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E-raamat: Economics of Electricity Markets

(Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Melbourne, Australia), (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden)
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  • Sari: IEEE Press
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Jul-2014
  • Kirjastus: Wiley-IEEE Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781118775738
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  • Formaat: PDF+DRM
  • Sari: IEEE Press
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Jul-2014
  • Kirjastus: Wiley-IEEE Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781118775738
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"The book covers the basic modelling of electricity markets, including the impact of uncertainty, an integral part of generation investment decisions and transmission cost-benefit analysis"--

With the transition to liberalized electricity markets in many countries, the shift to more environmentally sustainable forms of power generation and increasing penetration of electric vehicles and smart appliances, a fundamental understanding of the economic principles underpinning the electricity industry is vital. Using clarity and precision, the authors successfully explain the economic theory of all liberalized electricity market types from a cross-disciplinary engineering and policy perspective. No prior engineering knowledge or economics expertise is assumed in introducing key ideas such as nodal pricing, optimal dispatch and efficient pricing or in extending those models to areas including investment, risk management and the handling of contingencies.

Key features:

• Comprehensively covers the principles of all liberalized electricity market types, including the US, Europe, New Zealand and Australia.

• Provides up-to-date coverage of research and policy issues, including design of financial transmission rights, modeling of market power, problems of regional pricing, and design of distribution pricing to facilitate Smart Grid.

• Spans introductory material to cutting-edge thinking on risk-management and short-run dispatch.

• Supports independent learning and teaching with worked examples and problems, enabling the reader to test and further deepen their understanding, whilst also promoting their insight and intuition.

• Solutions to problems and figures are hosted on a companion website.

This ground-breaking text is an indispensable resource for the next generation of engineers, economists and policy-makers in or preparing to enter the electricity sector. Graduate students in electrical engineering and economics will benefit from the breadth of material and detailed, economically precise presentation.



Bridges the knowledge gap between engineering and economics in a complex and evolving deregulated electricity industry, enabling readers to understand, operate, plan and design a modern power system

With an accessible and progressive style written in straight-forward language, this book covers everything an engineer or economist needs to know to understand, operate within, plan and design an effective liberalized electricity industry, thus serving as both a useful teaching text and a valuable reference. The book focuses on principles and theory which are independent of any one market design. It outlines where the theory is not implemented in practice, perhaps due to other over-riding concerns. The book covers the basic modelling of electricity markets, including the impact of uncertainty (an integral part of generation investment decisions and transmission cost-benefit analysis). It draws out the parallels to the Nordpool market (an important point of reference for Europe). Written from the perspective of the policy-maker, the first part provides the introductory background knowledge required. This includes an understanding of basic economics concepts such as supply and demand, monopoly, market power and marginal cost. The second part of the book asks how a set of generation, load, and transmission resources should be efficiently operated, and the third part focuses on the generation investment decision. Part 4 addresses the question of the management of risk and Part 5 discusses the question of market power. Any power system must be operated at all times in a manner which can accommodate the next potential contingency. This demands responses by generators and loads on a very short timeframe. Part 6 of the book addresses the question of dispatch in the very short run, introducing the distinction between preventive and corrective actions and why preventive actions are sometimes required. The seventh part deals with pricing issues that arise under a regionally-priced market, such as the Australian NEM. This section introduces the notion of regions and interconnectors and how to formulate constraints for the correct pricing outcomes (the issue of "constraint orientation"). Part 8 addresses the fundamental and difficult issue of efficient transmission investment, and finally Part 9 covers issues that arise in the retail market.

