| Preface |
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xxi | |
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PART I THE BASICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION |
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1 | (15) |
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1.1 Two Approaches to the Study of Industrial Organization |
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3 | (4) |
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1.1.1 The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Approach |
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3 | (3) |
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1.1.2 The Chicago School Approach |
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6 | (1) |
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1.2 Static Versus Dynamic Models |
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7 | (1) |
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1.3 Theory and Empiricism |
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7 | (1) |
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1.4 Government and Industrial Organization |
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8 | (4) |
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1.4.1 The Content of the Antitrust Laws |
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8 | (3) |
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1.4.2 Enforcement Procedures |
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11 | (1) |
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1.5 The Global Economy and Industrial Organization |
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12 | (1) |
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1.6 General Approach of This Book |
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13 | (1) |
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13 | (3) |
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Chapter 2 The Firm and Its Costs |
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16 | (34) |
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2.1 The Neoclassical Firm |
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16 | (1) |
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2.2 The Theory of the Firm |
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17 | (4) |
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2.2.1 A Firm's Boundaries |
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17 | (3) |
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Application 2.1 A Chip of Its Own |
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20 | (1) |
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2.3 The Structure of Modern Firms |
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21 | (10) |
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2.3.1 Separation of Ownership and Control |
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22 | (1) |
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2.3.2 Managerial Objectives |
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22 | (1) |
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Application 2.2 Executive Compensation: Pay for Performance? |
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23 | (1) |
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Application 2.3 X-Inefficiency Goes Extreme: Putting Masseuses, Christmas Trees, Renoirs, and Monets on the Company Payroll |
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24 | (1) |
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2.3.3 Feasibility of Profit Maximization |
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25 | (1) |
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Application 2.4 How Do Firms Use Rule-of-Thumb Pricing? |
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26 | (2) |
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2.3.4 Constraints on Managers |
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28 | (1) |
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Application 2.5 Stockholder Revolt at the Happiest Place on Earth: The Disney Stockholders Versus Michael Eisner |
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28 | (3) |
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2.4 The Profit-Maximizing Output Level |
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31 | (1) |
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2.5 Cost Concepts: Single-Product Firms |
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31 | (10) |
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2.5.1 Accounting Costs Versus Economic Costs |
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31 | (1) |
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2.5.2 Short-Run Costs of Production |
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32 | (1) |
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Application 2.6 When Do Sunk Costs Matter to a Firm? |
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33 | (4) |
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2.5.3 Long-Run Costs of Production and Economies of Scale |
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37 | (2) |
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Application 2.7 A Measure of Economies of Scale |
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39 | (2) |
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2.6 Cost Concepts: Multiproduct Firms |
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41 | (3) |
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Application 2.8 A Measure of Economies of Scope |
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42 | (1) |
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Application 2.9 Are There Economies of Scope in Institutions of Higher Education? |
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43 | (1) |
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44 | (6) |
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Chapter 3 Competition and Monopoly |
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50 | (37) |
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3.1 The Economics of Perfect Competition |
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50 | (8) |
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3.1.1 The Assumptions of Perfect Competition |
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51 | (2) |
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3.1.2 The Firm's Supply Curve |
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53 | (2) |
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Application 3.1 Short-Run Losses in the Airline Industry |
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55 | (1) |
