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E-raamat: Checking Presidential Power: Executive Decrees and the Legislative Process in New Democracies

(Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile)
  • Formaat: EPUB+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 17-Jan-2019
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781108682954
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  • Formaat: EPUB+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 17-Jan-2019
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781108682954

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A central concern about the robustness of democratic rule in new democracies is the concentration of power in the executive branch and the potential this creates for abuse. This concern is felt particularly with regard to the concentration of legislative power. Checking Presidential Power explains the levels of reliance on executive decrees in a comparative perspective. Building on the idea of institutional commitment, which affects the enforcement of decision-making rules, Palanza describes the degree to which countries rely on executive decree authority as more reliance may lead to unbalanced presidential systems and will ultimately affect democratic quality. Breaking new ground by both theorizing and empirically analyzing decree authority from a comparative perspective, this book examines policy making in separation of powers systems. It explains the choice between decrees and statutes, and why legislators are sometimes profoundly engaged in the legislative process and yet other times entirely withdrawn from it.

The first to offer an explanation of the levels of reliance on executive decrees in comparative perspective, this book intends to reach an audience of scholars and non-academics interested in the behavior of legislators, the struggles behind the concentration of power by presidents, and Latin American politics.

Arvustused

'Palanza brings formidable tools to bear in this book - sophisticated theory, extensive data, deep knowledge of her cases, and clear writing. She tests her ideas with extensive studies of policy making in Brazil and Argentina, as well as with rigorous analysis drawing data from across Latin America. She shows us what factors push presidents toward unilateral policymaking and what institutional conditions foster legislative influence. This book is a real achievement.' John M. Carey, John Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences, Dartmouth College 'Palanza's Checking Presidential Power is a long overdue corrective to the often uncritical assumption that presidents are all-powerful and that legislatures (and courts) are mere bystanders in Latin America's separation-of-powers systems. By refusing to consider presidents and their decrees in isolation, Palanza's book gives us a much more holistic account, both theoretically and empirically, of how policy gets made in separation-of-powers systems.' Brian F. Crisp, Washington University, St Louis 'This is a great book. It is the first to provide a comprehensive and positive theory of the choice between policy-making by decree versus statute. Unlike previous work, it places the decision about the relative incidence of executive decrees in a broad strategic context, which includes not only the president but also legislators, the courts and interest groups. Palanza offers detailed empirical analysis of decree usage in several countries, as well as, to my knowledge, the first cross-national analysis of law-making by decree in presidential systems. This book will be required for anyone interested in executive politics, institutional analysis, presidentialism, democratization, Latin American and many other areas.' José Antonio Cheibub, Mary Thomas Marshall Professor in Liberal Arts, Texas A & M University 'In her groundbreaking book, Palanza (Pontificia Universidad de Chile) examines policy making in separation of powers systems by explaining the levels of reliance on executive decrees that may lead to unbalanced presidential systems and ultimately low democratic quality. The author accurately defends the long-held belief that policy enacted by decree is less stable than policy enacted by the widely supported congressional statutes.' K. M. Zaarour, Choice

Muu info

Provides the first comparative look into executive decree authority. It explains why presidents issue decrees and why checks and balances sometimes fail.
List of Figures
ix
List of Tables
xi
Acknowledgments xiii
List of Abbreviations
xix
1 Introduction: A Choice of Paths behind Each Policy
1(24)
1.1 A Choice of Legislative Instrument behind Every Choice of Policy
1(5)
1.2 Policy, Lawmaking, and New Democracies
6(5)
1.3 Delegation or Usurpation?
11(6)
1.4 Confronting the Puzzle from a Different Standpoint
17(5)
1.5 A Roadmap of this Book
22(3)
2 Decrees versus Statutes: Choice of Legislative Paths in Separation of Power Systems
25(1)
2.1 Introduction
25(2)
2.2 A Theoretical Model of Choice of Legislative Instruments
27(3)
2.3 The Game
30(15)
2.4 Decrees or Statutes?
45(1)
2.5 Final Remarks
46(2)
2.A Appendix: Strategic Games and Proofs
48(19)
3 Institutions and Institutional Commitment
67(2)
3.1 On Rules, Hurdle Factors, and Institutional Commitment
69(7)
3.2 Empirical Implications
76(5)
3.3 Empirical Analysis
81(7)
3.A Appendix: Complementary Analysis and Sources
88(3)
4 Reinstatement of Congressional Decision Rights: Brazil
91(2)
4.1 Decree Authority in Brazil: Medidas Provisorias
93(7)
4.2 Confronting the Brazilian Puzzle from a Different Standpoint
100(3)
4.3 Hypotheses and Data
103(15)
4.4 Conclusions
118(3)
4.A Appendix: Complementary Analysis and Sources
121(7)
5 A Corollary of Low Levels of Institutional Commitment: Argentina
128(1)
5.1 Introduction
128(2)
5.2 Executive Decrees
130(11)
5.3 Confronting the Argentine Puzzle from a Different Standpoint
141(3)
5.4 Hypotheses and Data
144(24)
5.5 Conclusions
168(3)
5.A Appendix: Complementary Analysis and Sources
171(12)
6 The Choice of Legislative Paths in Comparative Perspective
183(1)
6.1 Introduction
183(1)
6.2 Hurdle Factors and Institutional Commitment in Comparative Perspective
184(6)
6.3 Decrees in Latin America: The Cases
190(6)
6.4 Reliance on Decrees: Empirical Analysis
196(11)
6.5 Conclusions
207(2)
6.A Appendix: Complementary Analysis and Sources
209(6)
7 Conclusions: Rules, Institutional Commitment, and Checks on Presidents
215(1)
7.1 Variation in Reliance on Decrees
216(1)
7.2 Institutional Commitment and the Enforcement of Checks on the Executive
217(4)
7.3 Checking Presidents
221(4)
Bibliography 225(14)
Index 239
Valeria Palanza is Assistant Professor in the Instituto de Ciencias Políticas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Her research interests focus on issues of democracy, institutional arrangements, and the legislative process. Her most recent publications appear in Comparative Political Studies, Revista de Ciencia Política, and Legislative Studies Quarterly.