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E-raamat: EU Competition Law and the Information and Communication Technology Network Industries: Economic versus Legal Concepts in Pursuit of (Consumer) Welfare

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  • Formaat: 312 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 08-Mar-2012
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781847319128
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EU Competition Law and the Information and Communication Technology Network Industries: Economic versus Legal Concepts in Pursuit of (Consumer) WelfareSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: 312 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 08-Mar-2012
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781847319128
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Competition policies have long been based on a scholarly tradition focused on static models and static analysis of industrial organization. However, recent developments in industrial organization literature have led to significant advances, moving beyond traditional static models and a pre-occupation with price competition, to consider the organization of industries in a dynamic context. This is especially important in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) network industries where competition centers on network effects, innovation, and intellectual property rights and the key driver of consumer benefit is technological progress. Consequently, when an antitrust intervention is considered, a number of considerations, which arise out of the specific nature of the ICT sector, have to be taken into account to ensure improved consumer welfare. This book considers the adequacy of existing EU competition policy in the area of ICT industries against the findings of modern economic theory. Particular attention is given to the implications of these dynamic markets for the competitive assessment and treatment of most common competitive harms in this area, such as non-price predatory practices, tying and bundling, cooperative standard setting, platform joint-ventures, and cooperative research and development.

Arvustused

a timely and most welcome addition to the literatureThe monograph successfully summarises complex economic issues that are specific to ICT industries and presents them in a way that is accessible to lawyers. -- Pablo Ibanez Colomo * European Law Review, Volume 39, February 2014 * ... an extremely valuable book on this topical subject, which will prove very useful for both academics and practitioners examining competition enforcement dynamics in the ICT sector. -- Valerio Torti * European Competition Law Review, Volume 34, Issue 9 * ...this book is an ambitious attempt to analyse critically European competition policy in relation to ICT markets. Fatur's work is...highly readable and engaging... is certainly valuable at a descriptive level, and points out many opportunities for follow-up research into the subject matter. -- Jasper P. Sluijs * Common Market Law Review, Volume 50(3) * Although there are many publications dealing with specific aspects of the subject matter, in particular the Microsoft cases, the publication in question provides a unique contribution to this area of study...there are virtually no other publications offering a comprehensive analysis of this area of law. Therefore, this publication could prove very useful to both academics and practitioners, who want to familiarize themselves with the application of competition law in the ICT sector, as well as the various intricacies and issues that may arise...a great book, which is likely to become an exceptional point of reference for students, researchers and practitioners of competition law in the ICT sector. -- Laise Da Correggio Luciano * International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Volume 21(1) *