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3.1.3 The Market Supply Curve and Equilibrium |
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56 | (1) |
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3.1.4 Properties of Competitive Equilibrium |
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57 | (1) |
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3.2 Introduction to Welfare Economics |
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58 | (3) |
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Application 3.2 Consumer and Producer Surplus and the Basic Theory of the Gains from Trade |
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58 | (3) |
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3.3 The Economics of Monopoly |
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61 | (4) |
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3.3.1 The Relationship Between Marginal Revenue and Price |
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61 | (2) |
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3.3.2 Elasticities, the Degree of Market Power, and the Lerner Index |
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63 | (2) |
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65 | (5) |
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3.4.1 Measurement of the Costs of Market Power |
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66 | (1) |
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Application 3.3 Monopoly Rent-Seeking in the Pharmaceutical Industry |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (2) |
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3.5 Present Value and Discounting |
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70 | (2) |
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3.6 Antitrust Policy Toward Monopolization |
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72 | (8) |
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72 | (1) |
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Application 3.4 American Tobacco's "Attempt to Monopolize" |
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73 | (1) |
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74 | (2) |
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3.6.3 More Recent Trends in Section 2 Cases |
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76 | (3) |
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3.6.4 Section 2 in the Twenty-First Century |
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79 | (1) |
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80 | (7) |
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Chapter 4 Market Structure |
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87 | (51) |
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4.1 Concentration in Individual Markets |
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88 | (7) |
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4.1.1 Structure-Based Measures |
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88 | (1) |
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Application 4.1 Aggregate Concentration Within the United States and Globally |
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89 | (4) |
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4.1.2 Definition of the Relevant Market |
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93 | (2) |
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95 | (17) |
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4.2.1 Patterns of Entry and Exit |
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95 | (1) |
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96 | (1) |
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4.2.3 Static or Structural Barriers to Entry |
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97 | (2) |
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Application 4.2 How Do Economists Estimate Economies of Scale? |
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99 | (9) |
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Application 4.3 What Does the Evidence Say About Barriers to Entry? |
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108 | (1) |
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4.2.4 Incentives to Enter |
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109 | (1) |
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110 | (1) |
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4.2.6 The Interaction of Entry and Exit |
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111 | (1) |
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112 | (18) |
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113 | (2) |
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115 | (3) |
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Application 4.4 What's Brewing in the Beer Industry? |
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118 | (1) |
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4.3.3 The Effects of Horizontal Mergers on Competition and Welfare |
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119 | (3) |
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4.3.4 Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Mergers |
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122 | (1) |
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4.3.5 Public Policy Toward Horizontal Mergers |
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123 | (4) |
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4.3.6 Merger Guidelines and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act |
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127 | (3) |
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130 | (8) |
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Chapter 5 Monopoly Practices |
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138 | (22) |
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5.1 Dominant-Firm Price Leadership Model |
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138 | (7) |
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5.1.1 Sources of Dominance |
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139 | (1) |
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5.1.2 Pricing by a Dominant Firm |
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139 | (5) |
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Application 5.1 Banks and Credit Unions: Dominant Firms and Fringe Suppliers? |
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144 | (1) |
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5.1.3 Empirical Evidence of the Decline of Dominant-Firm Price Leaders |
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144 | (1) |
