Notes on Contributors |
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xiii | |
Foreword |
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xxi | |
Preface |
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xxvii | |
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1 Agent-Based Modeling and Tax Evasion: Theory and Application |
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3 | (34) |
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3 | (1) |
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1.2 Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax Noncompliance |
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4 | (1) |
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1.3 Standard Theories of Tax Evasion |
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5 | (5) |
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10 | (1) |
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1.5 Standard Protocols to Describe Agent-Based Models |
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11 | (7) |
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1.5.1 The Overview, Design Concepts, Details, and Decision-Making Protocol |
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13 | (4) |
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1.5.2 Concluding Remarks on the ODD+D Protocol |
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17 | (1) |
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1.6 Literature Review of Agent-Based Tax Evasion Models |
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18 | (9) |
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1.6.1 Public Goods, Governmental Tasks and Back Auditing |
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22 | (3) |
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7.6.2 Replication, Docking, and Calibration Studies |
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25 | (1) |
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1.6.3 Concluding Remarks on Agent-Based Tax Evasion Models |
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26 | (1) |
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1.7 Outlook: The Structure and Presentation of the Book |
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27 | (10) |
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1.7.1 Part I Introduction |
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28 | (1) |
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7.7.2 Part II Agent-Based Tax Evasion Models |
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28 | (3) |
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31 | (6) |
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2 How Should One Study Clandestine Activities: Crimes, Tax Fraud, and Other "Dark" Economic Behavior? |
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37 | (22) |
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37 | (1) |
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2.2 Why Study Clandestine Behavior At All? |
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38 | (2) |
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2.3 Tools for Studying Clandestine Activities |
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40 | (2) |
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2.4 Networks and the Complexity of Clandestine Interactions |
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42 | (3) |
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45 | (3) |
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2.6 Research Tools and Clandestine Activities |
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48 | (7) |
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55 | (4) |
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56 | (1) |
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56 | (3) |
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3 Taxpayer's Behavior: From the Laboratory to Agent-Based Simulations |
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59 | (32) |
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3.1 Tax Compliance: Theory and Evidence |
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59 | (3) |
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3.2 Research on Tax Compliance: A Methodological Analysis |
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62 | (6) |
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3.3 From Human-Subject to Computational-Agent Experiments |
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68 | (5) |
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3.4 An Agent-Based Approach to Taxpayers' Behavior |
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73 | (10) |
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3.4.1 The Macroeconomic Approach |
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74 | (3) |
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3.4.2 The Microeconomic Approach |
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77 | (69) |
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3.4.3 Micro-Level Dynamics for Macro-Level Interactions among Behavioral Types |
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80 | (3) |
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83 | (8) |
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84 | (7) |
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Part II AGENT-BASED TAX EVASION MODELS |
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4 Using Agent-Based Modeling to Analyze Tax Compliance and Auditing |
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91 | (34) |
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91 | (2) |
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4.2 Agent-Based Model for Tax Compliance and Audit Research |
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93 | (5) |
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93 | (1) |
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94 | (4) |
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98 | (1) |
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4.3 Modeling Individual Compliance |
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98 | (8) |
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98 | (3) |
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101 | (1) |
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4.3.3 Psychic Costs and Social Customs |
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102 | (4) |
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4.4 Risk-Taking and Income Distribution |
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106 | (5) |
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4.5 Attitudes, Beliefs, and Network Effects |
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111 | (4) |
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4.5.1 Networks and Meetings |
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113 | (1) |
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4.5.2 Formation of Beliefs |
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113 | (2) |
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4.6 Equilibrium with Random and Targeted Audits |
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115 | (4) |
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119 | (6) |
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122 | (1) |
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122 | (1) |
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123 | (2) |
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5 SIMULFIS: A Simulation Tool to Explore Tax Compliance Behavior |
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125 | (28) |
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Francisco J. Miguel Quesada |
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125 | (1) |
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126 | (19) |
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127 | (1) |
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5.2.2 Entities, State Variables, and Scales |
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127 | (4) |
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5.2.3 Process Overview and Scheduling |
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131 | (1) |
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5.2.4 Theoretical and Empirical Background |
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131 | (1) |
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5.2.5 Individual Decision Making |
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132 | (3) |
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135 | (1) |
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136 | (1) |
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5.2.8 Individual Prediction |
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136 | (1) |
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137 | (1) |
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137 | (1) |
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138 | (1) |
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138 | (1) |
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139 | (1) |
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5.2.14 Implementation Details |
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140 | (1) |
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140 | (1) |
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141 | (1) |
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141 | (4) |
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5.3 Some Experimental Results and Conclusions |
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145 | (8) |
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148 | (1) |
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148 | (5) |
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6 TAXSIM: A Generative Model to Study the Emerging Levels of Tax Compliance in a Single Market Sector |
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153 | (46) |
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153 | (2) |