Foreword v
Acknowledgements vii
Abbreviations xv
Table of Cases
xvii
Table of Treaties, Legislation and other Legislative Instruments
xxiii
1 Introduction
1(14)
I The Subject
1(1)
II Background
1(5)
III Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law and its Limitations
6(4)
IV EU Competition Policy and the Nature and Scope of the Analysis
10(3)
V Analytical Framework and Outline
13(2)
2 ICT Network Industries
15(17)
I General
15(1)
II Electronic Communications Network and Services
16(6)
A General
16(4)
B Telecommunications Networks and Services
20(1)
C Cable and Broadcasting Networks and Services
20(1)
D Internet, Internet Access and Internet Related Services
21(1)
III Hardware Platforms
22(1)
IV Software Platforms
23(2)
V Electronic Financial Sector Platforms
25(7)
A Card-based Payment Systems
25(1)
(i) General
25(1)
(ii) Card Systems
26(1)
(iii) Issuing of Payment Cards
27(1)
(iv) Acquiring of Card-holders and Merchants
28(1)
(v) ATM Networks
29(1)
B Electronic Financial Exchanges with Clearing and Settlement
29(1)
(i) Electronic Financial Exchanges
29(1)
(ii) Clearing and Settlement
30(2)
3 The Economics of Competition Policy
32(21)
I Major Economic Theories of Competition and their Evolution
32(6)
A Classical Era of Antitrust
32(1)
B Structural Era and the Harvard School
33(1)
C Efficiency Era and the Chicago School
34(2)
D The Post-Chicago Developments and the Era of Synthesis
36(2)
II Basic Economic Framework of Competition Policy
38(15)
A General
38(2)
B Economic Efficiency and Market Power
40(3)
C Efficiency Trade-offs
43(1)
(i) Allocative versus Productive Efficiencies
43(2)
(ii) Static versus Dynamic Efficiencies
45(2)
D Welfare Standards
47(1)
(i) Consumer Welfare Standard
47(2)
(ii) Total Welfare Standard
49(1)
(iii) Alternative Welfare Standards
49(1)
(iv) Existence of Optimal Welfare Standard?
50(3)
4 The Economics of the ICT Network Industries
53(46)
I Introduction
53(1)
II Fundamental Characteristics of Networks
53(4)
III The Economics of Innovation
57(10)
A General
57(2)
B Economic Theories of Innovation
59(3)
C Public Policies and Incentives to Innovate
62(2)
D Innovation in Network Systems
64(3)
IV Major Theories of Economic Harm: Vertical Foreclosure and Raising Rivals' Costs
67(4)
A Economic Theories of Vertical Foreclosure
68(2)
B Raising Rivals Costs as Alternative Method of Foreclosure
70(1)
V (Dynamic) Nature of Competition in the ICT Industries: Interplay of Networks, Innovation and Competition
71(28)
A Competition in Dynamic Markets: the Relations between Market Structure and Innovation
71(1)
(i) General
71(1)
(ii) Austrian School's Approach and Related Dynamic Theories
71(3)
(iii) Limits of the Austrian School's Approach
74(1)
(a) Intensive Innovation: Competition or Monopoly Driven?
74(2)
(b) Links between Market Concentration or Company Size and Innovation: Empirical Studies
76(2)
(c) Influence of Fundamental Technology Characteristics on Market Structure and Innovation Activity
78(1)
(d) Innovation and Market Structure: Importance of Competitive Process
79(1)
B Special Economic Characteristics and Sources of Market Power in the ICT Industries
80(1)
(i) Innovation and IPRs
81(1)
(ii) Network Effects and Tipping
82(1)
(a) Types of Network Effects
82(1)
(b) Network Effects and Network Size
83(2)
(c) Sub-optimal Networks: Network Competition, First-mover Advantage and Tipping
85(1)
(iii) Switching Costs and Lock-ins
86(1)
(iv) Compatibility and Standards
87(2)
(v) High Fixed/Sunk Costs and Low Marginal Costs
89(2)
(vi) Two-sided Platforms
91(1)
(a) Economic Background of Two-sided Platforms
91(2)
(b) Pricing
93(1)
(c) Industrial Organisation of Two-sided Markets
94(2)
C Competition in the Market versus Competition for the Market: Applicability of Schumpeterian Competition to Characteristics of Competition in the ICT Industries
96(3)
5 Analytical Framework, Market Definition and the Assessment of Market Power
99(40)
I Background
99(1)
II General Observations on EU Legal Framework and Competition Policy
100(3)
A Choice of the Welfare Standard Under EU Competition Policy
102(1)
III Appropriate Framework for Competition Analysis in the ICT Industries
103(12)
A Adequacy of Traditional (Static) Approach to Competition Analysis
103(2)
B Effects- versus Form-based Approach: the `First Principles' Approach to Competition Analysis
105(1)
C Effects-based Approach: Per Se Rule versus the Rule of Reason
106(1)
D Preliminary Screening for Possible Anti-competitive Effects
107(1)
E Competitive Harm and Consumer Welfare
108(2)
F General Framework for Competition Assessment: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
110(5)
IV Market Definition
115(13)
A General
115(1)
B Market Definition in the Context of ICT Industries
115(2)
C Some Specific Issues with the Role of Market Definition in the ICT Industries
117(1)
(i) The SSNIP Test and ICT Industries
117(1)
(ii) Concept of Innovation Markets
118(3)
(iii) After-markets and ICT Industries
121(1)
(iv) Market Definition: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
122(6)
V Market Power
128(11)
A Market Power: Pricing Power and Exclusionary Power
128(1)
B Market Power in the Context of ICT Industries
129(1)
C Some Specific Issues with Existence of Market Power in the ICT Industries
130(1)
(i) Market Share and Level of Concentration
130(1)
(ii) Barriers to Expansion or Entry
131(2)
D Market Power: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
133(6)
6 Unilateral Exclusionary Conduct and ICT Network Industries
139(54)
I General Comments on Unilateral Exclusionary Conduct and Abuse of Market Power
139(3)
II Unilateral Exclusionary Conduct: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
142(4)
III Predation
146(13)
A General
146(1)
B Predation and ICT Industries
147(1)
(i) Legal Standard(s) for Predation in ICT Industries
147(2)
(ii) Detection of Predation: Winner-Takes-(Almost)-All Markets versus Network Effects and Strategic Entry Deterrence
149(2)
C Predation: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
151(8)
IV Tying and Bundling
159(11)
A General
159(2)
B Tying and Bundling and ICT Industries
161(1)
C Tying and Bundling: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
162(8)
V Exclusive Dealing
170(6)
A General
170(1)
B Exclusive Dealing and ICT Industries
171(2)
C Exclusive Dealing: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
173(3)
VI Refusal to Deal
176(17)
A General
176(3)
B Refusal to Deal and ICT Industries
179(1)
(i) Duty to Deal: Equivalence of Physical Property and IPRs
179(1)
(ii) Unilateral Compatibility Decisions, Interconnection and Mandating Access
180(3)
C Refusal to Deal: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
183(10)
7 Collective Behaviour and ICT Network Industries
193(24)
I General Comments on Horizontal Co-operation Among Direct Competitors
193(1)
II Co-operative Standard Setting
193(11)
A General
193(1)
B Costs and Benefits of Compatibility and Standard Setting
194(2)
C Abuse of the Standard Setting Process
196(1)
D Co-operative Standard Setting and Competition Policy
197(1)
E Co-operative Standard Setting: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
198(6)
III Accumulation of IPRs: Cross-Licensing and Technology Pools
204(6)
A General
204(2)
B Accumulation of IPRs: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
206(4)
IV Collaborative Arrangement: Research and Platform Joint Venture
210(7)
A General
210(2)
B Collaborative Arrangements: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
212(5)
8 Mergers and ICT Network Industries
217(20)
I General
217(2)
II Horizontal Mergers
219(9)
A Horizontal Mergers and Competition in the Market
219(2)
B Horizontal Mergers and Competition for the Market
221(1)
C Horizontal Mergers: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
222(6)
III Non-Horizontal Mergers
228(9)
A General
228(2)
B Non-Horizontal Mergers: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
230(7)
9 Two-sided Platforms and Competitive Harm
237(7)
I General
237(2)
II Two-sided Platforms: Analysis of Existing EU Competition Policy
239(5)
10 Conclusion and Outlook
244(5)
Bibliography 249(16)
Index 265
Andrej Fatur is a partner at the law firm Fatur in Ljubljana, Slovenia.
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