Acknowledgements |
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xiii | |
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xiv | |
Introduction |
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1 | (20) |
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0.1 Innovation versus Restriction |
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4 | (3) |
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4 | (1) |
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0.1.2 Network Sovereignty |
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5 | (2) |
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0.2 Fuzzy Logic: The Chinese Approach to Innovation Regulation |
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7 | (8) |
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0.2.1 Policy Petri Dishes in Chinese Innovation |
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9 | (2) |
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11 | (4) |
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0.3 Significance of Data Localisation |
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15 | (3) |
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18 | (3) |
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PART I Historical and Doctrinal Background |
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1 Innovating in China's Entrepreneurial Ecosystem |
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21 | (15) |
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1.1 `China Cannot Innovate' |
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21 | (3) |
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1.2 The Origin of China's Policy Petri Dishes |
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24 | (2) |
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1.3 China's Unique Ecosystem: Adept at Catching Up |
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26 | (3) |
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1.4 Top-Down or Bottom-Up Innovation? |
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29 | (3) |
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1.5 Entrepreneurial Ecosystems with Chinese Characteristics |
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32 | (3) |
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1.6 Conclusion: Assumptions on Chinese Innovation Challenges |
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35 | (1) |
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2 The Extent of Fuzzy Logic: The Tech Giants and Their `Illegal' Legal Structure |
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36 | (26) |
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37 | (2) |
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2.1.1 What Is Meant by a `Fuzzy Logic' Law in China? |
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38 | (1) |
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2.2 Offshore Legal Structures: The Variable-Interest Entity (VIE) |
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39 | (11) |
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40 | (2) |
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2.2.2 Evading China's Investment Laws |
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42 | (1) |
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2.2.3 Paradoxical Side Effects of Fuzzy Logic on VIEs |
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43 | (3) |
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2.2.4 Disputes between Chinese Tech Firms and Activist VIE Investors |
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46 | (4) |
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2.3 The End of VIEs or a False Alarm? |
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50 | (2) |
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2.3.1 Future Legal Implications and Risks |
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51 | (1) |
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2.4 China Unable to Lure the Champions Home: 2018 |
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52 | (4) |
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2.4.1 Maintaining the Fuzzy Logic: CDRs and the 2019 Foreign Investment Law |
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53 | (3) |
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2.5 US Blacklistings in 2019--2020: Are VIEs Still Relevant? |
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56 | (3) |
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2.6 Conclusion: Still Too Big to Fail |
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59 | (3) |
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3 China's Cyber Policies: Conflict between Innovation and Restriction |
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62 | (18) |
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3.1 Internet Plus versus Network Sovereignty |
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62 | (1) |
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63 | (2) |
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3.2.1 Background to Internet Plus: China's Informatisation Strategy |
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64 | (1) |
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3.3 China's Cyber Institutions |
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65 | (5) |
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3.4 The Language of Internet Plus: Promoting Global Cooperation |
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70 | (2) |
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72 | (5) |
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3.6 Network Sovereignty, Content Censorship, Internet Plus and the Influence of the BATs |
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77 | (1) |
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3.7 Conclusion: Unresolved Questions |
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78 | (2) |
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4 China's Data Security Policies Leading to the Cyber Security Law |
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80 | (14) |
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4.1 Planning for China's Cyber Regime: `Cyber Security and Informatisation Are Two Wings of One Body' |
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81 | (2) |
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4.2 The Critical Need for a Cyber Security Regime in China |
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83 | (2) |
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4.3 Network Sovereignty Laws Prior to the Cyber Security Law |
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85 | (2) |
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4.4 China's Anti-Terrorism Law |
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87 | (5) |
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4.4.1 Data Encryption and Backdoor Keys in the United States |
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89 | (3) |
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4.5 Conclusion: Policy Indicators? |
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92 | (2) |
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5 The Cyber Security Law: Fuzzy Logic in a Touchstone Law |
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94 | (35) |
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5.1 Background: Initial Drafting, Consultation then Delayed Implementation |
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96 | (2) |
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5.2 The Law: Vague Regulations Make Compliance Difficult |