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5.2 Contestable Markets: A Check on Market Power? |
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145 | (3) |
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148 | (7) |
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5.3.1 Complementarity, Compatibility, and Standards |
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149 | (1) |
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150 | (1) |
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5.3.3 Switching Costs and Lock-In |
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151 | (1) |
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5.3.4 Significant Economies of Scale |
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151 | (1) |
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5.3.5 Math of Network Externalities |
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151 | (3) |
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5.3.6 Summary of Network Effects |
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154 | (1) |
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Application 5.2 Microsoft and Network Effects |
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154 | (1) |
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155 | (5) |
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Chapter 6 Empirical Industrial Organization |
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160 | (41) |
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6.1 Structure-Conduct-Performance |
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160 | (1) |
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6.2 Statistical Tools Used to Test the SCP Paradigm |
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161 | (5) |
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6.2.1 Exogenous and Endogenous Variables |
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166 | (1) |
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166 | (3) |
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6.3.1 Measures of Performance |
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166 | (2) |
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6.3.2 Summary of Measures of Profitability |
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168 | (1) |
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6.4 Measures of Market Structure |
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169 | (1) |
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6.4.1 Measures of Concentration |
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169 | (1) |
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169 | (1) |
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170 | (1) |
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6.5 Early Structure-Conduct-Performance Studies |
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170 | (1) |
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171 | (2) |
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6.6.1 Concentration and Profitability: Evidence from Industry-Level Studies |
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172 | (1) |
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6.6.2 Summary of Industry-Level Results |
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173 | (1) |
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6.7 Conceptual Problems with SCP Studies |
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173 | (5) |
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6.7.1 Collusion Versus Efficiency |
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173 | (2) |
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6.7.2 Assumption of Linearity |
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175 | (1) |
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6.7.3 Variations over Time |
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176 | (1) |
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6.7.4 Endogeneity Problem |
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177 | (1) |
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6.8 Prices and Concentration |
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178 | (1) |
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6.9 An Alternative Approach: Sunk Costs and Market Concentration |
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179 | (5) |
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6.9.1 Markets with Exogenous Sunk Costs |
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180 | (1) |
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6.9.2 Markets with Endogenous Sunk Costs |
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180 | (1) |
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6.9.3 Sutton's Empirical Tests |
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181 | (1) |
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Application 6.1 Applying Sutton's Theory in the Supermarket Industry |
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182 | (2) |
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6.10 The New Empirical Industrial Organization |
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184 | (10) |
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6.10.1 Structural Models that Estimate the Demand Curve and the Supply Relationship in a Market |
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185 | (6) |
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6.10.2 Additional Approaches to the New Empirical Industrial Organization |
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191 | (1) |
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6.10.3 Summary of New Empirical Industrial Organization Evidence |
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192 | (1) |
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Application 6.2 Price-Cost Margins in the RTE Cereal Industry |
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193 | (1) |
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194 | (7) |
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PART II MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: GAME THEORY AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR |
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Chapter 7 Game Theory: A Framework for Understanding Oligopolistic Behavior |
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201 | (24) |
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201 | (2) |
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7.1.1 The Information Structure of Games |
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202 | (1) |
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7.2 Simple Zero-Sum Games |