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155 | (20) |
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155 | (10) |
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165 | (7) |
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6.2.3 Observation and Emergence |
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172 | (1) |
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173 | (2) |
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175 | (19) |
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175 | (7) |
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6.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis |
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182 | (8) |
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6.3.3 Adaptive Audit Strategy |
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190 | (2) |
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6.3.4 Minimum Wage Policies |
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192 | (2) |
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194 | (5) |
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196 | (1) |
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196 | (3) |
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7 Development and Calibration of a Large-Scale Agent-Based Model of Individual Tax Reporting Compliance |
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199 | (26) |
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199 | (12) |
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201 | (1) |
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202 | (2) |
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204 | (3) |
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7.7.4 Taxpayer Reporting Behavior |
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207 | (2) |
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7.7.5 Filer Behavioral Response to Tax Audit |
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209 | (1) |
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210 | (1) |
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7.2 Model Validation and Calibration |
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211 | (3) |
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7.3 Hypothetical Simulation: Size of the "Gig" Economy and Taxpayer Compliance |
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214 | (2) |
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7.4 Conclusion and Future Research |
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216 | (2) |
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216 | (1) |
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217 | (1) |
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Appendix 7A Overview, Design Concepts, and Details (ODD) |
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218 | (1) |
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218 | (1) |
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7A.2 Entities, State Variables, and Scales |
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218 | (1) |
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7A.3 Process Overview and Scheduling |
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219 | (1) |
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219 | (4) |
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219 | (1) |
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220 | (1) |
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220 | (1) |
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220 | (1) |
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220 | (1) |
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221 | (1) |
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221 | (1) |
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221 | (1) |
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221 | (1) |
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222 | (1) |
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222 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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224 | (1) |
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8 Investigating the Effects of Network Structures in Massive Agent-Based Models of Tax Evasion |
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225 | (30) |
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225 | (1) |
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226 | (4) |
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230 | (11) |
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230 | (2) |
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232 | (5) |
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237 | (4) |
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241 | (1) |
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241 | (10) |
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243 | (3) |
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8.5.2 Distributing the Model on a Cluster Computer |
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246 | (5) |
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251 | (4) |
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251 | (4) |
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9 Agent-Based Simulations of Tax Evasion: Dynamics by Lapse of Time, Social Norms, Age Heterogeneity, Subjective Audit Probability, Public Goods Provision, and Pareto-Optimality |
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255 | (34) |
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255 | (2) |
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9.2 The Agent-Based Tax Evasion Model |
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257 | (12) |
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9.2.1 Overview of the Model |
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257 | (7) |
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264 | (4) |
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268 | (1) |
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9.3 Scenarios, Simulation Results, and Discussion |
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269 | (15) |
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9.3.1 Age Heterogeneity and Social Norm Updating |
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269 | (5) |
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9.3.2 Public Goods Provision and Pareto-optimality |
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274 | (3) |
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9.3.3 The Allingham-and-Sandmo Approach Reconsidered |
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277 | (4) |
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9.3.4 Calibration and Sensitivity Analysis |
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281 | (3) |
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9.4 Conclusions and Outlook |
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284 | (5) |
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285 | (1) |
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285 | (2) |
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287 | (2) |
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10 Modeling the Co-evolution of Tax Shelters and Audit Priorities |
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289 | (26) |
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289 | (2) |
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291 | (2) |
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293 | (6) |
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294 | (3) |
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297 | (2) |
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299 | (6) |
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299 | (3) |
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302 | (2) |
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304 | (1) |
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305 | (6) |
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10.5.1 Experiment LimitedAudit: Audit Observables That Do Not Detect IBOB |
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305 | (3) |
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10.5.2 Experiment Effective Audit: Audit Observables That Can Detect IBOB |
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308 | (1) |
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10.5.3 Experiment CoEvolution: Sustained Oscillatory Dynamics Of Fitness Values |
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308 | (3) |
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311 | (4) |
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314 | (1) |
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11 From Spins to Agents: An Econophysics Approach to Tax Evasion |
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315 | (22) |
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315 | (1) |
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316 | (4) |
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316 | (1) |
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11.2.2 Entities, State Variables, and Scales |
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316 | (2) |
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11.2.3 Process Overview and Scheduling |
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318 | (2) |
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11.3 Application to Tax Evasion |
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320 | (4) |
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11.4 Heterogeneous Agents |
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324 | (6) |
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11.5 Relation to Binary Choice Model |
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330 | (3) |
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333 | (4) |
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334 | (3) |
Index |
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337 | |