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1 Introduction: Sociocultural Approaches to Understanding Nuclear Thresholds |
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1 | (28) |
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Crossing Nuclear Thresholds |
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4 | (3) |
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7 | (1) |
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Sociocultural Analysis of Nuclear Proliferation |
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8 | (1) |
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Four Perspectives for Sociocultural Analysis |
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9 | (7) |
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10 | (2) |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (2) |
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15 | (1) |
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Complementary Approaches in Recent Literature |
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16 | (3) |
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19 | (10) |
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2 The Cultural Topography Analytic Framework |
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29 | (32) |
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Growing Pains in the Strategic Culture Paradigm |
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30 | (3) |
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The Cultural Topography Analytic Framework |
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33 | (24) |
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Step 1 Identify an Issue of Strategic Interest |
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35 | (2) |
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Step 2 Select Key Actors (Individuals or Groups) for Focused Study |
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37 | (3) |
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Step 3 Research Key Actors from Four Perspectives---Identity, Norms, Values, and Perceptual Lens |
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40 | (2) |
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42 | (3) |
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Step 4 Assess Impact of Cultural Factors on Key Actors |
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45 | (1) |
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Assessment of Cultural Factors in Case Studies |
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46 | (3) |
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Step 5 Develop a Tailored Set of Policy Levers to Impact Nuclear Decisionmaking |
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49 | (1) |
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50 | (1) |
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Using Less Direct Approaches to Influence Nuclear Decisions |
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51 | (6) |
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57 | (4) |
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3 Iran's Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Policy |
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61 | (48) |
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Origins and Evolution of Iran's Nuclear Program |
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64 | (4) |
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Iran's Nuclear Decisionmaking |
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68 | (5) |
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Traditional Keepers of Iran's Strategic Culture |
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70 | (2) |
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Non-traditional Keepers of Iran's Strategic Culture |
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72 | (1) |
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Characteristics of Iran's Strategic Culture |
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73 | (7) |
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Dualism Permeates Iranian Identity |
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74 | (1) |
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Strategic Patience Is Rewarded |
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75 | (1) |
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Iran Has a Historical "Right" to Hegemony |
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76 | (2) |
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Resistance Is Key to Action and Power |
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78 | (1) |
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World Order Is Unjust, Victimizes the Weak |
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79 | (1) |
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Impact of Strategic Culture on Iran's Nuclear Policy |
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80 | (12) |
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Deterrence Is the Best Defense |
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81 | (3) |
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Ambiguity Complicates Decisionmaking Process |
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84 | (1) |
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Islam and Shia Martyrdom Bolster Regime Legitimacy |
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84 | (2) |
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National Interests Supersede Revolutionary Ideals |
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86 | (2) |
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Proportionate Responses Preferable to Escalation |
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88 | (2) |
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Combination of Soft and Hard Power Most Effective for Resisting Enemies |
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90 | (1) |
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Rationalism and Heroic Flexibility Key for Survival |
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91 | (1) |
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Policy Implications and Recommendations |
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92 | (5) |
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97 | (12) |
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4 Prospects for Proliferation in Saudi Arabia |
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109 | (32) |
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Background on Saudi Nuclear Interest |
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110 | (5) |
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Saudi Perceptions of Threat and of the United States as Partner |
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115 | (5) |
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Threats Through the Saudi Perceptual Lens |
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115 | (3) |
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Perceptions of the United States |
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118 | (2) |
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Key Players and Decisionmaking Worms |
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120 | (6) |
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120 | (2) |
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122 | (1) |
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123 | (1) |
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124 | (2) |
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Values and the Paradoxes in Saudi Society |
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126 | (3) |
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Factors in Nuclear Decisionmaking |
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129 | (3) |
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129 | (2) |
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131 | (1) |
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132 | (2) |
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132 | (1) |
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133 | (1) |
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134 | (7) |
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5 Israeli Strategic Culture and the Iran "Preemption Scare" of 2009--2013 |
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141 | (32) |
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A Snapshot of Israelis Historical Engagement with Nuclear Issues |
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141 | (5) |
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Preserving Israel's Nuclear Monopoly: The Begin Doctrine |
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141 | (2) |
