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Striving for Military Stability in Europe: Negotiation, Implementation and Adaptation of the CFE Treaty [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 312 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 612 g, 18 Tables, black and white
  • Sari: Contemporary Security Studies
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Dec-2005
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0415354595
  • ISBN-13: 9780415354592
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat: Hardback, 312 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 612 g, 18 Tables, black and white
  • Sari: Contemporary Security Studies
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Dec-2005
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0415354595
  • ISBN-13: 9780415354592
Teised raamatud teemal:
This new book traces the changing relationship between Russia and NATO through the prism of conventional arms control, focusing on the negotiation, implementation and adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The author shows that arms control agreements reflect relations between parties and how the CFE Treaty codified parity between NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in November 1990. Although still widely viewed in the West as the cornerstone of security and stability in post-Cold War Europe, from the Russian perspective the treaty was soon overtaken by events. With the collapse of the WTO and the Soviet Union in 1991, it became impossible to talk of a military balance between East and West in Europe, especially as all the former WTO states opted for membership in NATO. This study details how the other state parties worked hard to adjust and adapt the treaty to meet Russian concerns about its new weakness relative to NATO, and the issues that complicated Russian acceptance of CFE limits.

This book will be of great interest to all students of NATO, European politics, international relations and strategic studies in general.
List of illustrations
ix
Preface xi
Acknowledgements xiv
Acronyms xv
PART I Background to the formal CFE negotiation
1(34)
Arms control as a barometer of European politics
3(12)
Introduction
3(2)
Cold war asymmetries
5(3)
Background to the CFE negotiation
8(7)
Negotiating the CFE mandate
15(20)
Introduction
15(1)
The issue of participation
15(3)
Defining the force categories to be limited
18(9)
Defining the area of application
27(2)
Associated measures
29(3)
The importance of Mikhail Gorbachev
32(3)
PART II Negotiating the treaty and assessing its impact
35(48)
Formal negotiations: March 1989 to November 1990
37(33)
Introduction
37(1)
NATO attitudes
37(1)
The new Soviet approach to arms control
38(2)
Seven rounds of formal negotiations
40(4)
Resolving the key issues
44(25)
Conclusion
69(1)
German singularity, nuclear modernization and the CFE-1A Agreement on personnel
70(13)
Introduction
70(1)
Nuclear modernization?
70(1)
The debate on manpower at CFE 1989-90
71(2)
The debate on German unification
73(5)
Formal CFE-1A negotiations
78(5)
PART III Ratification problems
83(36)
Resolving the discrepancies in Soviet data, 1990-91
85(13)
Introduction
85(1)
The four areas of contention
86(7)
General Moiseyev to the rescue
93(5)
The dissolution of the USSR, 1991--92
98(21)
Introduction
98(1)
The Baltic states opt out of the CFE regime
99(3)
The collapse of the USSR
102(2)
From the USSR to the CIS
104(1)
NATO's role in the reallocation of Soviet TLE
105(1)
The High Level Working Group
105(3)
A CIS Army or separate national armies?
108(5)
Entry into force
113(1)
CIS attitudes to the CFE Treaty
114(5)
PART IV Implementation
119(32)
Implementation of the CFE Treaty: the cup half full
121(13)
Introduction
121(1)
The compliance regime
121(1)
The phases of inspection
122(10)
Cascading: negative fall-out from the CFE reductions
132(2)
Implementation: the cup half empty -- non-compliance with Article V
134(17)
Introduction
134(1)
Does rebus sic stantibus apply?
134(1)
Negotiating the zones, 1989--90
135(1)
Russia requests treaty revisions
136(3)
Other Russian suggestions to solve the flank problem
139(2)
Assessing the Russian case
141(2)
Attitudes of the non-Russian state parties towards treaty revision
143(4)
Searching for a compromise
147(1)
The impact of the war in Chechnya
148(3)
PART V The need for treaty revisions
151(84)
Treaty revisions and NATO enlargement: concluding the Flank Agreement, 1995-97
153(13)
Introduction
153(1)
Russian attitudes towards NATO enlargement
153(2)
NATO's response
155(2)
Negotiations to revise the treaty
157(4)
The first CFE Review Conference
161(2)
Ratification and entry into force of the Flank Document
163(3)
Adapting the CFE Treaty to post-cold war Europe, 1997--99
166(25)
Introduction
166(1)
Background to the Russian proposals
166(1)
Negotiating the mandate for the adaptation talks
167(2)
Hopes and fears about treaty adaptation
169(4)
The opening NATO position
173(2)
The Russian position
175(1)
Closing the gap?
176(11)
Highlights of the Agreement on Adaptation
187(4)
Whither the Adapted CFE Treaty under President Putin?
191(25)
Introduction
191(1)
Putin's imperial tendency
191(14)
Russian compliance with ACFE still problematic
205(3)
Russia ratifies ACFE Treaty despite NATO enlargement
208(3)
NATO ratification awaits Russian compliance with host nation consent
211(5)
Conclusions
216(19)
Introduction
216(3)
Changes in Russia-Europe relations
219(8)
Adjusting and adapting the CFE treaty
227(2)
Confidence building aspects of the CFE regime
229(1)
Confidence eroding aspects of the CFE regime
230(2)
Conclusions
232(3)
Appendix I Parity Regained 235(3)
Appendix II Parity Lost 238(5)
Notes 243(38)
Index 281


Jane M. O. Sharp is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies in the International Policy Institute, Kings College London. She was formerly Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and from 19982003 served as the British representative on the UN Secretary Generals Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.