| Preface |
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xi | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xiii | |
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1 The best case for skepticism about the external world? (Stroud, "The Problem of the External World") |
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1 | (5) |
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2 Proving the external world exists (Or: Let's all give Moore a hand!) (Moore, "Proof of an External World") |
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6 | (4) |
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3 Some ways of resisting skepticism (Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism") |
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10 | (5) |
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4 Plausibility and possibilities (Moore, "Certainty") |
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15 | (4) |
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5 Skeptic on skeptic (Klein, "How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism") |
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19 | (5) |
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6 Realism in epistemology (Williams, "Epistemological Realism") |
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24 | (7) |
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7 Socratic questions and the foundation of empirical knowledge (Chisholm, "The Myth of the Given") |
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31 | (5) |
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8-9 The foundation of empirical knowledge? (Sellars, "Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" and "Epistemic Principles") |
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36 | (8) |
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10 It's not a given that empirical knowledge has a foundation (BonJour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?") |
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44 | (5) |
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11 Interpretation, meaning and skepticism (Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge") |
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49 | (5) |
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12 Blending foundationalism and coherentism (Haack, "A Foundherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification") |
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54 | (6) |
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13 Foundationalism, coherentism and supervenience (Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid") |
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60 | (7) |
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14 Infinitism (Klein, "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons") |
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67 | (6) |
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15 The Gettier problem (Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?") |
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73 | (4) |
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16 Some principles concerning knowledge and inference (Harman, Thought, Selections) |
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77 | (6) |
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17 The essence of the Gettier problem (Zagzebski, "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems") |
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83 | (2) |
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18 Knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state (Williamson, "A State of Mind") |
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85 | (7) |
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19 Closure, contrast and semi-skepticism (Dretske, "Epistemic Operators") |
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92 | (7) |
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20 Closure, contrast and anti-skepticism (Stine, "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure") |
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99 | (4) |
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21 Keeping close track of knowledge (Nozick, "Knowledge and Skepticism") |
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103 | (8) |
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22 Moore wins (Sosa, "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore") |
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111 | (5) |
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23 The closure principle: dangers and defense (Vogel, "Are There Counter examples to the Closure Principle?") |
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116 | (7) |
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24 Evidentialist epistemology (Feldman and Conee, "Evidentialism") |
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123 | (6) |
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25 Non-defensive epistemology (Foley, "Skepticism and Rationality") |
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129 | (6) |
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26 Reliabilism about justification (Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?") |
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135 | (6) |
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27 Reliabilism: a level assessment (Vogel, "Reliabilism Leveled") |
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141 | (5) |
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28 Against externalism (BonJour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge") |
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146 | (5) |
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29 Against internalism (Goldman, "Internalism Exposed") |
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151 | (5) |
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30 A skeptical take on externalism (Fumerton, "Externalism and Skepticism") |
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156 | (3) |
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31 A friendly take on internalism (Feldman and Conee, "Internalism Defended") |
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159 | (5) |
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32 Warrant (Plantinga, "Warrant: A First Approximation") |
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164 | (5) |
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33 Intellectual virtues (Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind) |
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169 | (3) |
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34 Virtue epistemology (Greco, "Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology") |
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172 | (4) |
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35 Knowledge, luck and virtue (Pritchard, "Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues") |
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176 | (5) |
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36 Epistemic value and cognitive achievement (Sosa, "The Place of Truth in Epistemology") |
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181 | (6) |
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37 Giving up on knowledge (Kvanvig, "Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?") |
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187 | (5) |
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38 Giving up on (exact) truth (Elgin, "True Enough") |
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192 | (4) |
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39 Naturalized epistemology advertised (Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized") |
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196 | (7) |
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40 Naturalized epistemology criticized (Kim, "What is `Naturalized Epistemology'?") |
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203 | (4) |
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41 Naturalized epistemology radicalized (Antony, "Quine as Feminist") |
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207 | (4) |
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42 A apriori justification and unrevisability (Putnam, "There is at Least One A Priori Truth") |
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211 | (4) |
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43 A priori justification and revisability (Casullo, "Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge") |
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215 | (4) |
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44 Philosophical method and empirical science (Bealer, "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy") |
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219 | (7) |
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45 Experimental epistemology (Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions") |
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226 | (4) |
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46 Natural kinds, intuitions and method in epistemology (Kornblith, "Investigating Knowledge Itself") |
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230 | (5) |
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47 Contextualism and skeptical puzzles (DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem") |
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235 | (5) |
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48 Contextualism and infallibilist intuitions (Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge") |
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240 | (4) |
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49 Contextualism and intuitional instability (Cohen, "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems") |
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244 | (3) |
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50 Knowledge and action (Stanley, "Knowledge and Practical Interests, Selections") |
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247 | (5) |
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51 Rationality and action (Fantl and McGrath, "Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification") |
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252 | (6) |
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52 One invariantist's scorecard (Hawthorne, "Sensitive Moderate Invariantism") |
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258 | (6) |
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53 A relativist theory of knowledge attributions (MacFarlane, "The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions") |
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264 | (6) |
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54 Rationality and trust (Baker, "Trust and Rationality") |
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270 | (3) |
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55 Testimony and gullibility (Fricker, "Against Gullibility") |
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273 | (4) |
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56 Some reflections on how epistemic sources work (Burge, "Content Preservation") |
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277 | (5) |
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57 Testimony and knowledge (Lackey, "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission") |
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282 | (4) |
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58 Memory and knowledge (Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge") |
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286 | (5) |
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59 Perception and knowledge (McDowell, "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge") |
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291 | (4) |
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60 Skills and knowledge (Reynolds, "Knowing How to Believe with Justification") |
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295 | (4) |
| Index |
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299 | |
Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta