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E-raamat: Game Theory and Economic Analysis: A Quiet Revolution in Economics

Edited by (Université Paris Dauphiné, France)
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This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributions include such themes as:
*the connections between Von Neumann's mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to him today
*the strategic use of information by game players
*the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players
*cooperative games and their place within the literature of games plus new developments in non-cooperative games
*possible applications for game theory in industrial and financial economics differential qualitative games and entry dissuasion.
List of contributors
vii
Introduction 1(12)
Christian Schmidt
PART I Historical insight 13(42)
Von Neumann and Morgenstern in historical perspective
15(18)
Robert W. Dimand
Mary Ann Dimand
Rupture versus continuity in game theory: Nash versus Von Neumann and Morgenstern
33(22)
Christian Schmidt
PART II Theoretical content 55(134)
Bluff and reputation
57(17)
Sylvain Sorin
An appraisal of cooperative game theory
74(16)
Herve Moulin
The coalition concept in game theory
90(24)
Sebastien Cochinard
Do Von Neumann and Morgenstern have heterodox followers?
114(21)
Christian Schmidt
From specularity to temporality in game theory
135(16)
Jean-Louis Rulliere
Bernard Walliser
PART III Applications
Collective choice mechanisms and individual incentives
151(21)
Claude D'Aspremont
Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet
Team models as a framework to analyze coordination problems within the firm
172(17)
Jean-Pierre Ponssard
Sebastien Steinmetz
Herve Tanguy
Index 189


Christian Schmidt is Professor at the University of Paris-Dauphine. He has recently published La théorie des jeux: essai dinterprétation (PUF, 2001).