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98 | (9) |
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5.2.1 Vague Rules: To Whom Does the Law Apply? |
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98 | (4) |
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5.2.2 Vague Rules: Data Localisation (Data Storage Requirements and Data Exits) |
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102 | (3) |
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5.2.3 Vague Rules: Unclear Product Review Requirements |
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105 | (2) |
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5.3 Backdoors under the Cyber Security Law? |
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107 | (3) |
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5.4 Third Parties in Security Reviews under the Cyber Security Law |
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110 | (5) |
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5.5 Evolving and Contradictory Subordinate Regulations on Data Transfers and Network Security |
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115 | (3) |
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5.6 Unresolved Issues: The Current Status of Cross-Border Data Flows under Article 37 of the Cyber Security Law |
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118 | (6) |
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121 | (1) |
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5.6.2 `Network Operators' Remains Broad and Undefined |
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122 | (2) |
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5.7 Conclusion: Fuzzy Logic, Even in a Touchstone Law |
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124 | (5) |
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PART II Impact on Artificial Intelligence |
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6 The Impacts of Data Localisation on Globalised Ecosystems and Chinese Tech |
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129 | (25) |
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130 | (3) |
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6.2 What Is Data Localisation? |
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133 | (1) |
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6.3 Two Major Motivations for Data Localisation: Protecting Personal Data and Ensuring Government Control over Data |
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133 | (4) |
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6.4 Existing Theories about Data Localisation Laws |
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137 | (10) |
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6.4.1 Arguments against Data Localisation Laws: Protectionism versus Data Protection |
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138 | (3) |
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6.4.2 Data Localisation Is `Technically Unviable' and Counterproductive to Data Protection Goals and National Security Concerns |
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141 | (3) |
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6.4.3 Increased Costs for Companies and Consumers |
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144 | (3) |
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6.5 Implications of the Rise of AI: Fuzzy Logic Masks Motivations for Data Localisation |
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147 | (5) |
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6.6 Conclusion: Costs-Benefits Can Change |
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152 | (2) |
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7 Data Protection but Not Data Privacy: `Data Protection Shall Not Hinder AI' |
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154 | (55) |
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7.1 Background: New Data Protection Regime Still Emerging |
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155 | (4) |
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7.1.1 Increased Data Protection under the Cyber Security Law |
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159 | (1) |
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7.2 Enforced Real-Name User Registration |
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159 | (7) |
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7.2.1 Real-Name User Registration |
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161 | (3) |
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7.2.2 Data Protection, not Privacy |
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164 | (2) |
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7.3 Data Protection a Key Social Issue, among Many `Trust' Scandals |
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166 | (9) |
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7.4 Polling: Growing Awareness of Data Privacy Issues |
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175 | (2) |
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7.5 BATs and Other Tech Firms Face Regular Data Protection Penalties, but Push Back against Authorities |
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177 | (3) |
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7.6 Privacy Standards Follow the Cyber Security Law on `Data Protection' |
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180 | (7) |
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7.6.1 What Is Protected Personal Information? |
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185 | (1) |
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7.6.2 What Were the Drafters of the Original Privacy Standards Intending? |
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186 | (1) |
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7.7 Definitional Fuzzy Logic in the Privacy Standards: Fuzzy Logic for Applying the standards |
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187 | (5) |
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7.7.1 `Sensitive Personal Information' and `Core Business Functions' |
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189 | (3) |
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7.8 Periodic Data Protection Impact Assessments |
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192 | (2) |
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7.9 2021: China's Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law to Become Fuzzy Logic Law? |
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194 | (7) |
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7.9.1 Consent and Storage of `Sensitive Personal Information' |
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196 | (1) |
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7.9.2 Data Localisation Expanded in 2021 and Beyond? |
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197 | (4) |
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7.10 Real-Name Registration, AI Development and Why Private Companies Control China's Datasets |
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201 | (6) |
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7.11 Conclusion: Inherent Fuzzy Logic Leading to Data Privacy Contradictions That May Benefit AI Development |
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207 | (2) |
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8 The Current State of AI Research Is Perfectly Suited to China's Fuzzy Logic System |
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209 | (51) |
