| Acknowledgments |
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xv | |
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xvi | |
| Introduction |
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1 | (8) |
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1 Why to Analyze State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations: The Flawed Debate on Direct Human Rights Obligations for Non-State Actors |
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9 | (38) |
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9 | (4) |
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II Why the Existing Human Rights Regime Cannot Be Construed to Contain Direct Obligations for Non-State Actors |
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13 | (17) |
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1 Customary International Law |
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14 | (2) |
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16 | (1) |
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17 | (1) |
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a Human Rights Treaties as Living Instruments |
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18 | (5) |
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23 | (3) |
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c "Abuse of Rights" Clauses |
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26 | (2) |
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28 | (2) |
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III Reasons Speaking for Direct Human Rights Obligations on Behalf of Private Actors |
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30 | (2) |
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IV Reasons against Imposing Direct Human Rights Obligations on Non-State Actors |
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32 | (11) |
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1 Procedural and Definitional Questions |
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32 | (1) |
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a Non-State Actors and International Norm Setting |
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32 | (2) |
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b Making Non-State Actors Duty Bearers: "Capacity" as an Adequate Yardstick? |
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34 | (3) |
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c Shared Accountability between States and Non-State Actors? |
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37 | (1) |
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2 Legitimacy Questions: Non-State Actors and the Balancing of Public Interests |
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38 | (3) |
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41 | (1) |
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a A Chance for States to Neglect Their Own Duties |
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42 | (1) |
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b Awarding Corresponding Rights to Non-State Actors |
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42 | (1) |
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V Conclusion: The Necessity of Exploiting the Full Potential of State Responsibility |
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43 | (4) |
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2 Establishing State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations: Proposal for a Conduct-Based Typology of Human Rights Obligations |
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47 | (31) |
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47 | (1) |
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II The Inadequacy of Traditional Human Rights Typologies |
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48 | (6) |
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1 Three Generations of Human Rights |
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49 | (2) |
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2 Obligations to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill |
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51 | (1) |
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3 Positive versus Negative Obligations |
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52 | (2) |
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III Proposal for a Conduct-Based Typology of Human Rights |
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54 | (22) |
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1 Positive Human Rights Obligations of Result |
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55 | (1) |
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a Preventive Obligations of Result |
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56 | (1) |
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aa The Duty to Enact Legislation |
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56 | (2) |
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1 Failure to Enact Legislation |
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58 | (2) |
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2 Enacting Legislation That Violates Human Rights |
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60 | (1) |
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bb The Duty to Establish an Administrative Apparatus |
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61 | (2) |
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b Punitive Obligations of Result |
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63 | (1) |
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aa The Duty to Establish an Investigative and Judicial Apparatus |
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63 | (1) |
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bb The Duty to Create Legal Remedies |
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64 | (1) |
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cc The Duty to Investigate Allegations of Human Rights Violations |
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65 | (2) |
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dd The Duty to Provide for Specific Criminal Legislation |
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67 | (1) |
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ee The Duty to Award Reparations |
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68 | (1) |
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2 Positive Human Rights Obligations of Diligent Conduct |
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69 | (2) |
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a Preventive Obligations of Diligent Conduct |
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71 | (1) |
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b Repressive Obligations of Diligent Conduct |
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71 | (3) |
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3 Positive Obligations of Progressive Realization |
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74 | (1) |
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75 | (1) |
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76 | (2) |
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3 The Origins of Due Diligence in International Law |
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78 | (38) |
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78 | (1) |
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II Due Diligence in Early Scholarly Writings |
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78 | (5) |
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1 Grotius's Concept of Patientia and Receptus Responsibility |
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79 | (1) |
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2 Pufendorf and the Presumption of Capacities to Prevent |
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80 | (1) |
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3 Wolff and Vattel: From Responsibility of the Monarch to Responsibility of States |
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80 | (1) |
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4 Hall and Oppenheim: Reasonable Measures of Prevention and Vicarious Responsibility |
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81 | (1) |
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82 | (1) |
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III Due Diligence in Early Jurisprudence |
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83 | (7) |
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1 The Duty to Protect Foreigners and the Establishment of Claims Commissions |
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83 | (1) |
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2 The Jurisprudence of the Claims Commissions |
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84 | (1) |
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a Preventive Obligations of Due Diligence |
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85 | (1) |
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b Repressive Obligations of Due Diligence |
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86 | (1) |
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c Due Diligence versus Complicity |
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87 | (1) |
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d Responsibility in Case of Civil Insurgency |
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88 | (1) |
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3 Due Diligence Obligations in Transboundary Cases |
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89 | (1) |
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IV Due Diligence within the System of State Responsibility |
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90 | (2) |
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1 Failed Attempts at Codification |
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90 | (2) |
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2 The ILC's Work on State Responsibility and the Due Diligence Concept |
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92 | (1) |
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V Confusion of Concepts: Distinguishing Due Diligence from Other Responsibility Concepts |
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92 | (22) |
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93 | (1) |
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94 | (1) |
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a The Role of Fault within the Law on State Responsibility: General Remarks |
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95 | (1) |
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b Due Diligence Obligations and Negligence |
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96 | (1) |
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c Due Diligence as a Standard of Conduct Contained in Primary Norms |
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97 | (2) |
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3 Liability for Acts Not Prohibited by International Law |
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99 | (1) |
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a Responsibility versus Liability |
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99 | (2) |
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b Draft Articles ojfr Prevention of Transboundary Harm |
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101 | (1) |
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4 Obligations of Conduct and Obligations of Result |
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102 | (1) |
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102 | (1) |
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b Why the Distinction Matters: The Temporal Dimension of a Breach |
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103 | (2) |
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c The ILC's Proposal on Preventive Obligations |
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105 | (1) |
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106 | (1) |
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a Complicity in Wrongful Conduct of Other States |
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107 | (2) |
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b Complicity in Non-State Conduct |
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109 | (1) |
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aa Complicity in Case of Individual Criminal Responsibility |
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109 | (1) |
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bb Complicity as Ground for Attribution |
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110 | (1) |
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cc Complicity versus Due Diligence: Where the Confusion Comes From |
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111 | (1) |
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1 Why the Distinction Is Relevant |
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112 | (1) |
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2 Distinction Based on the "Knowledge" Criterion |
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112 | (2) |
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114 | (2) |
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4 The Components of the Due Diligence Standard |
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116 | (26) |
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116 | (1) |
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117 | (4) |
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118 | (1) |
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118 | (1) |
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a An Obligation to Acquire Knowledge |
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119 | (1) |
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b Determination by Objective Factors |
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119 | (2) |
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121 | (7) |
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1 Institutional Capacities |
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122 | (1) |
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2 Territorial and Financial Capacities |
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123 | (1) |
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124 | (2) |
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b Technical and Financial Capacities |
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126 | (1) |
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c Force Majeure I Necessity |
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127 | (1) |
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128 | (12) |
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1 Elements of Reasonableness under International Law |
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129 | (1) |
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a Reasonableness and Proportionality |
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130 | (2) |
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b Reasonableness and Rationality |
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132 | (1) |
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c Reasonableness and Compliance |
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133 | (1) |
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d Reasonableness and Balancing |
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134 | (2) |
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2 Assessing Reasonableness: Objective versus Subjective Approaches |
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136 | (1) |
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137 | (3) |
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140 | (2) |
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5 Lessons to Be Learned from the Application of Due Diligence Obligations in Other Fields of International Law |
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142 | (62) |
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5.1 Due Diligence Obligations in International Environmental Law |
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144 | (1) |
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144 | (1) |
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II Preventive Obligations and the No-Harm Rule |
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145 | (2) |