  • Bridges the gap between engineering and economics in electricity, covering both the economics and engineering knowledge needed to accurately understand, plan and develop the electricity market
  • Comprehensive coverage of all the key topics in the economics of electricity markets
  • Covers the latest research and policy issues as well as description of the fundamental concepts and principles that can be applied across all markets globally
  • Numerous worked examples and end-of-chapter problems Companion website holding solutions to problems set out in the book, also the relevant simulation (GAMS) codes
Preface xv
Nomenclature xvii
PART I INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
1(30)
1 Introduction to Micro-economics
3(28)
1.1 Economic Objectives
3(2)
1.2 Introduction to Constrained Optimisation
5(1)
1.3 Demand and Consumers' Surplus
6(4)
1.3.1 The Short-Run Decision of the Customer
7
1.3.2 The Value or Utility Function
1(6)
1.3.3 The Demand Curve for a Price-Taking Customer Facing a Simple Price
7(3)
1.4 Supply and Producers' Surplus
10(4)
1.4.1 The Cost Function
11(1)
1.4.2 The Supply Curve for a Price-Taking Firm Facing a Simple Price
11(3)
1.5 Achieving Optimal Short-Run Outcomes Using Competitive Markets
14(3)
1.5.1 The Short-Run Welfare Maximum
14(1)
1.5.2 An Autonomous Market Process
15(2)
1.6 Smart Markets
17(3)
1.6.1 Smart Markets and Generic Constraints
17(1)
1.6.2 A Smart Market Process
18(2)
1.7 Longer-Run Decisions by Producers and Consumers
20(2)
1.7.1 Investment in Productive Capacity
20(2)
1.8 Monopoly
22(4)
1.8.1 The Dominant Firm -- Competitive Fringe Structure
24(1)
1.8.2 Monopoly and Price Regulation
25(1)
1.9 Oligopoly
26(2)
1.9.1 Cournot Oligopoly
27(1)
1.9.2 Repeated Games
27(1)
1.10 Summary
28(3)
Questions
29(1)
Further Reading
30(1)
PART II INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRICITY NETWORKS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS
31(60)
2 Introduction to Electric Power Systems
33(40)
2.1 DC Circuit Concepts
33(3)
2.1.1 Energy, Watts and Power
34(1)
2.1.2 Losses
35(1)
2.2 AC Circuit Concepts
36(2)
2.3 Reactive Power
38(7)
2.3.1 Mathematics of Reactive Power
40(2)
2.3.2 Control of Reactive Power
42(1)
2.3.3 Ohm's Law on AC Circuits
43(1)
2.3.4 Three-Phase Power
44(1)
2.4 The Elements of an Electric Power System
45(1)
2.5 Electricity Generation
46(6)
2.5.1 The Key Characteristics of Electricity Generators
49(3)
2.6 Electricity Transmission and Distribution Networks
52(8)
2.6.1 Transmission Networks
54(3)
2.6.2 Distribution Networks
57(2)
2.6.3 Competition and Regulation
59(1)
2.7 Physical Limits on Networks
60(6)
2.7.1 Thermal Limits
61(3)
2.7.2 Voltage Stability Limits
64(1)
2.7.3 Dynamic and Transient Stability Limits
64(2)
2.8 Electricity Consumption
66(1)
2.9 Does it Make Sense Distinguish Electricity Producer's and Consumers?
67(3)
2.9.1 The Service Provided by the Electric Power Industry
69(1)
2.10 Summary
70(3)
Questions
71(1)
Further Reading
72(1)
3 Electricity Industry Market Structure and Competition
73(18)
3.1 Tasks Performed in an Efficient Electricity Industry
73(3)
3.1.1 Short-Term Tasks
73(2)
3.1.2 Risk-Management Tasks
75(1)
3.1.3 Long-Term Tasks
75(1)
3.2 Electricity Industry Reforms
76(3)
3.2.1 Market-Orientated Reforms of the Late Twentieth Century
77(2)
3.3 Approaches to Reform of the Electricity Industry
79(2)
3.4 Other Key Roles in a Market-Orientated Electric Power System
81(1)
3.5 An Overview of Liberalised Electricity Markets
82(3)
3.6 An Overview of the Australian National Electricity Market
85(3)
3.6.1 Assessment of the NEM
87(1)
3.7 The Pros and Cons of Electricity Market Reform
88(1)
3.8 Summary
89(2)
Questions
90(1)
Further Reading
90(1)