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203 | (3) |
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Application 7.1 University Rankings and Merit-Based Financial Aid as a Zero-Sum Game |
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205 | (1) |
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7.3 Prisoner's Dilemma Games |
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206 | (3) |
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Application 7.2 A Prisoner's Dilemma---Doctors and HMOs |
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208 | (1) |
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209 | (1) |
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7.5 Games of Mixed Strategies |
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210 | (3) |
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213 | (4) |
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7.6.1 Credible Versus Noncredible Threats and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria |
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215 | (1) |
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Application 7.3 Dr. Strangelove and Credible Threats Gone Wrong |
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216 | (1) |
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217 | (8) |
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Chapter 8 The Development of Theory |
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225 | (34) |
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8.1 Models Based on Quantity Determination |
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225 | (15) |
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225 | (5) |
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8.1.2 The Cournot-Nash Equilibrium |
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230 | (4) |
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8.1.3 Cournot-Nash Model with More Than Two Firms |
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234 | (1) |
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8.1.4 Examples of Cournot-Nash Pricing in Real Markets |
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235 | (3) |
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Application 8.1 Empirical Evidence of Cournot-Nash Behavior---Experimental Games with Varying Numbers of Players |
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238 | (2) |
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Application 8.2 The Paradox of Mergers in a Cournot-Nash Market |
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240 | (1) |
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8.2 The Stackelberg Model |
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240 | (7) |
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8.2.1 Firms with Identical Costs and Demand |
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241 | (2) |
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8.2.2 The Stackelberg Model: Firms with Different Costs |
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243 | (2) |
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Application 8.3 Empirical Examples of Stackelberg Equilibrium |
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245 | (2) |
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247 | (8) |
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Application 8.4 Brazil and Columbia in the Coffee Export Market |
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250 | (1) |
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Application 8.5 Bounded Rationality, Sluggish Consumers, Internet Pricing, and the Failure to Achieve Bertrand Equilibrium |
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251 | (1) |
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8.3.1 The Bertrand-Edgeworth Model with Capacity Constraints |
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252 | (3) |
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255 | (4) |
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Chapter 9 Collusion: The Great Prisoner's Dilemma |
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259 | (48) |
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9.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma Revisited |
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259 | (8) |
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Application 9.1 Tit-for-Tat in Baseball |
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261 | (5) |
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Application 9.2 A Real-World Example of "Nice" Behavior in Response to Random or "Accidental" Defections Automobiles |
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266 | (1) |
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9.2 Another Strategy for Maintaining Effective Collusion: Trigger Price Strategies |
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267 | (11) |
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9.2.1 Trigger Prices in Games with Uncertainty |
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268 | (4) |
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9.2.2 Trigger Prices in Games with Uncertain Demand |
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272 | (2) |
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9.2.3 Trigger Prices with Observable Random Changes in Demand |
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274 | (2) |
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Application 9.3 The United Kingdom Salt Duopoly |
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276 | (2) |
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9.3 Collusive Agreements as Viewed by One Firm in a Cartel |
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278 | (7) |
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9.4 Factors Affecting the Ease or Difficulty of Effective Collusion |
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285 | (6) |
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9.4.1 The Existence of Market Power |
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285 | (1) |
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9.4.2 The Costs of Reaching and Maintaining an Agreement |
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286 | (3) |
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Application 9.4 Factors Facilitating Global Cartels: Evidence from Lysine, Citric Acid, and Vitamins A and E |
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289 | (2) |
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9.5 Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion |
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291 | (9) |
