| Acknowledgments |
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ix | |
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Chapter 1 The Problem Introduced: Would Determinism Rob Us of Free Will? |
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1 | (22) |
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1 Free Will, Ability to Do Otherwise, and the Basic Argument |
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1 | (2) |
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2 Determinism and Some Distinctions |
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3 | (3) |
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3 Narrow Ability, Wide Ability, and the No Choice Argument |
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6 | (10) |
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4 The Basic Argument Extended and Two Ways of Responding: Metaphysical Compatibilism and Moral Compatibilism |
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16 | (4) |
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5 How I Propose to Navigate the Treacherous Waters of the Free Will/Determinism Problem: A First Road Map of the Book |
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20 | (3) |
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Chapter 2 The Problem Distinguished: Is It Possible for Us to Have Free Will? Do We Have Free Will? |
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23 | (34) |
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1 Two Questions about Free Will: The Possibility Question and the Determinism Question |
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23 | (5) |
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2 Some Remarks about Methodology |
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28 | (4) |
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3 The Existential Question and Commonsense Compatibilism |
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32 | (3) |
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4 Impossibilism: Five Arguments for Fatalism |
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35 | (13) |
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5 Hard Determinism or Impossibilism? Five Versions of the Clarence Darrow Argument |
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48 | (9) |
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Chapter 3 Abilities, Choices, and Agent Causation |
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57 | (32) |
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1 What This
Chapter Is About and Why |
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57 | (3) |
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2 The Commonsense View (and the Limits of Common Sense) |
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60 | (10) |
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3 Two Steps beyond Common Sense: Limited Laws Indeterminism and Agent Causation |
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70 | (4) |
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4 Are Events the Only Causes? Could an Object Be a Cause? |
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74 | (8) |
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5 Could an Agent Be a Cause? |
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82 | (4) |
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86 | (3) |
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Chapter 4 The Unavoidability of Metaphysics: Moral Responsibility and Ability to Do Otherwise |
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89 | (36) |
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1 Alternatives, Choice, and Moral Responsibility |
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89 | (3) |
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2 Frankfurt's Bold Gambit and the Long Debate That Followed |
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92 | (5) |
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3 Two Ways of Getting Someone to Do What You Want |
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97 | (5) |
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4 Heads I Win, Tails You Lose |
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102 | (5) |
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5 Why There Is No Middle Way (Why Putting the Preemptor on the Scene Doesn't Help) |
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107 | (2) |
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6 Freedom of Action, Freedom of Will, and Three Ways of Having a Choice |
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109 | (5) |
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7 Frankfurt's Intuition Reconsidered: Why the Subtraction Argument Fails, Why the Supervenience Argument Fails |
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114 | (8) |
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8 Lessons for Compatibilists |
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122 | (3) |
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Chapter 5 Arguments for Incompatibilism |
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125 | (42) |
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1 No Forking Paths Argument |
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125 | (4) |
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2 No Present Causes Argument |
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129 | (5) |
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3 No Agent Causes Argument |
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134 | (7) |
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4 No Inner Commander Argument |
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141 | (7) |
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148 | (7) |
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6 The Consequence Argument |
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155 | (12) |
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Chapter 6 The Abilities and Dispositions of Our Freedom |
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167 | (48) |
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1 The Big Picture: The Bundle View |
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167 | (3) |
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2 Abilities and Dispositions |
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170 | (11) |
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3 Dispositions and Counterfactuals |
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181 | (6) |
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4 The Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis and Frankfurt's Argument |
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187 | (5) |
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5 Wide Abilities, Choice, and the Consequence Argument |
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192 | (4) |
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6 Historical Interlude: Objections to the Simple Conditional Analysis Reconsidered |
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196 | (12) |
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7 Virtues of the Bundle View |
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208 | (7) |
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Chapter 7 Laws, Counterfactuals, and Fixed Past Compatibilism |
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215 | (24) |
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1 What This
Chapter Is About and Why |
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215 | (2) |
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217 | (3) |
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3 Counterfactuals and Our Experience of Choice |
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220 | (8) |
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4 Counterfactuals: From Goodman to Lewis |
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228 | (7) |
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5 Choice Counterfactuals and Fixed Past Compatibilism |
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235 | (2) |
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237 | (2) |
| Notes |
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239 | (32) |
| References |
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271 | (8) |
| Index |
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279 | |
Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta