E-raamat: Deflationary Approach to Truth: A Guide

PART 1: WHAT DEFLATIONISM IS
1. Framing the General Approach 1.1
Deflationism vs. Inflationism 1.2 The Dimensions of Deflationism 1.3 On the
Instability of "Partial Deflationism" 1.4 Motivations and Methodological
Disputes
2. Early and Proto-Deflationary Accounts 2.1 Frege on Truth 2.2
Ramsey and the Redundancy Theory 2.3 Ayer on 'True' 2.4 Wittgenstein on
Truth-Talk 2.5 Strawson on What We Do with Truth-Talk 2.6 Tarski and the
(T)-Schema
3. The Species of Deflationism 3.1 Prosententialism 3.1.1 Prior's
Adverbial Prosententialism 3.1.2 Williams's Substitutional Prosententialism
3.1.3 Grover, Camp, and Belnap's Atomic Prosententialism 3.1.4 Brandom's
Operator Prosententialism 3.2 Disquotationalism 3.2.1 Quine's
Disquotationalism 3.2.2 Leeds's Recursive Disquotationalism 3.2.3 Field's
Pure Disquotational Truth 3.3 Minimalism 3.3.1 Horwich's Minimalism 3.3.2
Hill's Substitutional Minimalism PART
2. CHALLENGES TO DEFLATIONISM
4.
Challenges to Linguistic Deflationism 4.1 Immanence and Limitations on
Truth-Ascriptions 4.1.1 Immanence and Deflationism 4.1.2 Immanence, Foreign
Sentences, Sentences Speakers Do Not Understand 4.2 The Formulation and
Generalization Problems 4.2.1 The Formulation Problem 4.2.2 Understanding the
Generalization Problem 4.2.3 Justifying Generalizations vs. Proving
Generalizations 4.2.4 Field and Hill on Proving Generalizations
5. Challenges
to Metaphysical Deflationism 5.1 The Causal-Explanatory Role Challenge 5.1.1
Explaining the Success of Science 5.1.2 Explaining Behavioral Success 5.2 The
Conservativeness Argument 5.2.1 Explaining the Conservativeness Argument
5.2.2 Responses to the Conservativeness Argument 5.2.3 Consequences of the
Conservativeness Argument 5.3 The Correspondence Intuition, Truthmaking, and
the Truth Property Thesis 5.3.1 From the Correspondence Intuition to
Truth-Maker Theory 5.3.2 The Truth-Property Thesis 5.4 The Challenge from
Normativity
6. Challenges to Conceptual Deflationism 6.1 "Truth-Involving"
Accounts That Deflationists Can Accept 6.2 "Truth-Involving" Accounts That
Deflationists Must Replace 6.3 Deflationism and Theories of Meaning/Content
7. Formal Challenges and Paradox Treatment Deflationism 7.1 Constraints on an
Adequate Resolution of the Liar Paradox 7.1.1 General Constraints on Adequate
Paradox Treatment 7.1.2 Constraints for Paradox Treatment Deflationism 7.2
Tarski's Replacement Theory and the Liar Paradox 7.3 Kripke and
Ungroundedness 7.4 Field on the 'Determinately' Operator 7.5 Grover and
Semantic Inheritors 7.6 Horwich's Semantic Epistemicism 7.7 Deflationary
Dialetheism 7.8 Deflationism, the Paradoxes, and Concluding Remarks Appendix:
New Directions via Sentential-Variable Deflationism and Alethic Fictionalism
A.1 ASVD and the "How-Talk" NLI Approach A.2 The Merits of ASVD A.2.1
Avoiding the Formulation and Generalization Problems A.2.2 Emergence and
Resolution of the Liar Paradox A.2.3 ASVD and the Conservativeness Argument
A.2.4 Why Have a Truth Predicate? A.3 From ASVD to Alethic Fictionalism A.4
Conclusions: Accommodating Broad Four-Dimensional Deflationism Bibliography
index

Bradley Armour-Garb is Professor and Department Chair of Philosophy at the University at Albany-SUNY. His primary interests are in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, and metaphysics with an interest in epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics. Much of his work has regarded truth and paradox. He is the author and editor of several books.

James A. Woodbridge is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His primary philosophical interests are in philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophical logic. He is the co-author, with Bradley Armour-Garb, of Pretense and Pathology: Philosophical Fictionalism and its Applications (2015).