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147 | (7) |
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1 Precautionary Obligations |
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147 | (3) |
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2 An Obligation to Acquire Knowledge: Environmental Impact Assessments |
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150 | (3) |
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3 An Obligation to Share Knowledge? Duties to Cooperate |
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153 | (1) |
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154 | (5) |
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1 Best Available Technologies |
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155 | (1) |
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2 Common but Differentiated Responsibilities |
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156 | (3) |
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159 | (4) |
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1 Technological Development |
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159 | (1) |
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159 | (1) |
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3 Objective versus Subjective Standards of Care |
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160 | (1) |
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161 | (2) |
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163 | (4) |
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5.2 Due Diligence Obligations to Curb Terrorist Activities |
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167 | (1) |
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167 | (4) |
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171 | (1) |
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172 | (11) |
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1 Institutional Capacities |
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172 | (1) |
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2 Financial and Territorial Capacities |
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173 | (1) |
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a Self-Defense against Non-State Actors? |
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173 | (4) |
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b The Unwilling or Unable-Standard |
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177 | (1) |
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aa Is There an Obligation to Enhance Capacities? |
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178 | (1) |
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bb Does Inability Justify a Forceful Response by Other States? |
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179 | (2) |
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cc Broadening the Scope of Reasonable Efforts |
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181 | (2) |
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183 | (2) |
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5.3 Due Diligence Obligations in the Cybersphere |
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185 | (1) |
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185 | (1) |
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II The Problem of Attribution in the Cybersphere |
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186 | (2) |
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III Due Diligence in the Cybersphere |
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188 | (11) |
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1 Due Diligence Obligations in the Aftermath of a Cyber Incident |
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189 | (1) |
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2 Preventive Due Diligence Obligations in the Cybersphere |
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190 | (1) |
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a Knowledge: The Foreseeability of Harmful Cyber Incidents |
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190 | (3) |
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b Reasonable Measures of Prevention |
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193 | (2) |
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c Shifting the Burden of Proof? |
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195 | (2) |
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d Capacities in the Cybersphere |
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197 | (2) |
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IV Summary: Is There Room for Preventive Cyber Obligations? |
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199 | (3) |
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202 | (2) |
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6 Applying the Due Diligence Framework to the Field of Human Rights Protection |
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204 | (54) |
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204 | (1) |
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204 | (16) |
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1 Obtaining Knowledge: The Risk of Excessive Surveillance and Control |
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206 | (2) |
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2 The Knowledge Standard in Human Rights Jurisprudence |
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208 | (1) |
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a Information of Human Rights Risks |
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209 | (3) |
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b Constellations in Which States Create or Contribute to the Creation of Human Rights Risks |
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212 | (1) |
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212 | (1) |
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213 | (1) |
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c Consistent Patterns of Human Rights Violations |
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214 | (1) |
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aa Frequency of Human Rights Contraventions in the Past |
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215 | (1) |
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bb Frequent Human Rights Violations in a Particular Region |
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215 | (1) |
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cc Particular Risks for Certain Groups of Individuals |
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216 | (1) |
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217 | (1) |
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3 Human Rights Impact Assessments |
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218 | (2) |
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220 | (24) |
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1 Human Rights Due Diligence Obligations of Developing Countries |
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222 | (3) |
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2 Human Rights Due Diligence Obligations in Times of Economic Crisis |
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225 | (2) |
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3 Human Rights Due Diligence Obligations in Conflict Situations |
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227 | (4) |
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4 Human Rights Obligations Not Dependent on Capacities |
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231 | (1) |
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232 | (1) |
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b Duties to Monitor and to Inform |
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233 | (3) |
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236 | (1) |
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aa Obligations-to Seek Assistance |
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237 | (2) |
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bb Obligations to Render Assistance: Drawing Inspiration from the "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" Approach |
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239 | (2) |
