Introduces advice into economic analysis and explores its impact on decision-making and the evolution of conventions of behavior. The investigation of conventions of behavior and the norms is of interest to a wide variety of academic disciplines ranging from economics to psychology, to sociology, and also philosophy.
As societies progress, old generations of social agents die and are replaced by new ones. This book explores what happens in this transition as the old guard instructs the new arrivals about the wisdom of their ways. Do new entrants listen and follow the advice of their elders or dismiss it? Is intergenerational advice welfare improving or can it be destructive? Does such advice enhance the stability of social conventions or disrupt it? Using the concept of an Intergenerational Game and the tools of game theory and experimental economics, this study delves into the process of social leaning created by intergenerational advice passed from generation to generation. This book presents a unique theoretical and empirical study of the dynamics of social conventions not offered elsewhere.
Arvustused
'This book is written by one of the leading scholars in Experimental Economics. Dozens of doctoral students have been supervised in the 'Andy Schotter School of Experimental Economics' at NYU. After graduating, they join a worldwide network that is at the forefront of research in this field. Young researchers should treat this book as ADVICE on how to pursue a fulfilling academic career in Experimental Economics.' Ariel Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University and New York University 'People usually communicate with others before making important choices. One form of communication is advice, particularly from trusted sources. A primary example is intergenerational advice, passed along from parents to children. Andrew Schotter is a pioneer regarding such advice in laboratory experiments. In this brilliant work, he describes how intergenerational advice plays out in a wide variety of environments. It is time for researchers to delve more deeply into this realm and this will help pave the way.' Gary Charness, University of California, Santa Barbara
Muu info
Introduces advice into economic analysis and explores its impact on decision-making and the evolution of conventions of behavior.
1. Introduction; Part I. Background:
2. Advice;
3. Conventions, social
learning, and Intergenerational games; Part II. Coordination, Distribution,
and Trust Conventions:
4. On the evolution of co-ordination and inequality
preserving conventions- -the battle of the sexes revisited;
5. Conventional
behavior and bargaining advice and behavior in intergenerational;
6.
Trust and trustworthiness; Part III. The Impact of Public Advice and Common
Knowledge:
7. The impact of private and public advice in the minimum effort
game;
8. Advice and common knowledge in the 2/3rd's guessing game: does
advice increase strategic sophistication; Part IV. The Value of Advice:
9.
Learning with the advice of a meddlesome boss;
10. Advice and social
learning;
11. The market for advice; Part V. Advice and Economic Mechanisms:
12. Chatting and matching;
13. School matching and learning under the
influence of intergenerational advice;
14. Conclusions.
Andrew Schotter is Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University.