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E-raamat: Actual Consciousness

(University College London)
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  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Jul-2014
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191023859
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  • Formaat: PDF+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Jul-2014
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191023859

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What is it for you to be conscious? There is no agreement whatever in philosophy or science: it has remained a hard problem, a mystery. Is this partly or mainly owed to the existing theories not even having the same subject, not answering the same question? In Actual Consciousness, Ted Honderich sets out to supersede dualisms, objective physicalisms, abstract functionalism, general externalisms, and other positions in the debate. He argues that the theory of Actualism, right or wrong, is unprecedented, in nine ways. (1) It begins from gathered data and proceeds to an adequate initial clarification of consciousness in the primary ordinary sense. This consciousness is summed up assomething's being actual. (2) Like basic science, Actualism proceeds from this metaphorical or figurative beginning to what is wholly literal and explicit--constructed answers to the questions ofwhat is actual and what it is for it to be actual. (3) In so doing, the theory respects the differences of consciousness within perception, consciousness that is thinking in a generic sense, and consciousness that is generic wanting. (4)What is actual with your perceptual consciousness is a subjective physical world out there, very likelya room, differently real from the objective physical world, that other division ofthe physical world. (5) What it is for the myriad subjective physical worlds to be actual is for them to be subjectively physical, which is exhaustively characterized. (6) What is actual with cognitive and affective consciousness isaffirmed or valued representations. The representations being actual, which is essential to their nature, is their being differently subjectively physical from the subjective physical worlds. (7) Actualism, naturally enough when you think of it, but unlike any other existing general theory of consciousness, is thus externalist with perceptual consciousness but internalist with respect to cognitive and affective consciousness. (8) It satisfies rigorous criteria got from examination of the failures of the existing theories. In particular, it explains the role of subjectivity in thinking about consciousness, including a special subjectivity that is individuality. (9) Philosophers and scientists have regularly said that thinking about consciousness requires just giving up the old stuff and starting again. Actualism does this. Science is served by this main line philosophy, which is concentration on the logic of ordinary intelligence--clarity, consistency and validity, completeness, generality.

Arvustused

I admire Honderich's insightful self-reflective re-examination of the facts of consciousness as he perceives them . . . That Honderich's discussion of actual consciousness opens so many avenues for philosophical exploration is the measure of its success and likely long-lasting contribution to the study and understanding of consciousness. The book is highly recommended for its topic, approach and new perspectives on the challenging problem of adequately understanding consciousness in a scientific philosophy of mind. For those with minimal objection to countenancing as many actualities as there are perceiving minds, then the subjective actuality of consciousness may have found an ideal situation in Honderich's theory of actual consciousness. * Dale Jacquette, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online * Honderich's thought in Actual Consciousness is as always entirely accessible . . . For its genre this is an unusual book, not least, though engagingly, for the virtually "actual" presence of its author on every page. Honderich's checklists and their interrelations should provide themes for many seminars to come. * Alastair Hannay, Philosophy * This audacious venture should certainly be praised . . . good philosophy presses readers to think for themselves, and Actual Consciousness gives us much food for thought. * Roberta Locatelli, Times Higher Education *

Introduction xiii
1 Need for an Adequate Initial Clarification
1(16)
Questions, Common Sense Definition, Hold
1(6)
Obscurity, Pessimisms
7(2)
Adequate Initial Clarification
9(4)
Philosophy, Hope
13(4)
2 Five Leading Ideas about Consciousness
17(34)
Qualia
17(6)
Something Its Like For a Thing To Be That Thing
23(5)
Subjectivity
28(7)
Intentionality
35(8)
Phenomenality
43(8)
3 Something's Being Actual
51(34)
Retrospect and Argument
51(16)
Characteristics of Actual Consciousness: A Database
67(2)
Circularity Again? Laundry List?
69(6)
Metaphor, History, Objections, Reassurance
75(6)
The Questions about Consciousness
81(4)
4 Dualisms, Functionalisms, Consciousness-Criteria
85(32)
Dualisms
86(7)
Functionalism in General
93(5)
Abstract Functionalism
98(4)
Abstract Functionalism: The Causation Objection
102(3)
Abstract Functionalism: Four Other Objections
105(6)
Physical Functionalism
111(6)
5 Other Consciousness Theories, Criteria Again
117(32)
Non-Physical Intentionality and Supervenience, and Anomalous Monism
118(5)
Mentalism
123(6)
Naturalism
129(3)
Qualia Naturalism, Representational Naturalism
132(2)
Panpsychism, Double Aspect Theory, Neutral Monism
134(1)
Physicalisms: Papineau, Jackson, Searle, Dennett, Neuroscience, Union Theory, Higher-Order Theory, Churchlands, Quantum Theory
135(7)
Externalisms: Putnam, Burge, Noe, Clark
142(4)
Criteria etc.
146(3)
6 What Is it to Be Objectively Physical?
149(41)
The Physical World
149(2)
Definitions and Clarifications
151(2)
Physicality: Body, Not Mind
153(2)
Physicality: The Inventory and the Method of Science
155(11)
Physicality: Space and Time
166(2)
Physicality: Lawful Dependencies
168(5)
Physicality: Perception
173(4)
Objectivity: Separateness from Consciousness
177(2)
Objectivity: Public, No Privileged Access, Truth and Logic, Scientific Method Again
179(1)
Objectivity: Self, Hesitation, Continuum
180(4)
A Checklist of the Characteristics of the Objective Physical World
184(2)
Objective Physicality the Only Physicality, Chomsky on Physicality
186(4)
7 Perceptual Consciousness---What Is and What Isn't Actual
190(26)
Anticipation of Two Answers
190(3)
Qualia, Mental Paint, Representations, Content as Conceived---Not Actual
193(11)
What Is Actual
204(1)
Illusion, Hallucination, Naive Realism
205(3)
What It's Like, Self, Medium, Neural Properties, Connections, and so on---Also Not Actual
208(4)
Indicated Consciousness
212(4)
8 Perceptual Consciousness---Being Actual Is Being Subjectively Physical
216(33)
Subjective Physical Worlds---Their Physicality
217(10)
Subjective Physical Worlds---Their Subjectivity
227(3)
Checklist of the Characteristics of Subjective Physical Worlds
230(2)
Questions and Objections, A Lot
232(12)
Supervenience, Intelligible Connection, Truth
244(5)
9 Cognitive and Affective Consciousness---Theories, and What Is and What Isn't Actual
249(60)
Universal, Pure, and Other Representationism---and Another Anticipation
249(7)
Our Thinking and Wanting, and Linguistic Representations
256(3)
Linguistic Representations, A Simple Classification
259(8)
Languages of Thought
267(4)
Evolutionary Causalism
271(6)
Relationism
277(11)
Lingualism
288(6)
The Durable Truth of Some Representationism
294(2)
Conclusion: Actual Representations
296(3)
What Isn't and What Is Actual With Cognitive and Affective Consciousness?
299(5)
Dependency, Convention, Unicorns
304(2)
The Chinese Room Thought-Experiment
306(3)
10 Cognitive and Affective Consciousness---Being Actual Is Being Differently Subjectively Physical
309(17)
Actual Representations, Their Physicality
309(10)
Actual Representations, Their Subjectivity
319(4)
Subjective Physical Representations, A Checklist of Their Characteristics
323(3)
11 Conclusions Past and Present
326(43)
Actualism to Here and a Comparative Table
326(7)
Criteria: What is Actual, What Being Actual is, Reality, Difference
333(4)
Criterion: Subjectivity Including Individuality
337(6)
Criteria: Three Sides of Consciousness, Naturalism
343(3)
Criterion: Relations of Consciousness
346(3)
Pessimism?
349(8)
Hopes: Consciousness Science, Naive Realism, Freedom and Responsibility
357(6)
Actual Consciousness the Right Subject?
363(6)
Bibliography 369(24)
Index 393
Ted Honderich, Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College London, past chairman of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, and visiting professor at Yale and the CUNY Graduate Centre, came to England from Canada as a graduate student. He has lived in London for most of his life, and lectured in much of Europe and the East. His publications include The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (second edition; OUP, 2005), How Free Are You? (second edition; OUP, 2002), and The Philosophers (OUP, 1999).