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8.1 Why Has AI Developed So Quickly in China? The Current State of AI |
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213 | (8) |
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8.2 An AI `Sputnik Moment' for China |
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221 | (2) |
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8.3 AI Research Is Collaborative, Providing the Ideal Environment for China to Establish Pilot Rollouts |
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223 | (4) |
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8.4 Why Has AI Developed So Quickly in China? Private Firm/Government Symbiosis and Public--Private Petri Dishes |
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227 | (5) |
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8.5 Smart Cities as Petri Dishes for AI Development |
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232 | (6) |
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8.6 Incorporation of AI into Smart City and Innovation Policies: The AI Plan |
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238 | (5) |
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8.7 The AI Plan and Smart City Policies as Top-Down Signalling |
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243 | (4) |
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8.8 The Role of Public--Private Partnerships in China's National AI Platforms |
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247 | (4) |
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8.9 Public--Private Standard Setting and Interoperability |
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251 | (3) |
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8.9.1 Questions Remain Regarding the AI National Team |
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252 | (2) |
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8.10 Local Government Responses to Central Top-Down Signalling |
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254 | (2) |
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8.11 Will Network Sovereignty Threaten AI Development in China? |
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256 | (2) |
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8.12 Conclusion: Public--Private Symbiosis |
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258 | (2) |
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9 Open-Source AI Platforms and the Cyber Security Law |
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260 | (69) |
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9.1 What Are Open-Source AI Platforms? |
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262 | (3) |
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9.2 History of Open-Source Platforms in China |
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265 | (10) |
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9.3 Benefits of Open-Source Platforms for Innovation in AI |
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275 | (11) |
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9.3.1 Attracting Talent through Open Innovation |
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276 | (2) |
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9.3.2 Transparency: Researchers Demand Repeatability |
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278 | (4) |
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9.3.3 Cloud Computing Onboarding |
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282 | (3) |
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9.3.4 Maintenance and Crowdsourced Innovations |
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285 | (1) |
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9.4 Global Nature of Open-Source AI Platforms and Role of Global R&D Centres in AI Development in China |
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286 | (7) |
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289 | (4) |
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9.5 Chinese Government Approach to Open-Source AI Platforms: Public--Private Platforms for Domestic Open Innovation |
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293 | (8) |
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9.5.1 The `Open-Source' Aspects of the National AI Platforms |
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293 | (8) |
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9.6 Key Features of Open-Source AI Relevant to Applying the Cyber Security Law |
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301 | (5) |
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9.7 Case Studies of Open-Source AI Platforms in China |
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306 | (20) |
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9.7.1 Apollo: `Android for Automated Vehicles' |
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313 | (5) |
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9.7.2 Apollo's Data-Sharing Policies |
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318 | (4) |
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9.7.3 GPS Mapping Laws: Network Sovereignty as Economic Protectionism? |
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322 | (4) |
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9.8 Conclusion: Linked Open-Source Ecosystems? |
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326 | (3) |
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Conclusion: Effect of Data Localisation on Chinese AI Innovation |
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329 | (14) |
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330 | (5) |
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10.1.1 `Important Data' Remains Undefined in 2021 |
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330 | (2) |
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10.1.2 Concluding Remark: Fuzzy Logic Is Intentional |
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332 | (3) |
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10.2 Future Uncertainties |
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335 | (8) |
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10.2.1 Potential Future Developments in AI Policymaking |
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336 | (2) |
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10.2.2 Future Impact of Fuzzy Logic Regulatory Practice on Tech Firms and Entrepreneurs |
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338 | (5) |
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343 | (59) |
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343 | (7) |
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350 | (4) |
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354 | (2) |
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D Other Secondary Sources: English Language |
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356 | (32) |
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E Other Secondary Sources: Chinese Language |
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388 | (7) |
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395 | (1) |
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G Chinese Regulations, Notices, Guides and Standards |
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396 | (3) |
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H Chinese Policies, Plans and White Papers |
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399 | (1) |
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400 | (2) |
Index |
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402 | |