PART III OPTIMAL DISPATCH: THE EFFICIENT USE OF GENERATION, CONSUMPTION AND NETWORK RESOURCES
91(88)
4 Efficient Short-Term Operation of an Electricity Industry with no Network Constraints
93(26)
4.1 The Cost of Generation
93(3)
4.2 Simple Stylised Representation of a Generator
96(1)
4.3 Optimal Dispatch of Generation with Inelastic Demand
97(5)
4.3.1 Optimal Least Cost Dispatch of Generation Resources
98(1)
4.3.2 Least Cost Dispatch for Generators with Constant Variable Cost
99(2)
4.3.3 Example
101(1)
4.4 Optimal Dispatch of Both Generation and Load Assets
102(2)
4.5 Symmetry in the Treatment of Generation and Load
104(1)
4.5.1 Symmetry Between Buyer-Owned Generators and Stand-Alone
Generators
104(1)
4.5.2 Symmetry Between Total Surplus Maximisation and Generation Cost Minimisation
105(1)
4.6 The Benefit Function
105(1)
4.7 Nonconvexities in Production: Minimum Operating Levels
106(2)
4.8 Efficient Dispatch of Energy-Limited Resources
108(2)
4.8.1 Example
109(1)
4.9 Efficient Dispatch in the Presence of Ramp-Rate Constraints
110(1)
4.9.1 Example
111(2)
4.10 Startup Costs and the Unit-Commitment Decision
113(2)
4.11 Summary
115(4)
Questions
116(1)
Further Reading
117(2)
5 Achieving Efficient Use of Generation and Load Resources using a Market Mechanism in an Industry with no Network Constraints
119(20)
5.1 Decentralisation, Competition and Market Mechanisms
119(2)
5.2 Achieving Optimal Dispatch Through Competitive Bidding
121(2)
5.3 Variation in Wholesale Market Design
123(3)
5.3.1 Compulsory Gross Pool or Net Pool?
124(1)
5.3.2 Single Price or Pay-as-Bid?
125(1)
5.4 Day-Ahead Versus Real-Time Markets
126(3)
5.4.1 Improving the Quality of Short-Term Price Forecasts
127(2)
5.4.2 Reducing the Exercise of Market Power
129(1)
5.5 Price Controls and Rationing
129(4)
5.5.1 Inadequate Metering and Involuntary Load Shedding
131(2)
5.6 Time-Varying Demand, the Load-Duration Curve and the Price-Duration Curve
133(2)
5.7 Summary
135(4)
Questions
137(1)
Further Reading
137(2)
6 Representing Network Constraints
139(14)
6.1 Representing Networks Mathematically
139(2)
6.2 Net Injections, Power Flows and the DC Load Flow Model
141(4)
6.2.1 The DC Load Flow Model
144(1)
6.3 The Matrix of Power Transfer Distribution Factors
145(1)
6.3.1 Converting between Reference Nodes
146(1)
6.4 Distribution Factors for Radial Networks
146(1)
6.5 Constraint Equations and the Set of Feasible Injections
147(4)
6.6 Summary
151(2)
Questions
152(1)
7 Efficient Dispatch of Generation and Consumption Resources in the Presence of Network Congestion
153(18)
7.1 Optimal Dispatch with Network Constraints
153(3)
7.1.1 Achieving Optimal Dispatch Using a Smart Market
155(1)
7.2 Optimal Dispatch in a Radial Network
156(1)
7.3 Optimal Dispatch in a Two-Node Network
157(2)
7.4 Optimal Dispatch in a Three-Node Meshed Network
159(2)
7.5 Optimal Dispatch in a Four-Node Network
161(1)
7.6 Properties of Nodal Prices with a Single Binding Constraint
162(1)
7.7 How Many Independent Nodal Prices Exist?
163(1)
7.8 The Merchandising Surplus, Settlement Residues and the Congestion Rents
163(3)
7.8.1 Merchandising Surplus and Congestion Rents
163(1)
7.8.2 Settlement Residues
164(1)
7.8.3 Merchandising Surplus in a Three-Node Network
165(1)
7.9 Network Losses
166(3)
7.9.1 Losses, Settlement Residues and Merchandising Surplus
167(1)
7.9.2 Losses and Optimal Dispatch
168(1)
7.10 Summary
169(2)
Questions
170(1)
Further Reading
170(1)
8 Efficient Network Operation
171(8)
8.1 Efficient Operation of DC Interconnectors
171(2)
8.1.1 Entrepreneurial DC Network Operation
173(1)
8.2 Optimal Network Switching
173(4)
8.2.1 Network Switching and Network Contingencies
174(1)
8.2.2 A Worked Example
174(2)
8.2.3 Entrepreneurial Network Switching?
176(1)
8.3 Summary
177(2)
