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E-raamat: Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach

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This comparative examination of the derivative action in Asia explores its function, history and practical application in seven jurisdictions. The analysis by leading corporate law scholars of one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms in Asia will benefit corporate lawyers, business executives and corporate law and governance scholars.

This in-depth comparative examination of the derivative action in Asia provides a framework for analyzing its function, history and practical application and examines in detail how derivative actions law works in practice in seven important Asian jurisdictions (China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore). These case studies allow an evaluation of a number of the leading Western comparative corporate law and governance theories which have come to define the field over the last decade. By debunking some of these critically important theories, this book lays the foundation for an accurate understanding of the derivative action in Asia and a re-examination of the regulation of the derivative action around the world.

Arvustused

'Lucid, informative and wide-ranging in coverage, The Derivative Action in Asia will be a standard reference for corporate governance scholars and practitioners.' Curtis J. Milhaupt, Parker Professor of Comparative Corporate Law and Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law, Columbia Law School 'This book carefully explores one of the core mechanisms of corporate governance in a region that has not been examined sufficiently: Asia. The Derivative Action in Asia delivers a wealth of detail for readers interested in the systems of specific countries, while at the same time brilliantly complicating any search for a uniquely Asian approach by highlighting the diversity among those systems. I highly recommend it to scholars, practitioners, and anyone interested in comparative corporate governance.' Mark D. West, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Nippon Life Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School '[ This] book provides valuable information and insights not just concerning derivative actions per se, but also corporate governance patterns and theoretical debates, the investment environment and capitalism generally in Asia.' Sydney Law Review

