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E-raamat: Engineering Trustworthy Systems: Get Cybersecurity Design Right the First Time

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  • Formaat: 512 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 03-Aug-2018
  • Kirjastus: McGraw-Hill Education
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781260118186
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Engineering Trustworthy Systems: Get Cybersecurity Design Right the First TimeSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: 512 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 03-Aug-2018
  • Kirjastus: McGraw-Hill Education
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781260118186
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Cutting-edge cybersecurity solutions to defend against the most sophisticated attacks

This professional guide shows, step by step, how to design and deploy highly secure systems on time and within budget. The book offers comprehensive examples, objectives, and best practices and shows how to build and maintain powerful, cost-effective cybersecurity systems. Readers will learn to think strategically, identify the highest priority risks, and apply advanced countermeasures that address the entire attack space. Engineering Trustworthy Systems: Get Cybersecurity Design Right the First Time showcases 35 years of practical engineering experience from an expert whose persuasive vision has advanced national cybersecurity policy and practices.

Readers of this book will be prepared to navigate the tumultuous and uncertain future of cyberspace and move the cybersecurity discipline forward by adopting timeless engineering principles, including: 

•Defining the fundamental nature and full breadth of the cybersecurity problem
•Adopting an essential perspective that considers attacks, failures, and attacker mindsets 
•Developing and implementing risk-mitigating, systems-based solutions
•Transforming sound cybersecurity principles into effective architecture and evaluation strategies that holistically address the entire complex attack space 


Foreword xxxix
Acknowledgments xli
Introduction xliii
Part I: What Do You Want?
Chapter 1 What's the Problem?
3(22)
Overview
3(1)
Learning Objectives
4(1)
1.1 Baking in Trustworthiness: Design-Time
5(3)
1.1.1 What Is Trust?
5(2)
1.1.2 Trust and Belief
7(1)
1.1.3 Engineering
7(1)
1.1.4 Why Trust?
7(1)
1.2 Operational Perspective: Basic Questions
8(8)
1.2.1 Am I Under Attack?
9(1)
1.2.2 What Is the Nature of the Attack?
10(2)
1.2.3 What Is the Mission Impact So Far?
12(1)
1.2.4 What Is the Potential Mission Impact?
13(1)
1.2.5 When Did It Start?
13(1)
1.2.6 Who Is Attacking?
13(1)
1.2.7 What Are They Trying to Do?
14(1)
1.2.8 What Is the Attacker's Next Step?
14(1)
1.2.9 What Can I Do About It?
15(1)
1.2.10 What Are My Options and How Effective Will Each Option Be?
15(1)
1.2.11 How Will My Mitigation Actions Affect Operation?
15(1)
1.2.12 How Do I Better Defend Myself in the Future?
15(1)
1.3 Asymmetry of Cyberspace Effects
16(2)
1.3.1 Dimensionality
16(1)
1.3.2 Nonlinearity
17(1)
1.3.3 Coupling
17(1)
1.3.4 Velocity
17(1)
1.3.5 Manifestation
18(1)
1.3.6 Detectability
18(1)
1.4 The Cybersecurity Solution Landscape
18(3)
1.4.1 Information Assurance Science and Engineering
19(1)
1.4.2 Defensive Mechanisms
20(1)
1.4.3 Cybersensors and Exploitation
20(1)
1.4.4 Cyber Situation Understanding
20(1)
1.4.5 Cyber Actuation
20(1)
1.4.6 Cyber Command and Control
21(1)
1.4.7 Cyber Defense Strategy and Tactics
