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E-raamat: Counterfactuals and Probability

(University of Hamburg)
  • Formaat: 256 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 19-Jan-2017
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191089060
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Counterfactuals and ProbabilitySuurem pilt
  • Formaat: 256 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 19-Jan-2017
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191089060
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Moritz Schulz explores counterfactual thought and language: what would have happened if things had gone a different way. Counterfactual questions may concern large scale derivations (what would have happened if Nixon had launched a nuclear attack) or small scale evaluations of minor derivations (what would have happened if I had decided to join a different profession). A common impression, which receives a thorough defence in the book, is that oftentimes we find it impossible to know what would have happened. However, this does not mean that we are completely at a loss: we are typically capable of evaluating counterfactual questions probabilistically: we can say what would have been likely or unlikely to happen.

Schulz describes these probabilistic ways of evaluating counterfactual questions and turns the data into a novel account of the workings of counterfactual thought.

Arvustused

This is an exciting investigation of the semantics of counterfactuals that I highly recommend to both experts and people who want to catch up with recent results in the literature. It addresses both epistemic and metaphysical aspects of counterfactuals, and develops a novel refinement of the standard semantics. ... a well written and original study that merits reading from various perspectives. * Holger Andreas, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

Preface ix
1 Introduction
1(28)
1.1 Uncertainty about Counterfactuals
2(3)
1.2 Where Uncertainty Shows Up
5(1)
1.3 The Debate about Indicative Conditionals
6(5)
1.4 Counterfactuals
11(2)
1.5 Standard Semantics
13(3)
1.6 Systematizing the Data
16(3)
1.7 Identifying the Challenge
19(2)
1.8 Non-Standard Explanations
21(4)
1.9 Modifying the Semantics
25(2)
1.10 Overview
27(2)
2 The Problem of Evaluating Counterfactuals
29(31)
2.1 Probability
30(9)
2.2 Prior Epistemic Probabilities
39(6)
2.3 Hypothetical Epistemic Probabilities
45(3)
2.4 Prior Propensities
48(10)
2.4.1 Morgenbesser Cases
51(3)
2.4.2 Counterfactuals and Determinism
54(2)
2.4.3 Counterlegals
56(1)
2.4.4 Probabilistic Modus Ponens
57(1)
2.5 Conclusion
58(2)
3 Counterfactual Chance
60(35)
3.1 The Selection Function
60(3)
3.2 Relevance and Chance
63(7)
3.3 A Principal Principle for Counterfactuals
70(2)
3.4 Admissible Evidence
72(6)
3.5 Comparison with Skyrms
78(1)
3.6 Imaging
79(3)
3.7 Generalized Imaging
82(2)
3.8 Imaging and the PP-Constraint
84(4)
3.9 Some Methodological Considerations
88(4)
3.10 Conclusion
92(3)
4 A Puzzle About Counterfactuals
95(21)
4.1 The Problem for Standard Semantics
96(6)
4.2 The Puzzle
102(5)
4.3 A Means of Escape
107(3)
4.4 Comparison with Indicative Conditionals
110(4)
4.5 Conclusion
114(2)
5 Restriction and Modification
116(30)
5.1 The Restrictor View
117(3)
5.2 Simple Conditionals
120(3)
5.3 Counterfactual `If'-Clauses as Restrictors
123(3)
5.4 Counterfactual `If'-Clauses as Modifiers
126(5)
5.5 Variants of the View
131(3)
5.6 The Lack of Independent Evidence
134(4)
5.7 The Problem of Embeddings
138(6)
5.8 Conclusion
144(2)
6 Counterfactuals and Arbitrariness
146(37)
6.1 A Proposal
147(21)
6.1.1 The Epsilon-Operator
149(4)
6.1.2 Arbitrary Truth Conditions
153(2)
6.1.3 The Logic of Counterfactuals
155(7)
6.1.4 The Metaphysics of Arbitrariness
162(5)
6.1.5 Comparisons
167(1)
6.2 The Evaluation of Counterfactuals
168(8)
6.2.1 Uniformity Reconsidered
170(3)
6.2.2 Modelling the Epistemic Space
173(3)
6.3 Knowability and Assertability
176(5)
6.4 Revisiting the Puzzle
181(1)
6.5 Conclusion
182(1)
7 Applications
183(17)
7.1 Counterfactuals with a True Antecedent
183(5)
7.2 Duality
188(6)
7.3 Conditional Excluded Middle
194(3)
7.4 The Limit Assumption
197(3)
8 Triviality
200(15)
8.1 Lewis on Imaging
201(2)
8.2 Leitgeb's Observation
203(2)
8.3 Williams's Extension of Lewis's Triviality Result
205(7)
8.4 Conclusion
212(3)
9 Concluding Remarks
215(10)
9.1 Error Theories
216(3)
9.2 Pragmatic Explanations
219(1)
9.3 Unifying the Theory?
220(3)
9.4 Conclusion
223(2)
Bibliography 225(10)
Index 235
Moritz Schulz studied Mathematics and Philosophy at the University of Hamburg before completing a BPhil at Oxford University. Shultz received his PhD from the Humboldt University of Berlin in 2011. Since then, he completed a post-doc at the University of Barcelona and acted as an assistant at the University of Tübingen before taking up his current role as junior professor at the University of Hamburg.
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