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1 Introduction: A Dark Side of Comparative Constitutional Law |
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1 | (22) |
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A The Rhetorical Triumph of Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism |
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3 | (8) |
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B The New Authoritarianism and Shifting Patterns of Constitutional Borrowing |
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11 | (5) |
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C The Significance of Abusive Constitutional Borrowing |
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16 | (4) |
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D The Plan of the Rest of this Book |
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20 | (3) |
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2 Democracy and Abusive Constitutional Change |
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23 | (13) |
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23 | (5) |
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B Democracy and Liberalism |
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28 | (3) |
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C The Many Forms of Abusive Constitutional Change |
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31 | (4) |
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35 | (1) |
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3 The Concept and Scope of Abusive Constitutional Borrowing |
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36 | (20) |
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A The Who and What of Abusive Constitutional Borrowing |
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37 | (3) |
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B Constitutional Comparison and Borrowing |
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40 | (2) |
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C A Typology of Constitutional Borrowing |
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42 | (3) |
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D Four Modes of Abusive Constitutional Borrowing |
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45 | (10) |
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45 | (2) |
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2 Abusive Selective Borrowing |
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47 | (2) |
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3 Abusive Acontextual Borrowing |
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49 | (2) |
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4 Abusive Anti-Purposive Borrowing |
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51 | (4) |
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55 | (1) |
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4 The Abuse of Constitutional Rights |
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56 | (25) |
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A Hate Speech and Memory Laws in Rwanda, Poland, and Russia |
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59 | (7) |
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B Voting Rights in Hungary and Fiji |
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66 | (5) |
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C Gender Rights and Quotas in Rwanda |
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71 | (3) |
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D Environmental Rights in Ecuador |
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74 | (6) |
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80 | (1) |
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5 Abusive Judicial Review: Abusive Borrowing by and of Constitutional Courts |
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81 | (35) |
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A Defining and Situating Abusive Judicial Review |
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83 | (4) |
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B Abusive Judicial Review as a Regime Strategy: The Abuse of Judicial Review |
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87 | (7) |
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C Weak and Strong Forms of Abusive Judicial Review |
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94 | (4) |
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1 Weak Abusive Judicial Review |
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94 | (2) |
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2 Strong Abusive Judicial Review |
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96 | (2) |
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D Abusive Judicial Review in Action: Two Case Studies |
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98 | (14) |
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1 Venezuela and the Suppression of the Congress |
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98 | (5) |
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2 Cambodia, Thailand, and Militant Democracy |
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103 | (9) |
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E The Limits of a Strategy of Abusive Judicial Review |
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112 | (3) |
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115 | (1) |
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6 The Abuse of Constituent Power |
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116 | (36) |
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A Constituent Power and Constitution-Making in Latin America |
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117 | (12) |
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1 Pro-Democratic Usage: Colombia (1991) |
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120 | (2) |
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2 Abusive Usages: Venezuela (1999) and Ecuador (2008) |
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122 | (3) |
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3 Abusive End Game: The Venezuelan `Constituent Assembly' of 2017 |
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125 | (4) |
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B The Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine and Presidential Re-Election in Latin America |
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129 | (12) |
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1 Democratic Hedging in Colombia |
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131 | (1) |
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2 Abusive Usage Elsewhere in Latin America |
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132 | (4) |
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3 A Constitutional Right to Re-Election: The Logic of Abusive Usage |
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136 | (5) |
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C International Supports for Constituent Power |
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141 | (10) |
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1 Unconstitutional Government Norms in Fiji |
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141 | (3) |
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2 Constitutional Identity in Eastern Europe |
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144 | (7) |
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151 | (1) |
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7 The Abusive Borrowing of Political Constitutionalism and Weak-Form Judicial Review |
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152 | (24) |
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A Political Constitutionalism and its Relatives |
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153 | (5) |
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B The Abusive Borrowing of Political Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe |
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158 | (8) |
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C Israel and the Abusive Borrowing of the New Commonwealth Model |
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166 | (8) |
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174 | (2) |
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8 Can Abusive Borrowing Be Stopped? |
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176 | (33) |
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A Monitoring and Sanctioning Abuse |
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180 | (13) |
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1 Toward Global Legal Realism |
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182 | (4) |
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2 The Design of Monitoring Institutions |
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186 | (2) |
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3 The Level of Response: Transnational Norms vs International Law |
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188 | (2) |
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4 Avoiding Anti-Imperialist Backlash and Other Pitfalls |
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190 | (3) |
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B Abuse-Proofing Liberal Democratic Norms |
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193 | (10) |
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1 Abuse as Grounds for Elimination? |
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193 | (3) |
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196 | (4) |
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3 The Problem of (Proto-) Abuse by Liberal Democratic States |
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200 | (3) |
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C Debating and Defending Liberal Democracy: Contestation and Respect for the Democratic Minimum Core |
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203 | (6) |
Index |
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209 | |