21(1)
1.5 Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure
21(1)
Conclusion
22(1)
Questions
22(3)
Chapter 2 Cybersecurity Right-Think
25(12)
Overview
25(1)
Learning Objectives
26(1)
2.1 It's About Risk
26(1)
2.2 The Cybersecurity Trade-off: Performance and Functionality
26(7)
2.2.1 User-Friendliness
28(1)
2.2.2 Time to Market
29(1)
2.2.3 Employee Morale
29(1)
2.2.4 Missed Opportunity
30(1)
2.2.5 Opportunity Cost
30(1)
2.2.6 Quantity of Service or Product
31(1)
2.2.7 Quality of Service or Product
31(1)
2.2.8 Cost of Service or Product
32(1)
2.2.9 Limited Resources
33(1)
2.3 Theories of Security Come from Theories of Insecurity
33(1)
2.4 They Come at You Through the Weeds
33(1)
2.5 Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up
34(1)
2.6 Cybersecurity Is a Live Orchestra, Not a Recorded Instrument
35(1)
Conclusion
35(1)
Questions
36(1)
Chapter 3 Value and Mission: Know Thyself
37(14)
Overview
37(1)
Learning Objectives
38(1)
3.1 Focus on Mission and Value
38(2)
3.1.1 Avoid Concentrating Value
39(1)
3.1.2 Beware the Complacency of Trust
39(1)
3.2 Confidentiality: Value of Secrecy from Adversaries
40(4)
3.2.1 Acquired-Knowledge Secrets
40(1)
3.2.2 Planning Secrets
41(1)
3.2.3 Stolen Secrets
42(1)
3.2.4 Means-of-Stealing-Secrets Secrets
43(1)
3.3 Confidentiality: Beware the Tyranny of Secrecy
44(2)
3.3.1 Secrecy Is Tenuous
44(1)
3.3.2 Secrecy Is Expensive
44(1)
3.3.3 Secrecy Can Be Self-Defeating
45(1)
3.3.4 Secrecy Is Self-Breeding
45(1)
3.3.5 Secrecy Creates a Form of Corrupting Power and Impediment to Operation
46(1)
3.4 Confidentiality: Changing the Value Proposition
46(1)
3.4.1 Minimize Secrecy and Dependency on Secrecy
46(1)
3.4.2 Minimize Impact of Loss of Secrecy
47(1)
3.5 Integrity: The Root of All Trustworthiness Value
47(1)
3.6 Availability: An Essential Yet Tenuous Value
48(1)
Conclusion
48(1)
Questions
49(2)
Chapter 4 Harm: Mission in Peril
51(14)
Overview
51(1)
Learning Objectives
52(1)
4.1 Focus on Strategic Risks
52(2)
4.1.1 What Is Strategic Risk?
52(1)
4.1.2 Expected Harm
53(1)
4.1.3 The Range of Risks
54(1)
4.1.4 The Meaning of Focus
54(1)
4.2 Harm Is About Mission
54(1)
4.2.1 Elicitation of Harm
55(1)
4.2.2 Aggregating Harm Statements
55(1)
4.2.3 Representative Harm Lists
55(1)
4.3 Critical Asset Inventory: Data
55(3)
4.3.1 Data Asset Types
56(1)
4.3.2 Data Value Spectrum
56(1)
4.3.3 Criticality Classes
56(1)
4.3.4 Criticality Levels
57(1)
4.4 A Template for Exploring Mission Harm
58(3)
4.5 Harm Is in the Eye of the Beholder
61(1)
4.5.1 Gravity of Harm: Consensus
61(1)
4.5.2 Drawing Conclusions
61(1)
4.6 Sometimes Belief Is More Powerful than Truth
61(1)
4.6.1 Destroying Value
62(1)
4.6.2 Frustrating to Address: Life Is Unfair
62(1)
Conclusion
62(1)
Questions
63(2)
Chapter 5 Approximating Reality
65(24)
Overview
65(1)
Learning Objectives
66(1)
5.1 The Complexity of State: Why Model?
66(1)
5.2 Levels of Abstraction: At What Levels
67(1)
5.3 What to Model and Why
68(3)
5.3.1 The Target System
68(1)
5.3.2 Users
69(1)
5.3.3 Adversaries
70(1)
5.3.4 Measures/Countermeasures
70(1)
5.4 Models Are Always Wrong, Sometimes Useful
71(4)
5.4.1 Incompleteness of Essentials
71(1)
5.4.2 Inaccuracy
72(1)
5.4.3 Non-Timeliness
73(2)
5.5 Model Views
75(5)
5.5.1 Defender's View
75(2)
5.5.2 Adversary's View
77(2)
5.5.3 Attacking the Views Themselves
79(1)
5.6 Defense Models Must Consider Failure Modes
80(2)
5.7 Assume Adversaries Know Defender's System
82(1)
5.8 Assume Adversaries Are Inside Defender's System
83(1)
Conclusion
84(1)
Questions
85(4)
Part II: What Could Go Wrong?
Chapter 6 Adversaries: Know Thy Enemy
89(26)
Overview
89(1)
Learning Objectives
90(1)
6.1 Know Your Adversaries
91(4)
6.1.1 Intentions
91(1)
6.1.2 Capabilities
92(1)
6.1.3 Attacker Resources and Defender Resources
92(1)
6.1.4 Risk Tolerance
93(1)
6.1.5 Strategic Goals
93(1)
6.1.6 Tactics
94(1)
6.2 Assume Smart Adversaries
95(1)
6.3 Assume Adversaries Don't Play Fair
96(9)
6.3.1 Going Around Security Controls
96(1)
6.3.2 Going Beneath Security Controls
96(2)
6.3.3 Attacking the Weakest Link
98(1)
6.3.4 Violating a Design Assumption
99(1)
6.3.5 Using Maintenance Modes
100(1)
6.3.6 Using Social Engineering
100(1)
6.3.7 Using Bribery and Blackmail to Subvert Insiders
101(1)
6.3.8 Taking Advantage of Temporary Bypasses
101(1)
6.3.9 Taking Advantage of Temporary Connections
102(1)
6.3.10 Taking Advantage of Natural System Failure
103(1)
6.3.11 Exploiting Bugs You Did Not Even Know You Had
104(1)
6.3.12 Compromising External Systems that a System Trusts
104(1)
6.4 Anticipate Attack Escalation
105(1)
6.5 Red Teams
106(3)
6.5.1 Opposing Force
107(1)
6.5.2 Red Team Characteristics
107(1)
6.5.3 Other Types of Red Teams
108(1)
6.6 Cyberspace Exercises
109(3)
6.6.1 Red Versus Blue
109(1)
6.6.2 Pure Versus Hybrid
110(1)
6.6.3 Purple Collaboration
111(1)
6.7 Red Team Work Factor: Measuring Difficulty
112(1)
Conclusion
113(1)
Questions
113(2)
Chapter 7 Forests of Attack Trees
115(16)
Overview
115(1)
Learning Objectives
116(1)
7.1 Attack Trees and Forests
116(3)
7.1.1 Attack Tree Structure
116(1)
7.1.2 Deriving Attack Scenarios
117(1)
7.1.3 From Trees to Forests
118(1)
7.2 System Failures Predict Cybersecurity Failures
119(1)
7.2.1 Inspirational Catastrophes
119(1)
7.2.2 The 10x Rule
119(1)
7.2.3 Feigning Failure
120(1)
7.3 Understanding Failure Is the Key to Success: The Five Whys
120(1)
7.3.1 Why Five Whys?
120(1)
7.3.2 Projecting Fishbones
121(1)
7.4 Forests Should Be Representative, Not Exhaustive
121(2)
7.5 Drive Each Attack Tree Layer by Asking How
123(2)
7.6 Go as Deep as Needed and No Deeper
125(1)
7.7 Beware of External Dependencies
125(2)
7.7.1 Just in Time
125(1)
7.7.2 Information Dependency
126(1)
7.7.3 Creating Redundancy
126(1)
Conclusion
127(1)
Questions
127(4)
Part III: What Are the Building Blocks of Mitigating Risk?
Chapter 8 Countermeasures: Security Controls
131(24)
Overview
131(1)
Learning Objectives
132(1)
8.1 Countermeasures: Design to Purpose
133(1)
8.2 Ensure Attack-Space Coverage (Defense in Breadth)
133(1)
8.3 Defense in Depth and Breadth
134(2)
8.4 Multilevel Security, Trusted Code, Security Kernels
136(4)
8.4.1 Multilevel Security
136(2)
8.4.2 Trusted Code
138(1)
8.4.3 Security Kernel and the Reference Monitor
138(2)
8.5 Integrity and Type Enforcement
140(3)
8.5.1 Multilevel Integrity
140(1)
8.5.2 Type Enforcement
141(2)
8.6 Cybersecurity Usability
143(6)
8.6.1 Invisible
144(1)
8.6.2 Transparent
144(1)
8.6.3 Clear
145(1)
8.6.4 Easy to Understand
145(1)
8.6.5 Reliable
146(1)
8.6.6 Fast
146(1)
8.6.7 Reversible
146(1)
8.6.8 Adaptable
147(1)
8.6.9 Traceable
147(1)
8.6.10 Reviewable
148(1)
8.7 Deploy Default Secure
149(1)
8.8 Costs
149(3)
8.8.1 Cost Always Matters
149(1)
8.8.2 Time-to-Deploy Matters
150(1)
8.8.3 Impact to Mission Matters
150(1)
8.8.4 Pareto Rule: 80/20
151(1)
8.8.5 Opportunity Cost Is a Key Part of Cost
151(1)
8.8.6 How Much to Invest in Cybersecurity
151(1)
8.8.7 Optimizing Zero-Sum Cybersecurity Budgets
152(1)
Conclusion
152(1)
Questions
153(2)
Chapter 9 Trustworthy Hardware: Bedrock
155(12)
Overview
155(1)
Learning Objectives
155(1)
9.1 Foundation of Trust
156(2)
9.2 Instruction Set Architectures
158(1)
9.3 Supervisors with Rings and Things
158(1)
9.4 Controlling Memory: Mapping, Capabilities, and Tagging
159(3)
9.4.1 Memory Mapping
160(1)
9.4.2 Capabilities
160(2)
9.4.3 Tagging
162(1)
9.5 Software in Hardware
162(1)
9.5.1 Microcode
162(1)
9.5.2 Firmware
162(1)
9.5.3 Secure Bootstrapping
163(1)
9.6 Buses and Controllers
163(1)
Conclusion
164(1)
Questions
164(3)
Chapter 10 Cryptography: A Sharp and Fragile Tool
167(22)
Overview
167(1)
Learning Objectives
168(1)
10.1 What Is Cryptography?
168(1)
10.2 Key Space
169(2)
10.3 Key Generation
171(2)
10.4 Key Distribution
173(2)
10.4.1 Transmission to Intended Recipients
173(1)
10.4.2 Storage
174(1)
10.4.3 Loading
175(1)
10.5 Public-Key Cryptography
175(4)
10.5.1 The Math
176(1)
10.5.2 Certificates and Certificate Authorities
177(1)
10.5.3 Performance and Use
178(1)
10.5.4 Side Effect of Public-Key Cryptography
179(1)
10.6 Integrity
179(3)
10.7 Availability
182(2)
10.7.1 Positive Effects
182(1)
10.7.2 Negative Effects
182(2)
10.8 Chinks in the Cryptographic Armor
184(1)
10.8.1 Quantum Cryptanalytics: Disruptive Technology
184(1)
10.8.2 P=NP
185(1)
10.9 Cryptography Is Not a Panacea
185(1)
10.10 Beware of Homegrown Cryptography
186(1)
Conclusion
186(1)
Questions
187(2)
Chapter 11 Authentication
189(10)
Overview
189(1)
Learning Objectives
189(2)
11.1 Entity Identification: Phase 1 of Authentication
191(1)
11.2 Identity Certification: Phase 2 of Authentication
191(2)
11.3 Identity Resolution: Phase 3 of Authentication
193(1)
11.4 Identity Assertion and Identity Proving: Phases 4 and 5 of Authentication
194(1)
11.5 Identity Decertification: Phase 6 of Authentication
194(1)
11.6 Machine-to-Machine Authentication Chaining
195(1)
Conclusion
196(1)
Questions
196(3)
Chapter 12 Authorization
199(26)
Overview
199(1)
Learning Objectives
200(1)
12.1 Access Control
200(10)
12.1.1 Discretionary Access Control
201(2)
12.1.2 Mandatory Access Control
203(2)
12.1.3 Covert Channels
205(1)
12.1.4 Identity-Based Access Control
206(1)
12.1.5 Attribute-Based Access Control
207(3)
12.2 Attribute Management
210(6)
12.2.1 User Attributes and Privilege Assignment
210(1)
12.2.2 Resource Attribute Assignment
211(1)
12.2.3 Attribute Collection and Aggregation
211(2)
12.2.4 Attribute Validation
213(2)
12.2.5 Attribute Distribution
215(1)
12.3 Digital Policy Management
216(4)
12.3.1 Policy Specification
216(1)
12.3.2 Policy Distribution
217(1)
12.3.3 Policy Decision
218(1)
12.3.4 Policy Enforcement
218(2)
12.4 Authorization Adoption Schemas
220(2)
12.4.1 Direct Integration
221(1)
12.4.2 Indirect Integration
221(1)
12.4.3 Alternative Integration
221(1)
Conclusion
222(1)
Questions
222(3)
Chapter 13 Detection Foundation
225(12)
Overview
225(1)
Learning Objectives
225(1)
13.1 The Role of Detection
226(1)
13.2 How Detection Systems Work
227(1)
13.3 Feature Selection
228(3)
13.3.1 Attack Manifestation in Features
229(1)
13.3.2 Manifestation Strength
229(1)
13.3.3 Mapping Attacks to Features
230(1)
13.3.4 Criteria for Selection
230(1)
13.4 Feature Extraction
231(1)
13.5 Event Selection
231(1)
13.6 Event Detection
232(1)
13.7 Attack Detection
232(1)
13.8 Attack Classification
233(1)
13.9 Attack Alarming
233(1)
13.10 Know Operational Performance Characteristics for Sensors
233(1)
Conclusion
234(1)
Questions
235(2)
Chapter 14 Detection Systems
237(20)
Overview
237(1)
Learning Objectives
238(1)
14.1 Types of Detection Systems
238(7)
14.1.1 Signature-Based
238(3)
14.1.2 Anomaly Detection
241(4)
14.2 Detection Performance: False Positives, False Negatives, and ROCS
245(6)
14.2.1 Feature Selection
245(3)
14.2.2 Feature Extraction
248(1)
14.2.3 Event Selection
249(1)
14.2.4 Attack Detection
249(1)
14.2.5 Attack Classification
250(1)
14.2.6 Attack Alarming
251(1)
14.3 Drive Detection Requirements from Attacks
251(1)
14.4 Detection Failures
252(3)
14.4.1 Blind Sensors
252(1)
14.4.2 Below Noise Floor
252(1)
14.4.3 Below Alert Threshold
253(1)
14.4.4 Improper Placement
253(1)
14.4.5 Natural Failure
254(1)
14.4.6 Successfully Attacked
254(1)
14.4.7 Blocked Sensor Input
255(1)
14.4.8 Blocked Report Output
255(1)
Conclusion
255(1)
Questions
256(1)
Chapter 15 Detection Strategy
257(16)
Overview
257(1)
Learning Objectives
257(1)
15.1 Detect in Depth and Breadth
258(4)
15.1.1 Breadth: Network Expanse
258(2)
15.1.2 Depth: Network Expanse
260(1)
15.1.3 Breadth: Attack Space
261(1)
15.1.4 Depth: Attack Space
261(1)
15.2 Herd the Adversary to Defender's Advantage
262(1)
15.3 Attack Epidemiology
263(1)
15.4 Detection Honeypots
264(1)
15.5 Refining Detection
264(2)
15.5.1 Running Alerts to Ground
264(1)
15.5.2 Learning More About an Attack
265(1)
15.6 Enhancing Attack Signal and Reducing Background Noise
266(4)
15.6.1 Reducing the Noise Floor
267(2)
15.6.2 Boosting Attack Signal
269(1)
15.6.3 Lowering the Alert Threshold
270(1)
Conclusion
270(1)
Questions
271(2)
Chapter 16 Deterrence and Adversarial Risk
273(14)
Overview
273(1)
Learning Objectives
273(1)
16.1 Deterrence Requirements
274(3)
16.1.1 Reliable Detection: Risk of Getting Caught
274(1)
16.1.2 Reliable Attribution
275(1)
16.1.3 Meaningful Consequences
276(1)
16.2 All Adversaries Have Risk Thresholds
277(1)
16.3 System Design Can Modulate Adversary Risk
277(2)
16.3.1 Detection Probability
278(1)
16.3.2 Attribution Probability
278(1)
16.3.3 Consequence Capability and Probability
278(1)
16.3.4 Retaliation Capability and Probability
279(1)
16.3.5 Risky Behavior
279(1)
16.4 Uncertainty and Deception
279(1)
16.4.1 Uncertainty
279(1)
16.4.2 Deception
280(1)
16.5 When Detection and Deterrence Do Not Work
280(1)
Conclusion
281(1)
Questions
282(5)
Part IV: How Do You Orchestrate Cybersecurity?
Chapter 17 Cybersecurity Risk Assessment
287(26)
Overview
287(1)
Learning Objectives
288(1)
17.1 A Case for Quantitative Risk Assessment
288(1)
17.2 Risk as a Primary Metric
289(1)
17.3 Why Measure?
290(2)
17.3.1 Characterize
290(1)
17.3.2 Evaluate
291(1)
17.3.3 Predict
291(1)
17.3.4 Improve
292(1)
17.4 Evaluate Defenses from an Attacker's Value Perspective
292(1)
17.5 The Role of Risk Assessment and Metrics in Design
293(2)
17.6 Risk Assessment Analysis Elements
295(14)
17.6.1 Develop Mission Model
295(1)
17.6.2 Develop System Model
295(1)
17.6.3 Develop Adversary Models
296(1)
17.6.4 Choose Representative Strategic Attack Goals
297(1)
17.6.5 Estimate Harm Using Wisdom of Crowds
298(1)
17.6.6 Estimate Probability Using Wisdom of Crowds
299(2)
17.6.7 Choose Representative Subset
301(1)
17.6.8 Develop Deep Attack Trees
301(2)
17.6.9 Estimate Leaf Probabilities and Compute Root
303(2)
17.6.10 Refine Baseline Expected Harm
305(1)
17.6.11 Harvest Attack Sequence Cut Sets => Risk Source
306(2)
17.6.12 Infer Attack Mitigation Candidates from Attack Sequences
308(1)
17.7 Attacker Cost and Risk of Detection
309(1)
17.7.1 Resources
309(1)
17.7.2 Risk Tolerance
309(1)
Conclusion
309(1)
Questions
310(3)
Chapter 18 Risk Mitigation and Optimization
313(18)
Overview
313(1)
Learning Objectives
313(2)
18.1 Develop Candidate Mitigation Packages
315(2)
18.2 Assess Cost of Mitigation Packages
317(3)
18.2.1 Direct Cost
317(1)
18.2.2 Mission Impact
318(2)
18.3 Re-estimate Leaf Node Probabilities and Compute Root Node Probability
320(3)
18.4 Optimize at Various Practical Budget Levels
323(3)
18.4.1 Knapsack Algorithm
323(2)
18.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
325(1)
18.5 Decide Investment
326(1)
18.6 Execute
327(1)
Conclusion
327(1)
Questions
328(3)
Chapter 19 Engineering Fundamentals
331(20)
Overview
331(1)
Learning Objectives
331(1)
19.1 Systems Engineering Principles
332(8)
19.1.1 Murphy's Law
332(4)
19.1.2 Margin of Safety
336(1)
19.1.3 Conservation of Energy and Risk
336(1)
19.1.4 Keep It Simple, Stupid
337(1)
19.1.5 Development Process
338(1)
19.1.6 Incremental Development and Agility
339(1)
19.2 Computer Science Principles
340(7)
19.2.1 Modularity and Abstraction
340(2)
19.2.2 Layering
342(1)
19.2.3 Time and Space Complexity: Understanding Scalability
343(1)
19.2.4 Focus on What Matters: Loops and Locality
344(1)
19.2.5 Divide and Conquer and Recursion
345(2)
Conclusion
347(1)
Questions
348(3)
Chapter 20 Architecting Cybersecurity
351(18)
Overview
351(1)
Learning Objectives
351(1)
20.1 Reference Monitor Properties
352(3)
20.1.1 Functional Correctness
352(3)
20.1.2 Non-Bypassable
355(1)
20.1.3 Tamperproof
355(1)
20.2 Simplicity and Minimality Breed Confidence
355(1)
20.3 Separation of Concerns and Evolvability
356(1)
20.4 Security Policy Processing
356(4)
20.4.1 Policy Specification
357(1)
20.4.2 Policy Decision Making
358(2)
20.4.3 Policy Enforcement
360(1)
20.5 Dependability and Tolerance
360(5)
20.5.1 Cybersecurity Requires Fail Safety
360(1)
20.5.2 Expect Failure: Confine Damages Using Bulkheads
361(1)
20.5.3 Tolerance
362(2)
20.5.4 Synergize Prevention, Detect-Response, and Tolerance
364(1)
20.6 Cloud Cybersecurity
365(1)
Conclusion
366(1)
Questions
367(2)
Chapter 21 Assuring Cybersecurity: Getting It Right.
369(12)
Overview
369(1)
Learning Objectives
369(1)
21.1 Cybersecurity Functionality Without Assurance Is Insecure
370(1)
21.2 Treat Cybersecurity Subsystems as Critical Systems
371(1)
21.3 Formal Assurance Arguments
371(5)
21.3.1 Cybersecurity Requirements
372(2)
21.3.2 Formal Security Policy Model
374(1)
21.3.3 Formal Top-Level Specification
374(1)
21.3.4 Security-Critical Subsystem Implementation
375(1)
21.4 Assurance-in-the-Large and Composition
376(3)
21.4.1 Composition
376(1)
21.4.2 Trustworthiness Dependencies
376(1)
21.4.3 Avoiding Dependency Circularity
377(1)
21.4.4 Beware of the Inputs, Outputs, and Dependencies
378(1)
21.4.5 Violating Unstated Assumptions
378(1)
Conclusion
379(1)
Questions
379(2)
Chapter 22 Cyber Situation Understanding: What's Going On
381(20)
Overview
381(1)
Learning Objectives
382(1)
22.1 Situation Understanding Interplay with Command and Control
382(1)
22.2 Situation-Based Decision Making: The CODA Loop
383(2)
22.3 Grasping the Nature of the Attack
385(4)
22.3.1 What Vulnerability Is It Exploiting?
385(1)
22.3.2 Which Paths Are the Attacks Using?
385(2)
22.3.3 Are the Attack Paths Still Open?
387(1)
22.3.4 How Can the Infiltration, Exfiltration, and Propagation Paths Be Closed?
388(1)
22.4 The Implication to Mission
389(3)
22.4.1 Increased Risk
391(1)
22.4.2 Contingency Planning
391(1)
22.4.3 Nature and Locus Guiding Defense
392(1)
22.5 Assessing Attack Damages
392(1)
22.6 Threat Assessment
393(1)
22.7 The State of Defenses
393(3)
22.7.1 Health, Stress, and Duress
394(1)
22.7.2 Status
394(1)
22.7.3 Configuration Maneuverability
395(1)
22.7.4 Progress and Failure
396(1)
22.8 Dynamic Defense Effectiveness
396(1)
Conclusion
397(1)
Questions
398(3)
Chapter 23 Command and Control: What to Do About Attacks
401(28)
Overview
401(1)
Learning Objectives
402(1)
23.1 The Nature of Control
402(2)
23.1.1 Decision Cycle
402(1)
23.1.2 Speed Considerations
403(1)
23.1.3 Hybrid Control
403(1)
23.2 Strategy: Acquiring Knowledge
404(5)
23.2.1 Analogy
405(1)
23.2.2 Direct Experience
406(1)
23.2.3 Vicarious Experience
406(1)
23.2.4 Simulation
407(2)
23.3 Playbooks
409(7)
23.3.1 Game Theory
409(1)
23.3.2 Courses of Action in Advance
410(2)
23.3.3 Criteria for Choosing Best Action
412(3)
23.3.4 Planning Limitations
415(1)
23.4 Autonomic Control
416(4)
23.4.1 Control Theory
416(2)
23.4.2 Role of Autonomic Control
418(1)
23.4.3 Autonomic Action Palette
419(1)
23.5 Meta-Strategy
420(3)
23.5.1 Don't Overreact
421(1)
23.5.2 Don't Be Predictable
422(1)
23.5.3 Stay Ahead of the Attackers
422(1)
Conclusion
423(1)
Questions
424(5)
Part V: Moving Cybersecurity Forward
Chapter 24 Strategic Policy and Investment
429(14)
Overview
429(1)
Learning Objectives
430(1)
24.1 Cyberwar: How Bad Can Bad Get?
430(4)
24.1.1 Scenario
432(1)
24.1.2 Call to Action
432(1)
24.1.3 Barriers to Preparation Action
433(1)
24.1.4 Smoking Gun
433(1)
24.2 Increasing Dependency, Fragility, and the Internet of Things
434(2)
24.2.1 Societal Dependency
434(1)
24.2.2 Just-in-Time Everything
435(1)
24.2.3 The Internet of Things
435(1)
24.2.4 Propagated Weakness
435(1)
24.3 Cybersecurity in the Virtual World: Virtual Economy
436(1)
24.3.1 Booming Game Economy: Virtual Gold Rush
436(1)
24.3.2 Digital Currency Such as Bitcoin
436(1)
24.3.3 Virtual High-Value Targets
436(1)
24.3.4 Start from Scratch?
437(1)
24.4 Disinformation and Influence Operations: Fake News
437(2)
24.4.1 What's New?
437(1)
24.4.2 Hacking Wetware
438(1)
24.4.3 Polluting the Infosphere
439(1)
Conclusion
439(1)
Questions
440(3)
Chapter 25 Thoughts on the Future of Cybersecurity
443(24)
Overview
443(1)
Learning Objectives
444(1)
25.1 A World Without Secrecy
444(2)
25.1.1 Timed Release
445(1)
25.1.2 Minimize Generation
445(1)
25.1.3 Zero-Secrecy Operations
445(1)
25.2 Coevolution of Measures and Countermeasures
446(1)
25.3 Cybersecurity Space Race and Sputnik
447(3)
25.3.1 Gaining the Ultimate Low Ground
447(1)
25.3.2 Stuxnet and the Cyberattack Genie
447(1)
25.3.3 Georgia and Hybrid Warfare
448(1)
25.3.4 Estonia and Live-Fire Experiments
448(1)
25.3.5 Responsibility for Defending Critical Information Infrastructure
448(2)
25.4 Cybersecurity Science and Experimentation
450(4)
25.4.1 Hypothesis Generation
452(1)
25.4.2 Experimental Design
453(1)
25.4.3 Experiment Execution
453(1)
25.5 The Great Unknown: Research Directions
454(6)
25.5.1 Hard Research Problems
454(2)
25.5.2 Are Cybersecurity Problems Too Hard?
456(1)
25.5.3 Research Impact and the Heilmeier Catechism
456(3)
25.5.4 Research Results Dependability
459(1)
25.5.5 Research Culture: A Warning
459(1)
25.6 Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence
460(2)
Conclusion
462(1)
Questions
463(4)
Part VI: Appendix and Glossary Appendix Resources 467(16)
Glossary 483(40)
Index 523
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