Muu info

In-depth analysis of the derivative action in Asia a critical part of Asian corporate law and governance.
List of tables
xiv
List of contributors
xv
Foreword xvii
Preface xix
List of abbreviations
xxi
1 The derivative action: an economic, historical and practice-oriented approach
1(89)
Harald Baum
Dan W. Puchniak
I Introduction
1(6)
II The derivative action from an economic and functional perspective
7(57)
1 Definition, characteristics and delimitation
7(1)
a Definition
7(1)
b Characteristics
8(2)
c Delimitation
10(2)
2 Economic efficiencies and inefficiencies
12(1)
a Function
12(3)
b Empirical studies on the derivative action's compensatory value
15(4)
c The comparative value of the empirical research
19(4)
d The ambiguous empirical picture is compounded by the deterrence effect
23(3)
e Illuminating the potential negative effects of derivative actions
26(5)
3 Key elements of regulatory design
31(1)
a The need for economic incentives and disincentives
31(4)
b Designing appropriate economic incentives
35(8)
c Sufficient access to corporate information
43(3)
d Making the company the first option
46(1)
e Filtering out unmeritorious actions
47(11)
f Settlement and abandonment
58(2)
4 The derivative action in context: functional alternatives
60(4)
III The derivative action from a historical perspective
64(10)
1 Historical development in the United States
64(2)
2 Historical development in the United Kingdom
66(6)
3 Germany's historical rejection of the derivative action
72(2)
IV The derivative action from a practical perspective
74(16)
1 Procedure and practice in the United States
74(3)
2 Procedure and practice in the United Kingdom
77(5)
3 Procedure and practice in France
82(2)
4 Procedure and practice in Germany
84(6)
2 The complexity of derivative actions in Asia: an inconvenient truth
90(38)
Dan W. Puchniak
I Introduction
90(8)
II The seven leading Asian jurisdictions
98(2)
III An overview of the derivative action in Asia
100(24)
1 Japanese derivative actions: the rise of non-economic litigiousness
100(4)
2 South Korean derivative actions: moderately litigious and intriguingly unpredictable
104(4)
3 Taiwanese derivative actions: the chill of financial disincentives and domestic cultural norms
108(3)
4 Chinese derivative actions: a complex pathway to minority shareholder protection
111(3)
5 Hong Kong derivative actions: a late and partial break with common law tradition lays a path for reform
114(3)
6 Singapore's derivative actions: mundanely non-Asian, intriguingly non-American and at the forefront of the Commonwealth
117(3)
7 Derivative actions in India: explaining the rarity of derivative actions in a sea of litigation
120(4)
IV The complexity of derivative actions in Asia: a less convenient, but more realistic, truth
124(4)
3 Land of the rising derivative action: revisiting irrationality to understand Japan's unreluctant shareholder litigant
128(58)
Masafumi Nakahigashi
Dan W. Puchniak
I Introduction
128(4)
II Applying the assumption of the economically motivated and rational shareholder litigant to Japan
132(12)
1 The economically motivated and rational explanation for the absence of shareholder litigation in postwar Japan
132(7)
2 Japan's explosion of derivative actions (mis)understood through the lens of the economically motivated and rational shareholder litigant and its testable hypotheses
139(5)
III Putting the hypotheses of the economically motivated and rational Japanese derivative litigant to the test
144(14)
1 Testing the economically motivated and rational shareholder hypothesis: do shareholders benefit financially from derivative actions in Japan?
144(6)
2 Testing the economically motivated and rational attorney hypothesis: do economically motivated and rational attorneys drive derivative litigation in Japan?
150(5)
3 Testing the financial tracking hypothesis: does the rate of derivative actions track changes in their financial costs/benefits?
155(3)
IV Providing a rational explanation for `economically irrational' derivative litigation in Japan
158(10)
1 Demarcating the boundaries between rational and irrational behaviour
158(2)
2 Quasi-rational (non-economically motivated) behaviour drives derivative litigation in Japan
160(3)
3 Purely irrational behaviour as a potential driver of derivative litigation in Japan
163(5)
V Conclusion
168(18)
Appendices
170(16)
4 Invigorating shareholder derivative actions in South Korea
186(29)
Hyeok-Joon Rho
Kon-Sik Kim
I Introduction
186(1)
II Basics of derivative actions: law and reality in South Korea
187(9)
1 Background: the shareholding structure and the legal institutions for shareholder protection
187(1)
a The shareholding structure
187(2)
b Legal institutions for shareholder protection: shareholder direct suits and class actions
189(3)
2 Overview of the structure of a derivative action
192(1)
3 Some statistics and features
193(3)
III Standing for plaintiffs
196(4)
1 General shareholding requirement under the KCC
196(2)
2 Double derivative actions
198(1)
a Concept of a double derivative action and a recent Supreme Court case
198(1)
b Analysis: why are double derivative actions necessary in South Korea?
199(1)
IV Entrepreneurial lawyers: fees and incentives
200(6)
1 Lack of shareholders' incentives and the role of entrepreneurial lawyers in derivative actions
200(1)
2 Who will pay the plaintiff's lawyer?
201(2)
3 How much will the plaintiff's lawyer be paid?
203(1)
a Limitation on contingency fees
203(2)
b Limitation of directors' liability
205(1)
V Regulation of frivolous actions
206(5)
1 Demand requirement
206(1)
a Introduction
206(1)
b A corporation's decision not to sue
207(1)
c A derivative action filed without going through the demand process
207(2)
d Analysis
209(1)
2 Limiting collusive settlements
210(1)
VI A new trend in case law: digression from the passive role model?
211(2)
VII Concluding remarks
213(2)
Appendix
214(1)
5 Derivative actions in Taiwan: legal and cultural hurdles with a glimmer of hope for the future
215(28)
Wang Ruu Tseng
Wallace Wen Yeu Wang
I Introduction
215(1)
II The legal mechanism for conducting a derivative action: requirements for maintaining a derivative action
216(7)
1 The shareholder rules
219(1)
2 The `continuing ownership' rule
220(1)
3 The `security for damages or costs' rule
220(3)
III The ambiguity of civil procedure in Taiwanese derivative actions
223(5)
1 Notification of and intervening in a derivative action
224(1)