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241 | (1) |
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242 | (1) |
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bb Minimum Core Obligations |
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242 | (2) |
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244 | (1) |
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244 | (12) |
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248 | (1) |
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a Status of the Right That Is to Be Protected |
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248 | (2) |
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b Preventive Obligations: Seriousness of Risk |
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250 | (1) |
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c Punitive Obligations: Seriousness of Violation |
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251 | (1) |
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d Balancing with Other Human Rights and Public Interests |
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252 | (2) |
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254 | (1) |
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255 | (1) |
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256 | (2) |
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7 A Case for Extraterritorial Due Diligence Obligations in the Human Rights Context |
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258 | (64) |
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258 | (2) |
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II Between Universal Human Rights Protection and the Principle of Non-intervention: The Tension Underlying Extraterritorial Human Rights Protection |
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260 | (3) |
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III Jurisdictional Clauses in International Human Rights Regimes |
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263 | (2) |
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IV Jurisdictional Clauses and State Responsibility |
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265 | (2) |
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V Negative versus Positive Obligations in Extraterritorial Cases |
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267 | (7) |
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1 The ECtHR's Perspective |
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268 | (4) |
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272 | (2) |
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VI The Underdeveloped Potential of Positive Obligations of Diligent Conduct in Extraterritorial Constellations |
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274 | (10) |
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1 When Knowledge Can Be Expected in Extraterritorial Constellations |
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275 | (1) |
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a Due Diligence Obligations When the Victim is within a State's Jurisdictional Reach |
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276 | (1) |
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b Due Diligence Obligations When the Perpetrator is within a State's Jurisdictional Reach |
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277 | (1) |
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2 Reasonable Efforts in Extraterritorial Constellations: Reconciling Positive Obligations with the Principle of Non-intervention |
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278 | (6) |
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284 | (1) |
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VII Can There Be an Obligation to Act Extraterritorially? Drawing Inspiration from the "Unwilling or Unable" Standard |
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284 | (6) |
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1 Human Rights as a Common Concern and the Issue of Diverging Capacities |
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286 | (3) |
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2 How Extraterritorial Regulations Based on the Active Personality Principle Could Improve Human Rights Protection |
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289 | (1) |
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VIII First Steps in the Right Direction: Social and Economic Rights |
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290 | (2) |
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IX Areas in Which Extraterritorial Due Diligence Obligations Could Be Applied |
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292 | (30) |
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292 | (1) |
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a Foreign Trade Promotion: Drawing Inspiration from Procedural Obligations in Environmental Law |
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293 | (3) |
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b Applying the Due Diligence Standard to Arms Transfer Control |
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296 | (1) |
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aa International Norms Applicable to Arms Transfer |
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296 | (1) |
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bb Human Rights Law and Arms Transfer |
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297 | (2) |
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cc Attribution, Complicity, and Aiding and Abetting in the Context of Arms Transfers |
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299 | (1) |
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dd Due Diligence Obligations in the Context of Arms Transfers? |
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300 | (1) |
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300 | (1) |
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301 | (1) |
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301 | (1) |
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302 | (1) |
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303 | (3) |
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306 | (1) |
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306 | (1) |
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2 Regulating Extraterritorial Corporate Conduct |
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307 | (1) |
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307 | (2) |
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b The French Law on Duty of Care 2017 |
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309 | (3) |
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c Proposals on Corporate Regulations within the European Union |
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312 | (1) |
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aa EU Directive 2014/95/EU |
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313 | (1) |
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bb EU Flagship Initiative on the Garment Sector |
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313 | (1) |
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d The Californian Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 |
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314 | (1) |
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e The UK Motfern Slavery Act of 2015 |
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315 | (1) |
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f Domestic Proposals on the Regulation of Extraterritorial Corporate Conduct |
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316 | (1) |
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aa Proposal by the German Green Party of 2016 and Coalition Agreement of 2018 |
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316 | (2) |
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bb Switzerland: Konzerninitiative Verantwortung |
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318 | (1) |
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319 | (3) |
| Summary and Outlook |
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322 | (5) |
| Index |
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327 | |