Questions
178(1)
Further Reading
178(1)
PART IV EFFICIENT INVESTMENT IN GENERATION AND CONSUMPTION ASSETS
179(30)
9 Efficient Investment in Generation and Consumption Assets
181(18)
9.1 The Optimal Generation Investment Problem
181(2)
9.2 The Optimal Level of Generation Capacity with Downward Sloping Demand
183(3)
9.2.1 The Case of Inelastic Demand
185(1)
9.3 The Optimal Mix of Generation Capacity with Downward Sloping Demand
186(3)
9.4 The Optimal Mix of Generation with Inelastic Demand
189(2)
9.5 Screening Curve Analysis
191(2)
9.5.1 Using Screening Curves to Assess the Impact of Increased Renewable Penetration
192(1)
9.5.2 Generation Investment in the Presence of Network Constraints
193(1)
9.6 Buyer-Side Investment
193(2)
9.7 Summary
195(4)
Questions
196(1)
Further Reading
197(2)
10 Market-Based Investment in Electricity Generation
199(10)
10.1 Decentralised Generation Investment Decisions
199(2)
10.2 Can We Trust Competitive Markets to Deliver an Efficient Level of Investment in Generation?
201(2)
10.2.1 Episodes of High Prices as an Essential Part of an Energy-Only Market
201(1)
10.2.2 The `Missing Money' Problem
202(1)
10.2.3 Energy-Only Markets and the Investment Boom--Bust Cycle
203(1)
10.3 Price Caps, Reserve Margins and Capacity Payments
203(3)
10.3.1 Reserve Requirements
204(1)
10.3.2 Capacity Markets
205(1)
10.4 Time-Averaging of Network Charges and Generation Investment
206(1)
10.5 Summary
207(2)
Questions
207(2)
PART V HANDLING CONTINGENCIES: EFFICIENT DISPATCH IN THE VERY SHORT RUN
209(34)
11 Efficient Operation of the Power System in the Very Short-Run
211(20)
11.1 Introduction to Contingencies
211(1)
11.2 Efficient Handling of Contingencies
212(1)
11.3 Preventive and Corrective Actions
213(2)
11.4 Satisfactory and Secure Operating States
215(1)
11.5 Optimal Dispatch in the Very Short Run
216(2)
11.6 Operating the Power System Ex Ante as though Certain Contingencies have Already Happened
218(1)
11.7 Examples of Optimal Short-Run Dispatch
219(4)
11.7.1 A Second Example, Ignoring Network Constraints
221(1)
11.7.2 A Further Example with Network Constraints
222(1)
11.8 Optimal Short-Run Dispatch Using a Competitive Market
223(6)
11.8.1 A Simple Example
224(3)
11.8.2 Optimal Short-Run Dispatch through Prices
227(1)
11.8.3 Investment Incentives
228(1)
11.9 Summary
229(2)
Questions
230(1)
Further Reading
230(1)
12 Frequency-Based Dispatch of Balancing Services
231(12)
12.1 The Intradispatch Interval Dispatch Mechanism
231(1)
12.2 Frequency-Based Dispatch of Balancing Services
232(1)
12.3 Implications of Ignoring Network Constraints when Handling Contingencies
233(5)
12.3.1 The Feasible Set of Injections with a Frequency-Based IDIDM
235(3)
12.4 Procurement of Frequency-Based Balancing Services
238(3)
12.4.1 The Volume of Frequency Control Balancing Services Required
238(1)
12.4.2 Procurement of Balancing Services
239(1)
12.4.3 Allocating the Costs of Balancing Services
240(1)
12.5 Summary
241(2)
Questions
242(1)
Further Reading
242(1)
PART VI MANAGING RISK
243(36)
13 Managing Intertemporal Price Risks
245(22)
13.1 Introduction to Forward Markets and Standard Hedge Contracts
245(4)
13.1.1 Instruments for Managing Risk: Swaps, Caps, Collars and Floors
246(1)
13.1.2 Swaps
246(1)
13.1.3 Caps
247(1)
13.1.4 Floors
248(1)
13.1.5 Collars (and Related Instruments)
249(1)
13.2 The Construction of a Perfect Hedge: The Theory
249(3)
13.2.1 The Design of a Perfect Hedge
250(2)
13.3 The Construction of a Perfect Hedge: Specific Cases
252(4)
13.3.1 Hedging by a Generator with no Cost Uncertainty
252(2)
13.3.2 Hedging Cost-Shifting Risks
254(2)
13.4 Hedging by Customers
256(3)
13.4.1 Hedging by a Customer with a Constant Utility Function
257(1)
13.4.2 Hedging Utility-Shifting Risks
258(1)
13.5 The Role of the Trader
259(4)
13.5.1 Risks Facing Individual Traders
261(2)
13.6 Intertemporal Hedging and Generation Investment
263(1)
13.7 Summary
264(3)
Questions
265(2)
14 Managing Interlocational Price Risk
267(12)
14.1 The Role of the Merchandising Surplus in Facilitating Interlocational Hedging
267(2)
14.1.1 Packaging the Merchandising Surplus in a Way that Facilitates Hedging
269(1)
14.2 Interlocational Transmission Rights: CapFTRs
269(2)
14.3 Interlocational Transmission Rights: Fixed-Volume FTRs
271(2)
14.3.1 Revenue Adequacy
271(2)
14.3.2 Are Fixed-Volume FTRs a Useful Hedging Instrument?
273(1)
14.4 Interlocational Hedging and Transmission Investment
273(3)
14.4.1 Infinitesimal Investment in Network Capacity
214(60)
14.4.2 Lumpy Investment in Network Capacity
274(2)
14.5 Summary
276(3)
Questions
277(1)
Further Reading
277(2)
PART VII MARKET POWER
279(56)
15 Market Power in Electricity Markets
281(26)
15.1 An Introduction to Market Power in Electricity Markets
281(3)
15.1.1 Definition of Market Power
281(1)
15.1.2 Market Power in Electricity Markets
282(2)
15.2 How Do Generators Exercise Market Power? Theory
284(5)
15.2.1 The Price--Volume Trade-Off
284(2)
15.2.2 The Profit-Maximising Choice of Rate of Production for a Generator with Market Power
286(1)
15.2.3 The Profit-Maximising Offer Curve
287(2)
15.3 How do Generators Exercise Market Power? Practice
289(3)
15.3.1 Economic and Physical Withholding
289(2)
15.3.2 Pricing Up and the Marginal Generator
291(1)
15.4 The Incentive to Exercise Market Power: The Importance of the Residual Demand Curve
292(3)
15.4.1 The Shape of the Residual Demand Curve
293(1)
15.4.2 The Importance of Peak Versus Off-Peak for the Exercise of Market Power
293(2)
15.4.3 Other Influences on the Shape of the Residual Demand Curve
295(1)
15.5 The Incentive to Exercise Market Power: The Impact of the Hedge Position of a Generator
295(3)
15.5.1 Short-Term Versus Long-Term Hedge Products and the Exercise of Market Power
297(1)
15.5.2 Hedge Contracts and Market Power
297(1)
15.6 The Exercise of Market Power by Loads and Vertical Integration
298(2)
15.6.1 Vertical Integration
299(1)
15.7 Is the Exercise of Market Power Necessary to Stimulate Generation Investment?
300(1)
15.8 The Consequences of the Exercise of Market Power
301(3)
15.8.1 Short-Run Efficiency Impacts of Market Power
301(1)
15.8.2 Longer-Run Efficiency Impacts of Market Power
302(1)
15.8.3 A Worked Example
302(2)
15.9 Summary
304(3)
Questions
306(1)
Further Reading
306(1)
16 Market Power and Network Congestion
307(10)
16.1 The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Radial Network
307(4)
16.1.1 The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Radial Network: The Theory
308(3)
16.2 The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Meshed Network
311(2)
16.3 The Exercise of Market Power by a Portfolio of Generators
313(1)
16.4 The Effect of Transmission Rights on Market Power
314(1)
16.5 Summary
315(2)
Questions
315(1)
Further Reading
315(2)
17 Detecting, Modelling and Mitigating Market Power
317(18)
17.1 Approaches to Assessing Market Power
317(1)
17.2 Detecting the Exercise of Market Power Through the Examination of Market Outcomes in the Past
318(4)
17.2.1 Quantity-Withdrawal Studies
319(2)
17.2.2 Price--Cost Margin Studies
321(1)
17.3 Simple Indicators of Market Power
322(8)
17.3.1 Market-Share-Based Measures and the HHI
322(2)
17.3.2 The PSI and RSI Indicators
324(2)
17.3.3 Variants of the PSI and RSI Indicators
326(2)
17.3.4 Measuring the Elasticity of Residual Demand
328(2)
17.4 Modelling of Market Power
330(2)
17.4.1 Modelling of Market Power in Practice
331(1)
17.4.2 Linearisation
332(1)
17.5 Policies to Reduce Market Power
332(1)