2 Ambiguity in an involuntary decrease in a plaintiff's shareholdings
225(2)
3 The binding effect of settlements in derivative actions
227(1)
4 Court fees in derivative actions: a flat rate or a percentage?
227(1)
IV Derivative actions versus direct suits
228(2)
V The relationship between culture, institutional background and the derivative action
230(5)
1 The controlling shareholder system
230(1)
2 Weak company code
231(2)
3 Emphasis on criminal/administrative sanctions
233(1)
4 Taiwan's legal culture
233(1)
5 Paternalism and mass dispute resolution: `Asian values' after all?
234(1)
VI The impact of the derivative action on corporate governance
235(2)
VII The perception of the derivative action and professional services in the marketplace
237(3)
VIII Idiosyncrasies in derivative actions: the role of the government-sanctioned non-profit organization
240(1)
IX Concluding remarks
241(2)
6 Pathway to minority shareholder protection: derivative actions in the People's Republic of China
243(53)
Donald C. Clarke
Nicholas C. Howson
I Introduction
243(1)
II Economic and legal reform in the PRC and the derivative action
244(16)
1 Introduction: the derivative lawsuit and corporate governance in the Chinese context
244(1)
2 Corporatization and its effects
245(4)
3 The LLC form and other non-Company-Law forms
249(4)
4 The legal representative
253(1)
5 The Chinese judiciary: local protectionism, Party control and the avoidance of `mass' litigant cases
254(3)
6 Derivative versus representative
257(1)
7 Costs, cost allocation and cost--benefit analysis for shareholder plaintiffs
258(2)
III Derivative actions before 2006
260(9)
1 Non-statutory rule making: CSRC principles, SPC utterances, local `opinions', and the (draft) `Omnibus' regulation on the 1994 Company Law
260(3)
2 Pre-2006 cases
263(1)
a Genesis of the 1994 SPC Approving Response and other LLC cases
263(4)
b Widely held companies
267(2)
IV The 2006 Company Law and statutory authorization for derivative actions
269(6)
1 Standing
270(2)
2 Demand
272(1)
3 Defendants and associated causes of action
273(2)
V The reality of derivative actions in the PRC from 1 January 2006 to date
275(13)
1 Absence of CLS or publicly listed CLS-related cases
275(3)
2 `Straddling' actions: 2006 Company Law application to pre-2006 transactions
278(1)
3 Avoidance of derivative pleadings
279(1)
4 Autonomy and acceptance
280(2)
5 Technical competence
282(2)
6 Difficulties regarding underlying substantive claims
284(2)
7 Confusion between derivative and representative lawsuits
286(1)
8 Judge-made direct litigation right for supervisors
286(1)
9 Allocation of court fees and `loser pays all'
287(1)
VI Critique of article 152 and reform suggestions
288(5)
VII Conclusion
293(3)
7 A parallel path to shareholder remedies: Hong Kong's derivative actions
296(27)
Paul Von Nessen
S. H. Goo
Chee Keong Low
I Introduction
296(1)
II The common law derivative action: Foss v. Harbottle and its exceptions
297(7)
III The reform process in Hong Kong
304(6)
1 The consultancy report
304(1)
2 The report of the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform
305(2)
3 The SCCLR corporate governance consultation paper (July 2001)
307(1)
4 Companies (Amendments) Bill 2003
308(2)
IV How successful is Hong Kong's statutory derivative action?
310(13)
1 The judicial pronouncements
311(4)
2 Coexistence with the common law
315(4)
3 Should Hong Kong adopt the British reforms?
319(2)
4 Conclusions and observations on future success
321(2)
8 Derivative actions in Singapore: mundanely non-Asian, intriguingly non-American and at the forefront of the Commonwealth
323(46)
Meng Seng Wee
Dan W. Puchniak
I Introduction
323(3)
II Law of minority protection
326(25)
1 History and development
326(1)
a English tradition and seeds of change
326(2)
b Development of company law
328(2)
c Evolution of minority protection law
330(1)
2 Common law derivative action
331(1)
a Introduction
331(1)
b Critique
332(4)
c Conclusion
336(1)
3 Statutory derivative action
336(1)
a Impetus for reform
336(2)
b Scope
338(3)
c The law
341(7)
4 Personal right, corporate right and section 216
348(1)
a Introduction
348(1)
b Giving corporate relief under section 216
349(2)
5 Conclusion
351(1)
III Debunking Western stereotypes
351(14)
1 Western stereotypes of Singapore
351(3)
2 Realities
354(1)
a The evolution of Singapore society and the concurrent rise in shareholder litigation
354(5)
b Singapore's shareholder litigation defies the `nanny state' and `Asian values' stereotypes
359(6)
IV Intriguingly non-American in its success
365(4)
9 The rarity of derivative actions in India: reasons and consequences
369(29)
Vikramaditya Khanna
Umakanth Varottil
I Introduction
369(2)
II Why have derivative actions?
371(9)
1 The desirability of derivative suits to enforce corporate laws
371(7)
2 Application to the Indian context
378(2)
III The derivative action in India
380(14)
1 Foss v. Harbottle and its exceptions
381(1)
a Ultra vires transactions or illegality
382(1)
b Matters requiring special resolution
382(1)
c Fraud on the minority
382(1)
2 Procedural constraints
383(1)
a The `clean hands' doctrine
384(1)
b Order I, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code 1908
384(2)
3 Availability of other remedies
386(1)
a Oppression and mismanagement
386(2)
b Securities laws and SEBI
388(2)
4 Other constraints
390(1)
a Directors' duties
390(1)
b Controlling shareholders' duties
391(1)
c Cultural concerns
392(1)
d Costs
393(1)
IV Recent developments and reform efforts
394(2)
V Conclusions and recommendations for the future
396(2)
10 The derivative action in Asia: some concluding observations
398(6)
Dan W. Puchniak
Harald Baum
Legislative appendix 404(18)
Bibliography 422(21)
Index 443
Dan W. Puchniak is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore, where he specialises in company law with an emphasis on comparative corporate law in East Asia. Harald Baum is a Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Japanese Law Department at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, Germany. He also serves as Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law of Hamburg University and as Research Associate at the European Corporate Governance Institute in Brussels. Michael Ewing-Chow is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore (NUS) where he teaches world trade law and corporate law.
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