1 Introduction: Economics and Environmental Degradation |
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1 | (12) |
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3 | (4) |
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7 | (2) |
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9 | (2) |
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11 | (2) |
2 Environmental Externalities and Their Internalization Through Voluntary Approaches |
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13 | (24) |
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2.1 The Socially Optimal Pollution Level in Case of a Unilateral Externality |
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14 | (2) |
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2.2 Ways to Internalize Externalities |
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16 | (19) |
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16 | (16) |
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2.2.2 Other Voluntary Approaches 30 Appendix: Multilateral Externalities, Public Goods, and Mixed Goods |
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32 | (3) |
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35 | (2) |
3 Monetary Valuation of the Environment |
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37 | (30) |
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3.1 Theoretical Background |
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38 | (9) |
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38 | (8) |
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46 | (1) |
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3.2 The Contingent Valuation Method: Measuring Utility by Means of Surveys |
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47 | (18) |
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47 | (3) |
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50 | (1) |
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3.2.3 Problems with Contingent Valuation Studies |
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51 | (11) |
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3.2.4 Conclusions for the Design and Validity of CVM Studies |
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62 | (3) |
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65 | (2) |
4 A Comparison of Environmental Policy Instruments |
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67 | (66) |
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69 | (1) |
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4.2 Command and Control Instruments |
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70 | (5) |
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4.2.1 Types of Command and Control Instruments |
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70 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Command and Control Instruments |
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70 | (5) |
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4.3 Advantages of Environmental Taxes |
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75 | (5) |
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4.3.1 Cost-Effectiveness in Abating Emissions ("Static Efficiency") |
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75 | (2) |
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4.3.2 Stronger Incentives for Innovation ("Dynamic Efficiency") |
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77 | (3) |
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4.4 Problems with Environmental Taxation |
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80 | (18) |
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4.4.1 Differences of Environmental Impact |
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80 | (2) |
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4.4.2 Unknown Marginal Abatement Costs |
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82 | (4) |
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4.4.3 Effects of Environmental Taxation in Case of a Supplier's Monopoly |
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86 | (3) |
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4.4.4 The Possibility of Rising Emissions Through Environmental Taxation |
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89 | (4) |
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4.4.5 An Excessive Dynamic Incentive Effect |
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93 | (1) |
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4.4.6 Welfare Losses Due to the Double Burden of Environmental Taxes |
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94 | (4) |
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4.5 The Double Dividend Hypothesis: The Idea of "Greening" the Tax System |
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98 | (12) |
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4.5.1 The Idea of the Double Dividend |
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98 | (2) |
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4.5.2 The Level of the Optimal Environmental Tax When the Double Dividend Is Taken into Account |
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100 | (2) |
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4.5.3 Challenging the Existence of Double Dividends |
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102 | (5) |
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4.5.4 Conflicts of Environmental Taxes with Other Economic Objectives |
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107 | (3) |
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4.6 Emission Trading: An Alternative Incentive-Based Instrument of Environmental Policy |
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110 | (19) |
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4.6.1 The Functioning and the Prospective Advantages of Cap-and-Trade Systems |
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111 | (5) |
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4.6.2 Dynamic Efficiency of Permit Schemes |
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116 | (3) |
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4.6.3 Problems with Emission Trading |
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119 | (6) |
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4.6.4 Cap-and-Trade Systems in Practice |
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125 | (4) |
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4.7 The Limits of Emission Pricing: An Integrated View of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy |
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129 | (2) |
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131 | (2) |
5 International Environmental Problems |
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133 | (26) |
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134 | (1) |
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5.2 A Two-Country Game with a Reciprocal Externality: Payoff Structure and Nash Equilibria |
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135 | (5) |
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135 | (1) |
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5.2.2 Payoff Rankings and Country Types |
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136 | (1) |
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5.2.3 Explanation of Country Types |
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137 | (1) |
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138 | (2) |
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5.3 Transformations of the One-Shot Game |
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140 | (6) |
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5.3.1 Changes of Abatement Costs |
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140 | (4) |
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5.3.2 Extended Preferences |
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144 | (2) |
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146 | (5) |
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5.5 Success Factors of International Environmental Cooperation: Two Examples |
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151 | (3) |
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154 | |
Supplementary Information |
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Index |
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159 | |