17.6 Summary
333(2)
Questions
334(1)
Further Reading
334(1)
PART VIII NETWORK REGULATION AND INVESTMENT
335(18)
18 Efficient Investment in Network Assets
337(16)
18.1 Efficient AC Network Investment
337(1)
18.2 Financial Implications of Network Investment
338(4)
18.2.1 The Two-Node Graphical Representation
339(2)
18.2.2 Financial Indicators of the Benefit of Network Expansion
341(1)
18.3 Efficient Investment in a Radial Network
342(2)
18.4 Efficient Investment in a Two-Node Network
344(4)
18.4.1 Example
345(3)
18.5 Coordination of Generation and Network Investment in Practice
348(2)
18.6 Summary
350(3)
Questions
351(1)
Further Reading
351(2)
PART IX CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
353(44)
19 Regional Pricing and Its Problems
355(16)
19.1 An Introduction to Regional Pricing
355(2)
19.2 Regional Pricing Without Constrained-on and Constrained-off Payments
357(7)
19.2.1 Short-Run Effects of Regional Pricing in a Simple Network
360(1)
19.2.2 Effects of Regional Pricing on the Balance Sheet of the System Operator
361(2)
19.2.3 Long-Run Effects of Regional Pricing on Investment
363(1)
19.3 Regional Pricing with Constrained-on and Constrained-off Payments
364(3)
19.4 Nodal Pricing for Generators/Regional Pricing for Consumers
367(2)
19.4.1 Side Deals and Net Metering
367(2)
19.5 Summary
369(2)
Questions
370(1)
Further Reading
370(1)
20 The Smart Grid and Efficient Pricing of Distribution Networks
371(26)
20.1 Efficient Pricing of Distribution Networks
371(3)
20.1.1 The Smart Grid and Distribution Pricing
373(1)
20.2 Decentralisation of the Dispatch Task
374(3)
20.2.1 Decentralisation in Theory
374(3)
20.3 Retail Tariff Structures and the Incentive to Misrepresent Local Production and Consumption
377(3)
20.3.1 Incentives for Net Metering and the Effective Price
378(2)
20.4 Incentives for Investment in Controllable Embedded Generation
380(8)
20.4.1 Incentives for Investment in Intermittent Solar PV Embedded Generation
384(1)
20.4.2 Retail Tariff Structures and the Death Spiral
385(1)
20.4.3 An Illustration of the Death Spiral
386(2)
20.5 Retail Tariff Structures
388(2)
20.5.1 Retail Tariff Debates
389(1)
20.6 Declining Demand for Network Services and Increasing Returns to Scale
390(3)
20.7 Summary
393(4)
Questions
395(2)
References 397(2)
Index 399
Dr Biggar is Australias leading expert on the economics of wholesale electricity markets and the economics of public utility regulation. Since 2002 he has provided economic advice primarily to the Australian Energy Regulator and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. He has also provided advice to other government agencies including the Australian Energy Markets Operator, the Australian Energy Markets Commission, and the New Zealand Electricity Authority. He has published a number of papers in academic journals in the economics of electricity markets and the economics of public utility regulation and regularly provides training courses in these areas to government agencies and industry. He has a particular interest in the assessment of market power in wholesale electricity markets and in matters related to wholesale market design.

Dr Hesamzadeh is assistant professor in electric power systems division of the school of electrical engineering at KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden. Dr Hesamzadeh is a world leader in the modelling of market power in wholesale electricity markets, particularly in the context of transmission planning. His special fields of interests include Power Systems Planning and Design, Economics of Wholesale Electricity Markets, and Mathematical Modelling and Computing. Hesamzadeh is currently working towards his Docent degree in Electricity Markets at KTH.