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9.5.1 Public Policy Toward Direct Price-Fixing Agreements |
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293 | (1) |
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9.5.2 Price-Exchange Agreements |
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294 | (1) |
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9.5.3 Oligopolistic Behavior---Conscious Parallelism |
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295 | (2) |
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297 | (1) |
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9.5.5 Nonprofit Organizations: Cases Involving Colleges and Universities |
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298 | (2) |
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300 | (7) |
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Chapter 10 Cartels in Action |
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307 | (32) |
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10.1 Attempted Methods of Achieving Effective Collusion |
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307 | (22) |
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10.1.1 Dominant-Firm Price Leader and Benefactor |
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307 | (3) |
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310 | (5) |
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Application 10.1 A Sweet Case of Price Leadership: Dole and Del Monte in the Canned Pineapple Industry |
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315 | (1) |
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10.1.3 Most Favored Customer Clauses and "Low-Price" Guarantees |
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316 | (2) |
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Application 10.2 Most Favored Customer Clauses for Medicaid, But What About Everyone Else? |
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318 | (1) |
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10.1.4 Basing Point Pricing Systems |
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319 | (2) |
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10.1.5 Trade and Professional Associations |
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321 | (2) |
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Application 10.3 "Something Is Rotten in the State of Denmark": The Danish Government Promotes Tacit Price Fixing |
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323 | (2) |
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10.1.6 Schemes to Divide Markets |
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325 | (2) |
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327 | (2) |
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10.2 How Successful Are the Solutions? |
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329 | (4) |
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10.2.1 Excess Capacity Problems |
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329 | (1) |
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10.2.2 Encroachment of Substitute Products |
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330 | (1) |
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10.2.3 More Effective Antitrust Strategies: The Department of Justice Corporate Leniency Program |
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330 | (3) |
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333 | (6) |
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Chapter 11 Oligopoly Behavior: Entry and Pricing Strategies to Deter Entry |
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339 | (36) |
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339 | (16) |
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11.1.1 Limit Pricing with a Cost Advantage for the Monopolist Firm |
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339 | (3) |
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11.1.2 Limit Pricing in the Absence of a Cost Advantage for the Monopolist Firm |
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342 | (1) |
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11.1.3 The Critique of Game Theorists |
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343 | (5) |
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11.1.4 Limit Pricing with Asymmetric Information |
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348 | (3) |
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11.1.5 Empirical Evidence of Limit Pricing |
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351 | (3) |
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Application 11.1 Limit Pricing in the Antihistamine Market |
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354 | (1) |
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355 | (10) |
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11.2.1 Predatory Pricing with Perfect, Certain, Complete, and Symmetric Information |
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356 | (1) |
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11.2.2 Predatory Pricing with Imperfect, Certain, Incomplete, and Asymmetric Information |
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357 | (1) |
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11.2.3 The Kreps and Wilson Predatory Pricing Game |
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358 | (1) |
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11.2.4 Empirical Evidence: Predatory Pricing and Building a Tough Reputation |
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359 | (2) |
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Application 11.2 Does Wal-Mart Use Predatory Pricing? |
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361 | (2) |
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Application 11.3 Don't Mess with Bill: Netscape Versus Microsoft in the Internet Browser Market |
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363 | (2) |
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365 | (5) |
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Appendix: Details Of The Kreps And Wilson Predatory Pricing Model |
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370 | (5) |
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Chapter 12 Oligopoly Behavior: Entry and Nonpricing Strategies to Deter Entry |
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375 | (43) |
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375 | (6) |
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12.1.1 Investing in Research and Development to Lower Costs |
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379 | (1) |
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12.1.2 Empirical Evidence |
