development of the FS-X
377(2)
An Extensive Modification Program Approaching Indigenous Development
379(8)
The FS-X Program Contradicts Many Original Pentagon Objectives
387(2)
Next Steps
389(8)
Benefits of Production for the United States
390(1)
Risks of Cancellation
391(2)
How to Do Better
393(4)
Rethinking Collaboration
397(32)
Introduction
397(1)
What Went Wrong?
398(20)
Collaboration Imposed
399(1)
The Lack of U.S. Influence over the Technological Evolution of the FS-X
400(6)
Japanese Military R&D Capabilities Underestimated
406(3)
Conflicting U.S. Policy Goals
409(5)
Misguided Policy on Technology Transfer and Flowback
414(4)
Gaining Access to Foreign Technologies
418(6)
Lessons Learned from FS-X
418(2)
The Case of the X-31 Fighter Technology Demonstrator
420(4)
Codevelopment Proliferates Military R&D Capabilities
424(5)
References 429(24)
Index 453
Mark Lorell is a senior analyst at RAND in the International Policy Department. He is the author of numerous works on aerospace collaboration and foreign research and development policies.