| Acknowledgments |
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vii | |
| Introduction |
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1 | (4) |
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5 | (36) |
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The Strategic Decision: Should Dieppe in August 1942 Have Been Raided? |
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5 | (8) |
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The Outcome: Minor Success; Profitless Movement; Major Disaster |
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13 | (2) |
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Later Decisions: Should Reserves Have Been Sent to Red and White Beaches---As Was Done? |
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15 | (1) |
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The Outcome: Wounding, Capture and Death |
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16 | (1) |
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Still Later Decision: Should the Operation Have Been Called Off---As It Was? |
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16 | (1) |
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The Outcome: The Return of Twelve Hundred; Crowing in Berlin |
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17 | (1) |
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How Bad Was the Outcome? How Significant the Battle? |
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17 | (1) |
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An Alternative Approach to Judging Decisions and Outcomes, That of Decision Science |
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18 | (1) |
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Did the Lessons of Dieppe Make Its Outcome, on Net, Good? |
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19 | (2) |
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What Pluses, Other Than Its Lessons, Did Operation Jubilee Have? |
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21 | (1) |
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Judging Decisions Apart from Outcomes |
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22 | (1) |
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Was Undertaking Jubilee a Good or a Bad Decision? |
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23 | (2) |
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How Much Did Ill Luck, Flawed Execution, or Poor Intelligence Contribute to the Bad Outcome? |
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25 | (3) |
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Given the Retrospective Consensus That the Plans for Operations Rutter and Jubilee Were Disastrous, Why Had They Been Approved? |
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28 | (3) |
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Could No One Have Prevented the Suicidal Folly? Did the Fault Lie in the Meta-Decisions---The Determinations of How the Decisions Would Be Made? |
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31 | (3) |
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Meta-Decisional Issues: How Should Go-No-Go Determinations Be Made? How Were They Made on Dieppe? |
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34 | (1) |
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Did the British Authorize Rutter/Jubilee Expecting Failure---Perhaps Also Hoping for It and Even Acting to Sabotage the Raid? |
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35 | (2) |
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The Expected Value of Information |
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37 | (1) |
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What Should the Allies Have Done? |
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38 | (1) |
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Models of Governmental Decision-Making |
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38 | (1) |
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39 | (2) |
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41 | (45) |
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The Grand-Strategic Decision: Should the Allies in November 1942 Have Landed in North Africa? |
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41 | (8) |
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The Four Steps of Decision Science |
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49 | (1) |
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Competing Grand-Strategic Priorities |
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49 | (2) |
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51 | (1) |
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52 | (2) |
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54 | (3) |
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Values: Anglo-American Differences in Outlook and Priority |
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57 | (2) |
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Modes of Decision Influence |
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59 | (6) |
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65 | (1) |
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The Outcome: Brief Opposition in Landing; Loss of the Race for Tunis; Capturing Thrice as Many Men as Had Been in the Afrika Korps |
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66 | (6) |
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The Sequence of Outcome Ratings for Torch: First Good; Then Bad; Ultimately, Better Than Good |
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72 | (1) |
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73 | (2) |
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Consequences of the Allied Failure to Take Tunis Quickly |
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75 | (1) |
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Was Undertaking Operation Gymnast/Torch a Good or a Bad Decision? |
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75 | (3) |
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Was the Decision of Adolf Hitler to Send More Troops to Africa Good or Bad? |
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78 | (2) |
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80 | (1) |
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81 | (2) |
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Move-Order Plusses and Minuses |
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83 | (1) |
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84 | (2) |
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86 | (27) |
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The Non-Decision: Should the Allies in July and August of 1943 Have Acted, More Than They Negligibly Did, to Prevent the Escape of 53,000 Germans Across the Strait of Messina? |
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87 | (1) |
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The Outcome: Allied Conquest of Sicily; German Escape; Italian Forsaking of the Axis Alliance |
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88 | (1) |
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How Good or Bad Was the Outcome of Operation Husky? |
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89 | (1) |
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Judgments on the Non-Decision of Failing to Interdict German Flight and Its Outcome |
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90 | (1) |
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What Affected How Bad or How Good the Outcome of Operation Husky Was? |
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91 | (2) |
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What Steps Might the Allies Have Taken to Have Captured or Killed Tens of Thousands More Germans in Sicily? |
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93 | (4) |
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Why Did the Allies in Sicily Not Take Any of Many Possible Decision Alternatives, Instead of Drifting into Their Actual, Inferior Non-Decision? |
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97 | (2) |
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Who, If Anyone, Was at Fault? |
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99 | (1) |
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What Should the Allies Not Have Done? |
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100 | (2) |
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Principals and Agents; Unity of Command |
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102 | (6) |
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Why Did the Germans in Sicily Do Better Than the Allies? |
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108 | (1) |
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The Perspective of Game Theory |
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108 | (1) |
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109 | (1) |
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109 | (1) |
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How Bad Were the Consequences of the Non-Decision at Messina? |
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110 | (1) |
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111 | (2) |
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113 | (26) |
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The Strategic Decision: Should the Allies in January 1944 Have Landed at Anzio? |
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113 | (5) |
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The Operational Decision: Should Major General John Lucas, in His First Two Days Ashore, Have Pushed Boldly Forward---Which He Did Not Do? |
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118 | (2) |
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The Outcome: Stalemate at the Beachhead |
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120 | (2) |
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Did the Operational Decision of John Lucas Have a Good or a Bad Outcome? |
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122 | (1) |
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Was the Operational Decision of John Lucas Good or Bad? |
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123 | (2) |
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Did Operation Shingle Have a Good or a Bad Outcome? |
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125 | (2) |
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127 | (1) |
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128 | (2) |
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130 | (1) |
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Judgments of the Decision to Undertake Shingle |
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131 | (1) |
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132 | (2) |
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Game-Theoretic Perspectives on Anzio |
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134 | (1) |
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134 | (3) |
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137 | (2) |
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Epilogue: The Science of Deciding, the Theory of Games and War |
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139 | (32) |
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139 | (1) |
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Ways of Influencing and Resolving Decisions |
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139 | (4) |
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143 | (2) |
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145 | (3) |
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148 | (4) |
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Decision Fatigue, Food and Sex |
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152 | (1) |
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153 | (4) |
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157 | (2) |
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159 | (3) |
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Principals, Agents, Asymmetric Information, Command Unity and Coalitions |
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162 | (3) |
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The Potential Value of Decision Science and Game Theory Between Dieppe and Anzio |
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165 | (2) |
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Better Decisions in Conflicts to Come |
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167 | (4) |
| Chapter Notes |
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171 | (20) |
| Bibliography |
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191 | (6) |
| Index |
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197 | |
Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta