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E-raamat: Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012

(Cornell University)
  • Formaat: 344 pages
  • Sari: Inside Technology
  • Ilmumisaeg: 16-Aug-2013
  • Kirjastus: MIT Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262316538
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  • Formaat: 344 pages
  • Sari: Inside Technology
  • Ilmumisaeg: 16-Aug-2013
  • Kirjastus: MIT Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262316538

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In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks ofnew technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? InArguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective.Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technologystudies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedentedthreat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two differentprofessional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about therisks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that ourunderstanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledgeand mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a newrepertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.

In the 1950s,scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speedof ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers soused physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, afterestablishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risksassociated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continueto confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into howdifferent kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technologicalrisks.

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Winner of Winner, 2015 Computer History Museum Prize awarded by SIGCIS, the Special Interest Group for Computers, Information and Society 2015.
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1(16)
1 Software and the Race against Surprise Attack
17(24)
2 Framing an "Appallingly Complex" System
41(22)
3 Complexity and the "Art or Evolving Science" of Software
63(22)
4 "No Technological Solution"?
85(24)
5 What Crisis? Software in the "Safeguard" Debate
109(24)
6 The Politics of Complex Technology
133(18)
7 The Political Economy of Software Engineering
151(22)
8 Nature and Technology in the Star Wars Debate
173(26)
9 Conclusion: Complexity Unbound
199(28)
Notes 227(74)
Unpublished Sources and Notations 301(4)
Index 305