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379 | (2) |
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12.2 Raising Rivals' Costs |
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381 | (8) |
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12.2.1 Lobbying to Increase Barriers to Entry |
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383 | (1) |
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12.2.2 Increasing Advertising |
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383 | (1) |
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12.2.3 Providing Complementary Goods and Services |
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384 | (1) |
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12.2.4 Sabotaging Corporate Competitors |
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384 | (1) |
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12.2.5 Empirical Evidence on Raising Rivals' Costs |
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384 | (3) |
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Application 12.1 Detergent Wars and the Battle of Good Versus Evil: Amway v. Procter & Gamble |
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387 | (2) |
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389 | (6) |
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12.3.1 Empirical Evidence on Learning by Doing |
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390 | (4) |
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Application 12.2 Qualitative Learning by Doing in the Motion Picture Industry: The Case of the "Talkies" |
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394 | (1) |
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12.4 Product Proliferation |
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395 | (6) |
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12.4.1 Empirical Evidence on the Use of Product Proliferation |
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396 | (5) |
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12.5 Empirical Evidence on the Use of Price and Nonprice Strategies to Deter Entry |
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401 | (2) |
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403 | (7) |
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Appendix: Product Proliferation Revisited |
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410 | (8) |
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PART III BUSINESS PRACTICES |
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Chapter 13 Product Differentiation |
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418 | (37) |
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13.1 Forms of Product Differentiation |
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418 | (1) |
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13.2 Theoretical Analysis of Product Differentiation |
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419 | (9) |
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13.2.1 Product Differentiation in Spatial Models |
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420 | (8) |
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13.3 The Bertrand Model with Product Differentiation |
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428 | (2) |
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13.4 The Economics of Monopolistic Competition and the Optimal Amount of Variety |
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430 | (7) |
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13.4.1 The Welfare Benefits of Variety with Monopolistic Competition |
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432 | (4) |
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Application 13.1 "It's Not Delivery. It's DiGiorno": Monopolistic Competition in the Frozen Pizza Market |
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436 | (1) |
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13.5 Product Differentiation with Asymmetric Information |
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437 | (8) |
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437 | (3) |
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440 | (1) |
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13.5.3 Dealing with the Problems Associated with Product Differentiation, Asymmetric Information, and Adverse Selection |
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441 | (1) |
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Application 13.2 What Do the Markets for Thoroughbred Racehorses and Baseball Players Have in Common? Product Differentiation, Asymmetric Information, and Adverse Selection |
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442 | (2) |
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Application 13.3 Adverse Selection in Internet Dating, or So, If He's/She's So Great, Why Is He/She Using eHarmony to Get a Date? |
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444 | (1) |
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13.6 The Product Differentiation Advantages of First Movers |
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445 | (5) |
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450 | (5) |
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455 | (31) |
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14.1 The Social Benefits of Advertising |
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455 | (2) |
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14.2 The Social Costs of Advertising |
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457 | (5) |
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14.2.1 Advertising and Quality |
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459 | (3) |
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14.3 Advertising and Market Structure |
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462 | (11) |
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14.3.1 Welfare Effects of Advertising |
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462 | (2) |
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14.3.2 The Dorfman-Steiner Model |
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464 | (2) |
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14.3.3 Advertising and Oligopoly Behavior |
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466 | (4) |
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Application 14.1 The Variability of the Advertising-to-Sales Ratios Across Industries |
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470 | (3) |
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14.4 Advertising as a Barrier to Entry |
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473 | (2) |
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14.5 Strategic Advantages of Heavily Advertised Brands |
|
|
475 | (1) |
|
14.6 Product Differentiation and Increased Competition |
|
|
475 | (1) |
|
|
|
476 | (5) |
|
14.7.1 Traditional Studies of the Relationship between Advertising and Performance Across Industries |
|
|
476 | (3) |
|
14.7.2 New Empirical Industrial Organization Studies |
|
|
479 | (2) |
|
|
|
481 | (5) |
|
Chapter 15 Technological Change and Research and Development |
|
|
486 | (46) |
|
15.1 Schumpeter and the Process of "Creative Destruction" |
|
|
486 | (2) |
|
Application 15.1 Examples of Creative Destruction |
|
|
488 | (1) |
|
15.2 The Process of Technological Change |
|
|
488 | (1) |
|
15.3 The Relationship Between Market Structure, Firm Size, and Technological Advance |
|
|
489 | (14) |
|
15.3.1 The Impact of Oligopoly |
|
|
491 | (5) |
|
15.3.2 Dominant Firms as Fast-Second Innovators |
|
|
496 | (2) |
|
15.3.3 A Contribution of Game Theory |
|
|
498 | (2) |
|
15.3.4 The Theoretical Impact of a Patent System |
|
|
500 | (3) |
|
15.4 The Impact of Firm Size |
|
|
503 | (2) |
|
|
|
505 | (7) |
|
15.5.1 Measurement Issues |
|
|
505 | (2) |
|
15.5.2 Testing Schumpeter's Hypotheses |
|
|
507 | (5) |
|
15.6 The Economics of the Patent System |
|
|
512 | (8) |
|
15.6.1 Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Patents |
|
|
515 | (3) |
|
15.6.2 Intellectual Property Rights and Copyrights |
|
|
518 | (1) |
|
Application 15.2 Why Bother with Intellectual Property Rights? The Case of China |
|
|
518 | (2) |
|
15.7 Patents, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Law |
|
|
520 | (2) |
|
|
|
522 | (7) |
|
Appendix: Game Theory And Patent Races |
|
|
529 | (3) |
|
Chapter 16 Price Discrimination |
|
|
532 | (50) |
|
16.1 Types of Price Discrimination |
|
|
532 | (15) |
|
16.1.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination |
|
|
533 | (1) |
|
Application 16.1 Microsoft's Attempt to Use First-Degree Price Discrimination |
|
|
534 | (1) |
|
16.1.2 Second-Degree Price Discrimination |
|
|
535 | (2) |
|
Application 16.2 The Use of Coupons and Second-Degree Price Discrimination |
|
|
537 | (2) |
|
16.1.3 The Welfare Effects of Second-Degree Price Discrimination |
|
|
539 | (1) |
|
16.1.4 Third-Degree Price Discrimination |
|
|
540 | (1) |
|
16.1.5 Welfare Implications of Third-Degree Price Discrimination |
|
|
540 | (4) |
|
Application 16.3 Third-Degree Price Discrimination at Disney World |
|
|
544 | (1) |
|
Application 16.4 Combining Second-Degree and Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Broadway Theater Tickets |
|
|
545 | (2) |
|
16.2 Two-Part Tariffs, Tying, and Bundling |
|
|
547 | (12) |
|
|
|
547 | (2) |
|
16.2.2 The Welfare Effects of a Two-Part Tariff |
|
|
549 | (2) |
|
Application 16.5 Changing Pricing Strategies at Disneyland and Disney World |
|
|
551 | (1) |
|
|
|
551 | (1) |
|
|
|
552 | (5) |
|
Application 16.6 Mixed Bundling in Over-the-Counter Cold Remedies |
|
|
557 | (1) |
|
16.2.5 Requirements Tie-in Sales |
|
|
558 | (1) |
|
16.3 Distribution Effects of Price Discrimination |
|
|
559 | (1) |
|
16.4 Effect on Competition |
|
|
560 | (2) |
|
16.5 Antitrust: Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act |
|
|
562 | (10) |
|
16.5.1 Secondary-Line Cases |
|
|
563 | (5) |
|
16.5.2 Primary-Line Cases |
|
|
568 | (3) |
|
16.5.3 Illegally Induced Price Discrimination |
|
|
571 | (1) |
|
|
|
572 | (8) |
|
Appendix: The Welfare Implications Of Price Discrimination With Nonlinear Demand |
|
|
580 | (2) |
|
Chapter 17 Vertical Integration and Vertical Relationships |
|
|
582 | (46) |
|
17.1 Vertical Relationships as a Solution to Economic Problems |
|
|
582 | (4) |
|
17.1.1 The Problem of Double Marginalization |
|
|
584 | (2) |
|
17.2 Alternative Methods of Achieving Joint Profit Maximization |
|
|
586 | (8) |
|
17.2.1 The Problem of Insufficient Promotional Services |
|
|
586 | (4) |
|
Application 17.1 Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and the Value of an Upscale Pub's Amenities in Australia |
|
|
590 | (2) |
|
Application 17.2 The Welfare Effects of Exclusive Dealing in the U.S. Beer Industry |
|
|
592 | (1) |
|
17.2.2 Solving the Problem of Input Substitution |
|
|
593 | (1) |
|
17.3 The Competitive Effects of Vertical Relationships |
|
|
594 | (12) |
|
17.3.1 Resale Price Maintenance Agreements |
|
|
594 | (2) |
|
Application 17.3 Toys "R" Us as the Facilitator of Toy Manufacturer Collusion |
|
|
596 | (2) |
|
Application 17.4 Free Riding and the Internet |
|
|
598 | (3) |
|
17.3.2 Strategic Uses of Vertical Restraints and Integration |
|
|
601 | (1) |
|
17.3.3 Raising the Capital Barrier to Entry |
|
|
602 | (1) |
|
17.3.4 Collusion and Vertical Integration |
|
|
603 | (1) |
|
Application 17.5 The Possible Negative Welfare Impacts of Increasing Vertical Integration: The Case of the Southern California Gasoline Retailing Market |
|
|
604 | (1) |
|
|
|
605 | (1) |
|
17.4 Antitrust: Public Policy Toward Vertical Restraints of Trade |
|
|
606 | (12) |
|
|
|
606 | (3) |
|
17.4.2 Cases Dealing with Franchising Agreements |
|
|
609 | (1) |
|
17.4.3 Exclusive Dealing Agreements |
|
|
610 | (2) |
|
17.4.4 Territorial and Customer Restrictions |
|
|
612 | (2) |
|
17.4.5 Resale Price Maintenance Agreements |
|
|
614 | (4) |
|
|
|
618 | (6) |
|
Appendix: The Problem Of Input Substitution |
|
|
624 | (4) |
|
Chapter 18 Regulation and Deregulation |
|
|
628 | (31) |
|
18.1 The Rationale for Economic Regulation: Traditional Public Utility Regulation |
|
|
628 | (2) |
|
18.2 The Workings of American Regulation |
|
|
630 | (3) |
|
18.2.1 Setting the Permitted Rate of Return |
|
|
631 | (2) |
|
18.3 Efficiency Problems Associated with Rate of Return Regulation |
|
|
633 | (4) |
|
|
|
633 | (1) |
|
18.3.2 The Averch-Johnson Effect |
|
|
633 | (2) |
|
18.3.3 Setting the Price Structure with Decreasing Costs |
|
|
635 | (1) |
|
18.3.4 Setting the Price Structure with Increasing Costs |
|
|
636 | (1) |
|
18.4 The Spread of Regulation into Other Markets |
|
|
637 | (3) |
|
18.4.1 The Capture Theory of Regulation |
|
|
637 | (1) |
|
Application 18.1 It's More Than Peanuts |
|
|
638 | (2) |
|
18.5 The Movement from Regulation to Deregulation |
|
|
640 | (13) |
|
18.5.1 Surface Transportation |
|
|
640 | (1) |
|
18.5.2 Airline Regulation and Deregulation |
|
|
641 | (1) |
|
Application 18.2 Airline Regulation: Where Did All the Profits Go? |
|
|
642 | (3) |
|
|
|
645 | (1) |
|
Application 18.3 Electricity Restructuring: Lights Out in California? |
|
|
646 | (1) |
|
18.5.4 Natural Gas Industry |
|
|
647 | (1) |
|
|
|
648 | (5) |
|
|
|
653 | (6) |
| Glossary |
|
659 | (9) |
| Answers to Odd-Numbered Problems |
|
668 | (29) |
| Index |
|
697 | (34) |
| Credits |
|
731 | |
