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E-raamat: Being and Owning: The Body, Bodily Material, and the Law

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(Lecturer, University of Otago)
  • Formaat: EPUB+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Jun-2015
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191043857
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Being and Owning: The Body, Bodily Material, and the LawSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: EPUB+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Jun-2015
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191043857
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When part of a person's body is separated from them, or when a person dies, it is unclear what legal status the item of bodily material is able to obtain. A 'no property rule' which states that there is no property in the human body was first recorded in an English judgment in 1882. Claims based on property rights in the human body and its parts have failed on the basis that the human body is not the subject of property. Despite a recent series of exceptions to the 'no property rule', the law still has no clear answer as to the legal status of the body or its material. In this book, Wall examines the appropriate legal status of bodily material, and in doing so, develops a way for the law to address disputes over the use and storage of bodily material that, contrary to the current trend, resists the application of property law.



Wall assesses when a person ought to be able to possess, control, use, or profit from, his or her own bodily material or the bodily material of another person. Bodily material may be valuable because it retains a functional unity with the body or is a material resource that is in short supply. With this in mind, Wall measures the extent to which property law can represent the rights and duties that protects the entitlement that a person may exercise in bodily material, and identifies the limits to the appropriate application of property law. An alternative to property law is developed with reference to the right of bodily integrity and the right to privacy.

Arvustused

I recommend this book to philosophers and bioethicist looking for a subtle and informative discussion of recent and prospective legal developments regarding ownership of bodily materials. * Sean Aas, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal *

Table of Cases
xv
Table of Legislation
xvii
Introduction 1(10)
I The Property of No One
1(2)
II Three Main Inquiries
3(2)
III
Chapter Synopses
5(4)
IV Parameters
9(2)
1 The Ownership of Bodily Material
11(28)
I Incidents of Ownership
13(7)
a Honore's Taxonomy
14(2)
b Incidents of Ownership and Legal Disputes
16(4)
II Ownership Is Not a Legal Concept
20(6)
a Incidents of Ownership and Legal Actions
20(4)
b Twin Notions of Property
24(2)
III Ownership Is a Series of Functional Relationships
26(5)
a Functional Variation
27(3)
b The Ownership Spectrum
30(1)
IV Justifying Ownership
31(6)
a Range of Justifications
31(3)
b Pre-Social and Social Analyses
34(3)
V
Chapter Summary
37(2)
2 The Objectification of Bodily Material
39(40)
I Ownership and Self-Ownership
41(15)
a Subjectivity and Self-Ownership
41(2)
b Separation and Self-Ownership
43(2)
c Prior Embodiment
45(2)
d The Application of Work or Skill
47(3)
e The Nexus of Dual Relations
50(2)
f Yearworth and the Hegelian Basis
52(4)
II Self-Ownership and Physical Subjectivity
56(10)
a A Physical Subjectivity
57(1)
b The Body For-Itself
58(1)
c The Body For-Itself and an Object In-Itself
59(1)
d The Self-Ascribed Body
60(1)
e The Body For-Itself and Self-Ownership
61(2)
f The Body For-Others
63(1)
g First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives
64(2)
III Self-Ownership and Competing Social Needs
66(9)
a The Social Value of Bodily Material
67(2)
b The Body as a Material Resource
69(1)
c Abstract and Physical Flourishing
70(3)
d Conflicting Duties
73(2)
IV
Chapter Summary
75(4)
3 The Commodification of Bodily Material
79(32)
I A Pre-Social Right to Profit
81(7)
a The Right to Profit and the Synchronic Connection
81(1)
b Self-Ownership and the Right to Profit
82(3)
c The Dual Nexus and the Right to Profit
85(2)
d The Missing Step in the Justification
87(1)
II A Social Right to Profit
88(10)
a The Right to Profit and the Diachronic Connection
89(1)
b The Diachronic Connection and Reasons for Action
90(1)
c Reasons for Action and Value Equivalence
91(3)
d Intrinsic and Extrinsic Reasons for Action
94(2)
e The Ambiguous Body and Value Equivalence
96(2)
III Value Denigration
98(11)
a The General Concern: Value Denigration
99(3)
b The Particular Concern: Financial Pressure and Value Equivalence
102(2)
c The Sting in the Diachronic Tail
104(2)
d Limits on the Diachronic Argument
106(3)
IV
Chapter Summary
109(2)
4 The Concept of Property Law
111(30)
I Property and Exclusion
113(8)
a Property beyond Thing-ness
114(1)
b The Legal Relationship between the Rights-Holder and the Duty-Bearer
115(1)
c An Open-Ended Set of Activities
116(2)
d The Exclusion of Others
118(3)
II Bodies and Exclusion
121(3)
III Property and Contingency
124(7)
a Munzer's Criterion of Transferability
124(1)
b Two Criteria for Contingency
125(3)
c Returning to the Hegelian Blur
128(3)
IV Bodies and Non-Contingency
131(7)
a Contingency and the Third-Person Point of View
132(2)
b Contingency and the First-Person Point of View
134(2)
c Contingency and Value Equivalence
136(2)
V
Chapter Summary
138(3)
5 The Structure of Property Law
141(34)
I The Basis of the Right
143(4)
a The Exclusion Strategy and Pre-Existing Rights
143(2)
b The Governance Strategy and Direct Rights
145(2)
II The Content of the Right
147(5)
a The Original and Derivative Dimensions of the Right
147(1)
b Exclusion, Governance, and the Content of the Right
148(2)
c The Content of the Right and Bodily Material
150(2)
III The Content of Primary Duties
152(5)
a Duties of Non-Interference and Duties of Care
152(3)
b Exclusion, Governance, and the Content of the Primary Duty
155(1)
c Complementary Duties and the `No Property Rule'
156(1)
IV The Content of the Remedial Duty
157(8)
a The Principle of Corrective Justice
157(2)
b Corrective Remedial Duties
159(1)
c The Principle of Distributive Justice
160(1)
d Distributive Corrective Duties
161(2)
e Additional Hurdles under Corrective Remedial Duties
163(2)
f Remedial Duties and Bodily Material
165(1)
V The Transferability of the Right
165(8)
a Property Rules
167(1)
b Governance Rules
168(2)
c Inalienability Rules
170(3)
VI
Chapter Summary
173(2)
6 The Limits of Property Law
175(36)
I Exclusion, Governance, and Bodily Material
177(8)
a The Limits of the Governance Strategy
178(2)
b The Exclusion Strategy and Bodily Material
180(4)
c Governance and Exclusion
184(1)
II Contingent Rights and Bodily Material
185(6)
a Bodily Integrity, Property, and Privacy
186(1)
b Preferences, Choices, and Bodily Material
187(2)
c Conceptual Inconsistency
189(1)
d The Ambiguous Body and the Analogy with Privacy
190(1)
III Rights, Duties, and Bodily Material
191(14)
a The Basis of the Right
191(5)
b The Content of the Right
196(1)
c The Content of the Primary Duty
197(2)
d The Content of the Remedial Duty
199(3)
e The Transferability of the Right
202(3)
IV Structural Configurations and the Way Further Forward
205(3)
a Structural Configurations
205(1)
b A New Property
206(1)
c A New Confidentiality
207(1)
V
Chapter Summary
208(3)
Conclusion
211(10)
I The No Property Rule
211(2)
II The Lockean Exception
213(1)
III The Hegelian Exception
213(1)
IV Beyond Hegel and Beyond Yearworth
214(2)
V The Current State of the Law
216(1)
VI Maintaining a Distinction in the Law
217(4)
Bibliography 221(8)
Index 229
Jesse Wall is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Otago. He was a Lecturer and Junior Research Fellow at Merton College, Oxford. He was awarded a Rhodes scholarship to undertake studies at Pembroke College, Oxford, where he completed a B.C.L, M.Phil, and D.Phil.
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