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The Begin Doctrine in Action: The September 2007 Destruction of Syria's Al-Kibar Reactor |
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143 | (3) |
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Analysis and Key Insights Provided by the Cultural Topography Analytical Framework |
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146 | (9) |
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Netanyahu at the Helm: "To Attack or Not to Attack" |
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146 | (3) |
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So Why Didn't Netanyahu Pull the Trigger? |
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149 | (2) |
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151 | (1) |
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151 | (1) |
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152 | (1) |
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153 | (2) |
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155 | (1) |
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Alternate Explanations of Israel's Failure to Strike Iran |
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155 | (2) |
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Strategic Culture Insights |
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157 | (5) |
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How Much Influence Did the United States Have on Israeli Decisionmaking? |
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159 | (2) |
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How Did Iran Perceive and Influence the Situation? |
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161 | (1) |
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Policy Implications and Recommendations |
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162 | (11) |
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The Value of Strategic Culture Analysis |
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162 | (2) |
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Israel's Willingness to Use Force Against Iran's Nuclear Program in the Future: Strategic Culture Guideposts |
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164 | (9) |
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6 Cultural Underpinnings of Current Russian Nuclear and Security Strategy |
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173 | (26) |
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Russian Identity and Current Geopolitical Threat Perceptions |
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174 | (2) |
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The Nuclear Community and Its Decisionmaking Architecture |
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176 | (3) |
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The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Strategy |
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179 | (4) |
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"Regional Nuclear Deterrence" (1991--2010) |
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180 | (1) |
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"New Generation Warfare" (2010--Present) |
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181 | (2) |
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Cultural Underpinnings of Russian Strategic Behavior |
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183 | (11) |
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Moral-Psychological vs. Material Factors in the Culture of War |
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183 | (2) |
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Holistic Approach to Strategy |
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185 | (2) |
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Theory-Driven Military Innovations |
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187 | (4) |
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Culture of Management and Military Innovations |
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191 | (2) |
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193 | (1) |
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194 | (5) |
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7 Ukraine's Nuclear Culture: Past, Present, Future |
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199 | (28) |
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200 | (2) |
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Factors Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation in Ukraine |
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202 | (9) |
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Ukraine's Lack of Control of the Soviet Nuclear Arsenal |
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202 | (1) |
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Ukraine's Identity as a Leader in the Global Nonproliferation Movement |
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203 | (5) |
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Nuclear Narratives in Popular Culture: The Fear of Another Nuclear Disaster |
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208 | (3) |
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Non -governmental Organizations as Drivers of Ecological Awareness and Nonproliferation Norms |
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211 | (1) |
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Nuclear "Enabling" Factors Potentially Weakening Ukraine's Non-nuclear Status |
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211 | (7) |
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Nuclear Weapon Technology Latency |
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212 | (2) |
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The Perceptual Lens of the Conflict with Russia |
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214 | (3) |
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Nuclear Terrorism and Cyber Terrorism Threats |
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217 | (1) |
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Key Political Actors and Influencers of Ukrainian Nuclear Culture |
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218 | (3) |
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Conclusions and Policy Levers |
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221 | (6) |
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8 North Korea's Strategic Culture and Its Evolving Nuclear Strategy |
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227 | (24) |
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The Supreme Leader: Ultimate Decisionmaker and Embodiment of North Korean National Identity |
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228 | (3) |
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North Korean Identity and Nuclear Weapons |
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231 | (4) |
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North Korean Values and Nuclear Weapons |
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235 | (3) |
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North Korean Norms and Nuclear Weapons |
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238 | (2) |
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North Korean Perceptual Lens and Nuclear Weapons |
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240 | (4) |
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Policy Implications and Recommendations |
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244 | (7) |
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9 Conclusion: Using Strategic Culture to Explain Real-World Decisionmaking |
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251 | (16) |
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251 | (1) |
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Changes in the Past Decade |
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252 | (2) |
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Strategic Culture as a Theory and as a Methodology |
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254 | (3) |
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Strategic Culture Does Matter |
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257 | (2) |
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Practical Matters: A Checklist of Policy Responses to Nuclear Thresholds |
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259 | (6) |
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Nuclear Decision Thresholds |
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259 | (6) |
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265 | (2) |
Index |
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267 | |