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E-raamat: Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology

Series edited by (Harvard University), (University of Ljubljana), (University of Arizona), Series edited by (New York University)
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The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz [ hacek over z] Potrc [ hacek over c] argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, Horgan and Potrc [ hacek over c] consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call "blobjectivism"--the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos ("the blobject"), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts. The arguments in Austere Realism are powerfully made and concisely and lucidly set out. The authors' contentions and their methodological approach--products of a decade-long collaboration--will generate lively debate among scholars in metaphysics, ontology, and philosophy. Terence E. Horgan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. Matjaz [ hacek over z] Potrc [ hacek over c] is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana.



A provocative ontological-cum-semantic position asserting that the right ontology is austere in its exclusion of numerous common-sense and scientific posits and that many statements employing such posits are nonetheless true.
Preface ix
Introduction
1(192)
Simple Realism: The Native Approach to Truth and Ontology
7(8)
Problems for Simple Realism
15(18)
Contextual Semantics: Truth as Indirect Correspondence
33(36)
Austere Realism: Overcoming Simple Realism's Problems
69(22)
The Ascendance of the Austere: Further Arguments for Austere Realism
91(28)
Objections to Austere Realism
119(42)
Betting on the Blobject: The Choice among Austere Ontologies
161(32)
Notes 193(14)
References 207(8)
Index 215