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E-raamat: Aesthetic Testimony: An Optimistic Approach

Jon Robson (Assistant Professor, University of Nottingham)

Formaat: 176 pages
Ilmumisaeg: 17-Nov-2022
Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
Keel: eng
ISBN-13: 9780192677501

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Formaat: 176 pages
Ilmumisaeg: 17-Nov-2022
Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
Keel: eng
ISBN-13: 9780192677501

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Aesthetic judgements that are formed on the basis of testimony are commonly held to be defective, illegitimate, or otherwise problematic. This book assesses the debate surrounding aesthetic testimony and argues for the surprising conclusion that this widespread view is mistaken. Aesthetic testimony is in no way inferior as a source of judgement when compared to either first-hand aesthetic judgement or testimony concerning non-aesthetic matters. Alongside establishing this position (an extreme form of 'optimism' concerning aesthetic testimony), Jon Robson also responds to the most prominent arguments for the opposing view ('pessimism' concerning aesthetic testimony). Along the way, it also re-examines our understanding of the norms which govern both judgement and assertion in aesthetics.

Introduction

(12)

0.1 Testimony: Aesthetic and Otherwise

(1)

0.2 Testimony

(3)

0.3 The History of the Debate

(4)

0.4 The Purpose of This Work

(1)

0.5 Overview

(3)

1 Optimism and Pessimism

(19)

1.1 Optimism, Pessimism, and Aesthetic Judgement

(1)

1.2 The Scope of the Aesthetic

(3)

1.3 The Scope of Aesthetic Judgement

(2)

1.4 What are Optimism and Pessimism?

(2)

1.5 The Two Asymmetry Theses

(3)

1.6 Optimistic Pessimists and Pessimistic Optimists

(5)

1.7 Some Varieties of Pessimism

(2)

1.8 Some Varieties of Optimism

(2)

2 Constitutive Pessimism

(22)

2.1 A Royal Road to Pessimism?

(2)

2.2 Pessimism by Stipulation

(2)

2.3 Was Sibley a (Constitutive) Pessimist?

(2)

2.4 Non-Cognitivism and Aesthetic Judgement

(4)

2.5 Scruton, Todd, and Aesthetic Expressivism

(4)

2.6 Lopes on Aesthetic Appreciation

(4)

2.7 Appreciation Revisited

(4)

3 The Presumption of Optimism

(25)

3.1 The Burden of Proof

(1)

3.2 Pessimism and Folk Belief

(2)

3.3 Pessimism and Folk Practice

(3)

3.4 A Presumption of Optimism?

(4)

3.5 Pessimists of the World Unite

(4)

3.6 Constitutive Considerations

(3)

3.7 Objections and Replies

(2)

3.8 Beyond BP

(5)

3.9 Constitutive Optimism?

(1)

4 Pessimism and the Appeal to Cases

(20)

4.1 Pessimism and Cases

(1)

4.2 Pessimistic Intuitions

(3)

4.3 Rejecting Pessimistic Intuitions

(2)

4.4 Accommodating Pessimistic Intuitions

(2)

4.5 Unusability Pessimism and Non-Epistemic Norms

(2)

4.6 Contextualism and Expertise

(6)

4.7 Contextualist Optimism

(2)

4.8 Some Further Cases

(3)

5 Optimism and the Appeal to Cases

(20)

5.1 Pessimistic Intuitions and Optimistic Intuitions

(1)

5.2 Optimism and the Variety of Aesthetic Judgements

(2)

5.3 Rejecting Optimistic Intuitions

101

(2)

5.4 Accommodating Optimistic Intuitions

103

(2)

5.5 Optimistic Practices

105

(3)

5.6 The Unusability Account

108

(3)

5.7 Weighing Things up

111

(2)

5.8 Defending my Account

113

(6)

6 Pessimism, Assertion, and Signalling

119

(18)

6.1 Aesthetics and Assertion

119

(1)

6.2 Norms of Assertion

120

(3)

6.3 The Argument from Assertion

123

(1)

6.4 The Appreciative Signalling Account

124

(4)

6.5 Some Initial Objections

128

(2)

6.6 A Further Worry

130

(2)

6.7 Analogues to the Aesthetic Signalling Account

132

(5)

7 The Debate Concerning Assertion

137

(18)

7.1 The State of the Dialectic

137

(1)

7.2 Epistemic Explanations and Pragmatic Explanations

138

(3)

7.3 A Wider Range of Cases

141

(3)

7.4 A Gustatory Analogy

144

(4)

7.5 Summing up

148

(1)

7.6 A Third Contender

149

(3)

7.7 Where to Now?

152

(3)

Bibliography

155

(10)

Index

165

Jon Robson received his PhD, examining the ethical implications of metaphysical theories of time and modality, from the University of Leeds. He is currently Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, where his main research interests are in aesthetics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion.

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