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Invited Talk.- Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems.- Auctions, Markets and Mechanism Design.- How Bad is the Merger Paradox.- Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism.- Lookahead Auctions with Pooling.- Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents.- On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets.- Explicitly Simple Near-tie Auctions.- Computational Aspects in Games.- Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy.- Complexity of Public Goods Games on Graphs.- PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in Lipschitz Games.- Seniorities and Minimal Clearing in Financial Network Games.- Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities.- Automated Equilibrium Analysis of 2 2 2 Games.- Congestion and Network Creation Games.- An Improved Bound for the Tree Conjecture in Network Creation Games.- A common generalization of budget games and congestion games.- Cost-Sharing Games with Rank-Based Utilities.- On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games.- On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games.- Data Sharing and Learning.- Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts.- Coopetition Against an Amazon.- Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents.- Fast Convergence of Optimistic Gradient Ascent in Network Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games.- Social Choice and Stable Matchings.- Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts.- Fair ride allocation on a line.- Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences.- Collective Schedules: Axioms and algorithms.- Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting.- Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment.- Gehrlein Stable Committee with Multi-Modal Preferences. -Online Max-min Fair Allocation.- Incomplete List Setting of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas.- Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams.