| Preface |
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xv | |
| Nomenclature |
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xvii | |
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PART I INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC CONCEPTS |
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1 | (30) |
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1 Introduction to Micro-economics |
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3 | (28) |
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3 | (2) |
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1.2 Introduction to Constrained Optimisation |
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5 | (1) |
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1.3 Demand and Consumers' Surplus |
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6 | (4) |
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1.3.1 The Short-Run Decision of the Customer |
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7 | |
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1.3.2 The Value or Utility Function |
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1 | (6) |
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1.3.3 The Demand Curve for a Price-Taking Customer Facing a Simple Price |
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7 | (3) |
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1.4 Supply and Producers' Surplus |
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10 | (4) |
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11 | (1) |
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1.4.2 The Supply Curve for a Price-Taking Firm Facing a Simple Price |
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11 | (3) |
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1.5 Achieving Optimal Short-Run Outcomes Using Competitive Markets |
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14 | (3) |
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1.5.1 The Short-Run Welfare Maximum |
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14 | (1) |
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1.5.2 An Autonomous Market Process |
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15 | (2) |
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17 | (3) |
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1.6.1 Smart Markets and Generic Constraints |
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17 | (1) |
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1.6.2 A Smart Market Process |
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18 | (2) |
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1.7 Longer-Run Decisions by Producers and Consumers |
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20 | (2) |
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1.7.1 Investment in Productive Capacity |
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20 | (2) |
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22 | (4) |
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1.8.1 The Dominant Firm -- Competitive Fringe Structure |
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24 | (1) |
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1.8.2 Monopoly and Price Regulation |
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25 | (1) |
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26 | (2) |
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27 | (1) |
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27 | (1) |
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28 | (3) |
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29 | (1) |
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30 | (1) |
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PART II INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRICITY NETWORKS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS |
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31 | (60) |
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2 Introduction to Electric Power Systems |
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33 | (40) |
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33 | (3) |
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2.1.1 Energy, Watts and Power |
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34 | (1) |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (2) |
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38 | (7) |
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2.3.1 Mathematics of Reactive Power |
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40 | (2) |
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2.3.2 Control of Reactive Power |
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42 | (1) |
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2.3.3 Ohm's Law on AC Circuits |
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43 | (1) |
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44 | (1) |
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2.4 The Elements of an Electric Power System |
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45 | (1) |
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2.5 Electricity Generation |
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46 | (6) |
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2.5.1 The Key Characteristics of Electricity Generators |
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49 | (3) |
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2.6 Electricity Transmission and Distribution Networks |
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52 | (8) |
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2.6.1 Transmission Networks |
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54 | (3) |
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2.6.2 Distribution Networks |
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57 | (2) |
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2.6.3 Competition and Regulation |
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59 | (1) |
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2.7 Physical Limits on Networks |
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60 | (6) |
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61 | (3) |
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2.7.2 Voltage Stability Limits |
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64 | (1) |
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2.7.3 Dynamic and Transient Stability Limits |
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64 | (2) |
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2.8 Electricity Consumption |
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66 | (1) |
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2.9 Does it Make Sense Distinguish Electricity Producer's and Consumers? |
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67 | (3) |
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2.9.1 The Service Provided by the Electric Power Industry |
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69 | (1) |
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70 | (3) |
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71 | (1) |
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72 | (1) |
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3 Electricity Industry Market Structure and Competition |
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73 | (18) |
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3.1 Tasks Performed in an Efficient Electricity Industry |
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73 | (3) |
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73 | (2) |
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3.1.2 Risk-Management Tasks |
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75 | (1) |
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75 | (1) |
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3.2 Electricity Industry Reforms |
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76 | (3) |
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3.2.1 Market-Orientated Reforms of the Late Twentieth Century |
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77 | (2) |
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3.3 Approaches to Reform of the Electricity Industry |
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79 | (2) |
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3.4 Other Key Roles in a Market-Orientated Electric Power System |
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81 | (1) |
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3.5 An Overview of Liberalised Electricity Markets |
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82 | (3) |
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3.6 An Overview of the Australian National Electricity Market |
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85 | (3) |
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3.6.1 Assessment of the NEM |
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87 | (1) |
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3.7 The Pros and Cons of Electricity Market Reform |
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88 | (1) |
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89 | (2) |
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90 | (1) |
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90 | (1) |
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PART III OPTIMAL DISPATCH: THE EFFICIENT USE OF GENERATION, CONSUMPTION AND NETWORK RESOURCES |
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91 | (88) |
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4 Efficient Short-Term Operation of an Electricity Industry with no Network Constraints |
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93 | (26) |
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4.1 The Cost of Generation |
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93 | (3) |
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4.2 Simple Stylised Representation of a Generator |
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96 | (1) |
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4.3 Optimal Dispatch of Generation with Inelastic Demand |
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97 | (5) |
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4.3.1 Optimal Least Cost Dispatch of Generation Resources |
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98 | (1) |
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4.3.2 Least Cost Dispatch for Generators with Constant Variable Cost |
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99 | (2) |
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101 | (1) |
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4.4 Optimal Dispatch of Both Generation and Load Assets |
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102 | (2) |
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4.5 Symmetry in the Treatment of Generation and Load |
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104 | (1) |
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4.5.1 Symmetry Between Buyer-Owned Generators and Stand-Alone |
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104 | (1) |
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4.5.2 Symmetry Between Total Surplus Maximisation and Generation Cost Minimisation |
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105 | (1) |
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105 | (1) |
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4.7 Nonconvexities in Production: Minimum Operating Levels |
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106 | (2) |
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4.8 Efficient Dispatch of Energy-Limited Resources |
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108 | (2) |
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109 | (1) |
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4.9 Efficient Dispatch in the Presence of Ramp-Rate Constraints |
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110 | (1) |
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111 | (2) |
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4.10 Startup Costs and the Unit-Commitment Decision |
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113 | (2) |
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115 | (4) |
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116 | (1) |
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117 | (2) |
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5 Achieving Efficient Use of Generation and Load Resources using a Market Mechanism in an Industry with no Network Constraints |
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119 | (20) |
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5.1 Decentralisation, Competition and Market Mechanisms |
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119 | (2) |
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5.2 Achieving Optimal Dispatch Through Competitive Bidding |
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121 | (2) |
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5.3 Variation in Wholesale Market Design |
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123 | (3) |
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5.3.1 Compulsory Gross Pool or Net Pool? |
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124 | (1) |
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5.3.2 Single Price or Pay-as-Bid? |
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125 | (1) |
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5.4 Day-Ahead Versus Real-Time Markets |
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126 | (3) |
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5.4.1 Improving the Quality of Short-Term Price Forecasts |
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127 | (2) |
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5.4.2 Reducing the Exercise of Market Power |
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129 | (1) |
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5.5 Price Controls and Rationing |
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129 | (4) |
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5.5.1 Inadequate Metering and Involuntary Load Shedding |
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131 | (2) |
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5.6 Time-Varying Demand, the Load-Duration Curve and the Price-Duration Curve |
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133 | (2) |
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135 | (4) |
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137 | (1) |
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137 | (2) |
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6 Representing Network Constraints |
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139 | (14) |
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6.1 Representing Networks Mathematically |
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139 | (2) |
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6.2 Net Injections, Power Flows and the DC Load Flow Model |
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141 | (4) |
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6.2.1 The DC Load Flow Model |
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144 | (1) |
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6.3 The Matrix of Power Transfer Distribution Factors |
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145 | (1) |
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6.3.1 Converting between Reference Nodes |
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146 | (1) |
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6.4 Distribution Factors for Radial Networks |
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146 | (1) |
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6.5 Constraint Equations and the Set of Feasible Injections |
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147 | (4) |
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151 | (2) |
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152 | (1) |
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7 Efficient Dispatch of Generation and Consumption Resources in the Presence of Network Congestion |
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153 | (18) |
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7.1 Optimal Dispatch with Network Constraints |
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153 | (3) |
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7.1.1 Achieving Optimal Dispatch Using a Smart Market |
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155 | (1) |
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7.2 Optimal Dispatch in a Radial Network |
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156 | (1) |
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7.3 Optimal Dispatch in a Two-Node Network |
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157 | (2) |
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7.4 Optimal Dispatch in a Three-Node Meshed Network |
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159 | (2) |
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7.5 Optimal Dispatch in a Four-Node Network |
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161 | (1) |
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7.6 Properties of Nodal Prices with a Single Binding Constraint |
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162 | (1) |
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7.7 How Many Independent Nodal Prices Exist? |
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163 | (1) |
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7.8 The Merchandising Surplus, Settlement Residues and the Congestion Rents |
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163 | (3) |
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7.8.1 Merchandising Surplus and Congestion Rents |
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163 | (1) |
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7.8.2 Settlement Residues |
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164 | (1) |
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7.8.3 Merchandising Surplus in a Three-Node Network |
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165 | (1) |
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166 | (3) |
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7.9.1 Losses, Settlement Residues and Merchandising Surplus |
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167 | (1) |
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7.9.2 Losses and Optimal Dispatch |
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168 | (1) |
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169 | (2) |
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170 | (1) |
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170 | (1) |
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8 Efficient Network Operation |
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171 | (8) |
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8.1 Efficient Operation of DC Interconnectors |
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171 | (2) |
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8.1.1 Entrepreneurial DC Network Operation |
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173 | (1) |
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8.2 Optimal Network Switching |
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173 | (4) |
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8.2.1 Network Switching and Network Contingencies |
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174 | (1) |
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174 | (2) |
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8.2.3 Entrepreneurial Network Switching? |
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176 | (1) |
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177 | (2) |
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178 | (1) |
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178 | (1) |
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PART IV EFFICIENT INVESTMENT IN GENERATION AND CONSUMPTION ASSETS |
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179 | (30) |
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9 Efficient Investment in Generation and Consumption Assets |
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181 | (18) |
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9.1 The Optimal Generation Investment Problem |
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181 | (2) |
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9.2 The Optimal Level of Generation Capacity with Downward Sloping Demand |
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183 | (3) |
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9.2.1 The Case of Inelastic Demand |
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185 | (1) |
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9.3 The Optimal Mix of Generation Capacity with Downward Sloping Demand |
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186 | (3) |
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9.4 The Optimal Mix of Generation with Inelastic Demand |
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189 | (2) |
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9.5 Screening Curve Analysis |
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191 | (2) |
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9.5.1 Using Screening Curves to Assess the Impact of Increased Renewable Penetration |
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192 | (1) |
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9.5.2 Generation Investment in the Presence of Network Constraints |
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193 | (1) |
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9.6 Buyer-Side Investment |
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193 | (2) |
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195 | (4) |
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196 | (1) |
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197 | (2) |
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10 Market-Based Investment in Electricity Generation |
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199 | (10) |
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10.1 Decentralised Generation Investment Decisions |
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199 | (2) |
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10.2 Can We Trust Competitive Markets to Deliver an Efficient Level of Investment in Generation? |
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201 | (2) |
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10.2.1 Episodes of High Prices as an Essential Part of an Energy-Only Market |
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201 | (1) |
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10.2.2 The `Missing Money' Problem |
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202 | (1) |
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10.2.3 Energy-Only Markets and the Investment Boom--Bust Cycle |
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203 | (1) |
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10.3 Price Caps, Reserve Margins and Capacity Payments |
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203 | (3) |
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10.3.1 Reserve Requirements |
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204 | (1) |
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205 | (1) |
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10.4 Time-Averaging of Network Charges and Generation Investment |
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206 | (1) |
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207 | (2) |
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207 | (2) |
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PART V HANDLING CONTINGENCIES: EFFICIENT DISPATCH IN THE VERY SHORT RUN |
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209 | (34) |
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11 Efficient Operation of the Power System in the Very Short-Run |
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211 | (20) |
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11.1 Introduction to Contingencies |
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211 | (1) |
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11.2 Efficient Handling of Contingencies |
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212 | (1) |
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11.3 Preventive and Corrective Actions |
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213 | (2) |
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11.4 Satisfactory and Secure Operating States |
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215 | (1) |
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11.5 Optimal Dispatch in the Very Short Run |
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216 | (2) |
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11.6 Operating the Power System Ex Ante as though Certain Contingencies have Already Happened |
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218 | (1) |
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11.7 Examples of Optimal Short-Run Dispatch |
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219 | (4) |
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11.7.1 A Second Example, Ignoring Network Constraints |
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221 | (1) |
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11.7.2 A Further Example with Network Constraints |
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222 | (1) |
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11.8 Optimal Short-Run Dispatch Using a Competitive Market |
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223 | (6) |
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224 | (3) |
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11.8.2 Optimal Short-Run Dispatch through Prices |
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227 | (1) |
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11.8.3 Investment Incentives |
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228 | (1) |
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229 | (2) |
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230 | (1) |
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230 | (1) |
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12 Frequency-Based Dispatch of Balancing Services |
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231 | (12) |
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12.1 The Intradispatch Interval Dispatch Mechanism |
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231 | (1) |
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12.2 Frequency-Based Dispatch of Balancing Services |
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232 | (1) |
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12.3 Implications of Ignoring Network Constraints when Handling Contingencies |
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233 | (5) |
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12.3.1 The Feasible Set of Injections with a Frequency-Based IDIDM |
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235 | (3) |
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12.4 Procurement of Frequency-Based Balancing Services |
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238 | (3) |
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12.4.1 The Volume of Frequency Control Balancing Services Required |
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238 | (1) |
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12.4.2 Procurement of Balancing Services |
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239 | (1) |
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12.4.3 Allocating the Costs of Balancing Services |
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240 | (1) |
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241 | (2) |
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242 | (1) |
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242 | (1) |
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243 | (36) |
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13 Managing Intertemporal Price Risks |
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245 | (22) |
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13.1 Introduction to Forward Markets and Standard Hedge Contracts |
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245 | (4) |
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13.1.1 Instruments for Managing Risk: Swaps, Caps, Collars and Floors |
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246 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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247 | (1) |
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248 | (1) |
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13.1.5 Collars (and Related Instruments) |
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249 | (1) |
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13.2 The Construction of a Perfect Hedge: The Theory |
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249 | (3) |
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13.2.1 The Design of a Perfect Hedge |
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250 | (2) |
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13.3 The Construction of a Perfect Hedge: Specific Cases |
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252 | (4) |
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13.3.1 Hedging by a Generator with no Cost Uncertainty |
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252 | (2) |
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13.3.2 Hedging Cost-Shifting Risks |
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254 | (2) |
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13.4 Hedging by Customers |
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256 | (3) |
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13.4.1 Hedging by a Customer with a Constant Utility Function |
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257 | (1) |
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13.4.2 Hedging Utility-Shifting Risks |
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258 | (1) |
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13.5 The Role of the Trader |
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259 | (4) |
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13.5.1 Risks Facing Individual Traders |
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261 | (2) |
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13.6 Intertemporal Hedging and Generation Investment |
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263 | (1) |
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264 | (3) |
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265 | (2) |
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14 Managing Interlocational Price Risk |
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267 | (12) |
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14.1 The Role of the Merchandising Surplus in Facilitating Interlocational Hedging |
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267 | (2) |
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14.1.1 Packaging the Merchandising Surplus in a Way that Facilitates Hedging |
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269 | (1) |
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14.2 Interlocational Transmission Rights: CapFTRs |
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269 | (2) |
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14.3 Interlocational Transmission Rights: Fixed-Volume FTRs |
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271 | (2) |
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271 | (2) |
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14.3.2 Are Fixed-Volume FTRs a Useful Hedging Instrument? |
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273 | (1) |
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14.4 Interlocational Hedging and Transmission Investment |
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273 | (3) |
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14.4.1 Infinitesimal Investment in Network Capacity |
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214 | (60) |
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14.4.2 Lumpy Investment in Network Capacity |
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274 | (2) |
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276 | (3) |
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277 | (1) |
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277 | (2) |
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279 | (56) |
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15 Market Power in Electricity Markets |
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281 | (26) |
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15.1 An Introduction to Market Power in Electricity Markets |
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281 | (3) |
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15.1.1 Definition of Market Power |
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281 | (1) |
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15.1.2 Market Power in Electricity Markets |
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282 | (2) |
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15.2 How Do Generators Exercise Market Power? Theory |
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284 | (5) |
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15.2.1 The Price--Volume Trade-Off |
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284 | (2) |
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15.2.2 The Profit-Maximising Choice of Rate of Production for a Generator with Market Power |
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286 | (1) |
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15.2.3 The Profit-Maximising Offer Curve |
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287 | (2) |
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15.3 How do Generators Exercise Market Power? Practice |
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289 | (3) |
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15.3.1 Economic and Physical Withholding |
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289 | (2) |
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15.3.2 Pricing Up and the Marginal Generator |
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291 | (1) |
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15.4 The Incentive to Exercise Market Power: The Importance of the Residual Demand Curve |
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292 | (3) |
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15.4.1 The Shape of the Residual Demand Curve |
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293 | (1) |
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15.4.2 The Importance of Peak Versus Off-Peak for the Exercise of Market Power |
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293 | (2) |
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15.4.3 Other Influences on the Shape of the Residual Demand Curve |
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295 | (1) |
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15.5 The Incentive to Exercise Market Power: The Impact of the Hedge Position of a Generator |
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295 | (3) |
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15.5.1 Short-Term Versus Long-Term Hedge Products and the Exercise of Market Power |
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297 | (1) |
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15.5.2 Hedge Contracts and Market Power |
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297 | (1) |
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15.6 The Exercise of Market Power by Loads and Vertical Integration |
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298 | (2) |
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15.6.1 Vertical Integration |
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299 | (1) |
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15.7 Is the Exercise of Market Power Necessary to Stimulate Generation Investment? |
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300 | (1) |
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15.8 The Consequences of the Exercise of Market Power |
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301 | (3) |
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15.8.1 Short-Run Efficiency Impacts of Market Power |
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301 | (1) |
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15.8.2 Longer-Run Efficiency Impacts of Market Power |
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302 | (1) |
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302 | (2) |
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304 | (3) |
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306 | (1) |
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306 | (1) |
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16 Market Power and Network Congestion |
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307 | (10) |
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16.1 The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Radial Network |
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307 | (4) |
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16.1.1 The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Radial Network: The Theory |
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308 | (3) |
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16.2 The Exercise of Market Power by a Single Generator in a Meshed Network |
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311 | (2) |
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16.3 The Exercise of Market Power by a Portfolio of Generators |
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313 | (1) |
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16.4 The Effect of Transmission Rights on Market Power |
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314 | (1) |
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315 | (2) |
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315 | (1) |
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315 | (2) |
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17 Detecting, Modelling and Mitigating Market Power |
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317 | (18) |
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17.1 Approaches to Assessing Market Power |
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317 | (1) |
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17.2 Detecting the Exercise of Market Power Through the Examination of Market Outcomes in the Past |
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318 | (4) |
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17.2.1 Quantity-Withdrawal Studies |
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319 | (2) |
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17.2.2 Price--Cost Margin Studies |
|
|
321 | (1) |
|
17.3 Simple Indicators of Market Power |
|
|
322 | (8) |
|
17.3.1 Market-Share-Based Measures and the HHI |
|
|
322 | (2) |
|
17.3.2 The PSI and RSI Indicators |
|
|
324 | (2) |
|
17.3.3 Variants of the PSI and RSI Indicators |
|
|
326 | (2) |
|
17.3.4 Measuring the Elasticity of Residual Demand |
|
|
328 | (2) |
|
17.4 Modelling of Market Power |
|
|
330 | (2) |
|
17.4.1 Modelling of Market Power in Practice |
|
|
331 | (1) |
|
|
|
332 | (1) |
|
17.5 Policies to Reduce Market Power |
|
|
332 | (1) |
|
|
|
333 | (2) |
|
|
|
334 | (1) |
|
|
|
334 | (1) |
|
PART VIII NETWORK REGULATION AND INVESTMENT |
|
|
335 | (18) |
|
18 Efficient Investment in Network Assets |
|
|
337 | (16) |
|
18.1 Efficient AC Network Investment |
|
|
337 | (1) |
|
18.2 Financial Implications of Network Investment |
|
|
338 | (4) |
|
18.2.1 The Two-Node Graphical Representation |
|
|
339 | (2) |
|
18.2.2 Financial Indicators of the Benefit of Network Expansion |
|
|
341 | (1) |
|
18.3 Efficient Investment in a Radial Network |
|
|
342 | (2) |
|
18.4 Efficient Investment in a Two-Node Network |
|
|
344 | (4) |
|
|
|
345 | (3) |
|
18.5 Coordination of Generation and Network Investment in Practice |
|
|
348 | (2) |
|
|
|
350 | (3) |
|
|
|
351 | (1) |
|
|
|
351 | (2) |
|
PART IX CONTEMPORARY ISSUES |
|
|
353 | (44) |
|
19 Regional Pricing and Its Problems |
|
|
355 | (16) |
|
19.1 An Introduction to Regional Pricing |
|
|
355 | (2) |
|
19.2 Regional Pricing Without Constrained-on and Constrained-off Payments |
|
|
357 | (7) |
|
19.2.1 Short-Run Effects of Regional Pricing in a Simple Network |
|
|
360 | (1) |
|
19.2.2 Effects of Regional Pricing on the Balance Sheet of the System Operator |
|
|
361 | (2) |
|
19.2.3 Long-Run Effects of Regional Pricing on Investment |
|
|
363 | (1) |
|
19.3 Regional Pricing with Constrained-on and Constrained-off Payments |
|
|
364 | (3) |
|
19.4 Nodal Pricing for Generators/Regional Pricing for Consumers |
|
|
367 | (2) |
|
19.4.1 Side Deals and Net Metering |
|
|
367 | (2) |
|
|
|
369 | (2) |
|
|
|
370 | (1) |
|
|
|
370 | (1) |
|
20 The Smart Grid and Efficient Pricing of Distribution Networks |
|
|
371 | (26) |
|
20.1 Efficient Pricing of Distribution Networks |
|
|
371 | (3) |
|
20.1.1 The Smart Grid and Distribution Pricing |
|
|
373 | (1) |
|
20.2 Decentralisation of the Dispatch Task |
|
|
374 | (3) |
|
20.2.1 Decentralisation in Theory |
|
|
374 | (3) |
|
20.3 Retail Tariff Structures and the Incentive to Misrepresent Local Production and Consumption |
|
|
377 | (3) |
|
20.3.1 Incentives for Net Metering and the Effective Price |
|
|
378 | (2) |
|
20.4 Incentives for Investment in Controllable Embedded Generation |
|
|
380 | (8) |
|
20.4.1 Incentives for Investment in Intermittent Solar PV Embedded Generation |
|
|
384 | (1) |
|
20.4.2 Retail Tariff Structures and the Death Spiral |
|
|
385 | (1) |
|
20.4.3 An Illustration of the Death Spiral |
|
|
386 | (2) |
|
20.5 Retail Tariff Structures |
|
|
388 | (2) |
|
20.5.1 Retail Tariff Debates |
|
|
389 | (1) |
|
20.6 Declining Demand for Network Services and Increasing Returns to Scale |
|
|
390 | (3) |
|
|
|
393 | (4) |
|
|
|
395 | (2) |
| References |
|
397 | (2) |
| Index |
|
399 | |