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1 | (8) |
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7 | (2) |
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2 Why Are Collective Actions Needed in Europe: Small Claims Are Not Reasonably Enforced in Practice and Collective Actions Ensure Effective Access to Justice |
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9 | (14) |
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2.1 What Are the Hurdles Faced by Small Claims in Europe |
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11 | (3) |
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2.2 How Do Collective Actions Overcome the Above Hurdles and Why Are They Efficient? |
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14 | (2) |
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2.3 Why Are Collective Actions Not Working Spontaneously if They Are Efficient? |
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16 | (1) |
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2.4 How Could Collective Actions Be Made Work? |
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17 | (3) |
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20 | (1) |
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20 | (3) |
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3 Major European Objections and Fears Against the Opt-Out System: Superego, Ego and Id |
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23 | (22) |
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3.1 European Objections Against Class Actions: Scruples or Pretexts? |
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23 | (15) |
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3.1.1 Constitutional Concerns: Private Autonomy and Tacit Adherence |
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24 | (6) |
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3.1.1 Opt-Out Collective Actions Are Alien to Continental Legal Traditions |
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30 | (3) |
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3.1.1 It Is Very Difficult to Identify the Members of the Group and to Prove Group Membership |
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33 | (2) |
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3.1.1 Opt-Out Collective Actions Would Lead to a Litigation Boom and Would Create a Black-Mailing Potential for Group Representatives |
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35 | (3) |
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3.2 The Headspring of European Taboos and Traditionalism: Party Autonomy and the State's Prerogative to Enforce the Public Interest |
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38 | (2) |
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40 | (2) |
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42 | (3) |
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4 Transatlantic Perspectives: Comparative Law Framing |
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45 | (26) |
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4.1 Disparate Regulatory Environments |
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45 | (7) |
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4.2 Why Should Europeans Not Fear the American Cowboy? Diverging Effects of Disparate Regulatory Environments |
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52 | (7) |
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4.3 The Novel Questions of Collective Actions in Europe |
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59 | (7) |
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4.3.3 Funding in the Absence of One-Way Cost-Shifting, Contingency Fees and Punitive Damages |
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59 | (3) |
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4.3.3 Two-Way Cost-Shifting |
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62 | (1) |
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4.3.3 Distrust of Market-Based Mechanisms in the Enforcement of Public Policy (No Private Attorney General) |
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62 | (1) |
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4.3.3 European Opt-In Collective Actions and Joinders of Parties |
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63 | (1) |
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4.3.3 Opt-Out Systems and the "Only Benefits" Principle |
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64 | (2) |
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66 | (1) |
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67 | (4) |
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5 European Models of Collective Actions |
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71 | (42) |
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5.1 The European Landscape: To Opt in or to Opt Out? |
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73 | (12) |
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5.2 Purview: Step-by-Step Evolution of a Precautious Revolution |
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85 | (3) |
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5.3 Pre-requisites of Collective Action and Certification |
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88 | (7) |
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5.4 Standing and Adequate Representation |
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95 | (3) |
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5.5 Status of Group Members in Opt-in Proceedings: Liability for Legal Costs and Res Judicata Effect |
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98 | (3) |
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5.6 Status of Group Members in Opt-Out Proceedings: Liability for Legal Costs, Res Judicata Effect and the "Only Benefits" Principle |
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101 | (4) |
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105 | (1) |
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106 | (2) |
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108 | (5) |
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113 | |
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6.1 Collective Actions Are Needed in Europe to Ensure Access to Justice and Effectiveness of the Law |
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114 | (2) |
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6.2 European Objections and Fears Against the Opt-Out System: Superego, Ego and Id |
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116 | (1) |
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6.3 Transatlantic Perspectives: Comparative Law Framing |
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117 | (2) |
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6.4 European Models of Collective Actions: A Transsystemic Overview |
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119 | (2) |
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6.5 Closing Thoughts: "Small Money, Small Football, Big Money, Big Football" |
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121 | (1) |
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122 | |