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E-raamat: Game Theory: An Introduction

  • Formaat: 416 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Sep-2024
  • Kirjastus: Princeton University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780691270654
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  • Formaat: 416 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Sep-2024
  • Kirjastus: Princeton University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780691270654
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Rigorous yet accessible for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students, this text offers comprehensive treatment of principal ideas and applications. Tadelis (U. of California, Berkeley; also affiliated as an economist with eBay Research Labs) begins with rational decision making and covers the single-person decision problem, and uncertainty and time. The coverage that follows includes static and dynamic games of complete information, and of incomplete information. Each chapter ends with a summary and exercises, and the final chapter is a mathematical appendix covering sets and sequences, functions, calculus and optimization, and probability and random variables. Annotation ©2013 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives.

Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them.

  • Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory
  • Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information
  • Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises
  • Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission
  • Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students
  • Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students

Arvustused

"The book is enjoyable to read and truly an enrichment in game theory. It is widely well-structured and well-written and mathematically correct. The purpose is given perfectly. I recommend the book for researchers and graduate students who wants to get some insight in the area of game theory."--Sirma Zeynep, Zentralblatt MATH "The book aims to be precise and rigorous, yet accessible and reader-friendly, and, to a great extent, it does hit these apparently conflicting targets... The depth of the book is intermediate, with a conventional, yet clear, style of writing. It will please mainstream economists... It can help advanced undergraduates and also students at honors or master's levels. It can also be used by PhD students seeking a fast, not so mathematized introduction to the field."--Jose Rodriques-Neto, Economic Record

Preface xi
PART I Rational Decision Making
Chapter 1 The Single-Person Decision Problem
3(11)
1.1 Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences
4(5)
1.1.1 Preference Relations
5(2)
1.1.2 Payoff Functions
7(2)
1.2 The Rational Choice Paradigm
9(2)
1.3 Summary
11(1)
1.4 Exercises
11(3)
Chapter 2 Introducing Uncertainty and Time
14(29)
2.1 Risk, Nature, and Random Outcomes
14(4)
2.1.1 Finite Outcomes and Simple Lotteries
15(1)
2.1.2 Simple versus Compound Lotteries
16(1)
2.1.5 Lotteries over Continuous Outcomes
17(1)
2.2 Evaluating Random Outcomes
18(6)
2.2.1 Expected Payoff: The Finite Case
19(1)
2.2.2 Expected Payoff: The Continuous Case
20(1)
2.2.3 Caveat: It's Not Just the Order Anymore
21(1)
2.2.4 Risk Attitudes
22(1)
2.2.5 The St. Petersburg Paradox
23(1)
2.3 Rational Decision Making with Uncertainty
24(2)
2.3.1 Rationality Revisited
24(1)
2.3.2 Maximizing Expected Payoffs
24(2)
2.4 Decisions over Time
26(3)
2.4.1 Backward Induction
26(2)
2.4.2 Discounting Future Payoffs
28(1)
2.5 Applications
29(3)
2.5.1 The Value of Information
29(2)
2.5.2 Discounted Future Consumption
31(1)
2.6 Theory versus Practice
32(1)
2.7 Summary
33(1)
2.8 Exercises
33(10)
PART II Static Games of Complete Information
Chapter 3 Preliminaries
43(16)
3.1 Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies
46(4)
3.1.1 Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma
48(1)
3.1.2 Example: Cournot Duopoly
49(1)
3.1.3 Example: Voting on a New Agenda
49(1)
3.2 Matrix Representation: Two-Player Finite Game
50(2)
3.2.1 Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma
51(1)
3.2.2 Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors
52(1)
3.3 Solution Concepts
52(5)
3.3.1 Assumptions and Setup
54(1)
3.3.2 Evaluating Solution Concepts
55(1)
3.3.3 Evaluating Outcomes
56(1)
3.4 Summary
57(1)
3.5 Exercises
58(1)
Chapter 4 Rationality and Common Knowledge
59(20)
4.1 Dominance in Pure Strategies
59(4)
4.1.1 Dominated Strategies
59(2)
4.1.2 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
61(1)
4.1.3 Evaluating Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
62(1)
4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strietly Dominated Pure Strategies
63(6)
4.2.1 Iterated Elimination and Common Knowledge of Rationality
63(2)
4.2.2 Example: Cournot Duopoly
65(2)
4.2.3 Evaluating 1ESDS
67(2)
4.3 Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability
69(7)
4.3.1 The Best Response
69(2)
4.3.2 Beliefs and Best-Response Correspondences
71(2)
4.3.3 Rationalizability
73(1)
4.3.4 The Cournot Duopoly Revisited
73(1)
4.3.5 The "p-Beauty Contest"
74(2)
4.3.6 Evaluating Rationalizability
76(1)
4.4 Summary
76(1)
4.5 Exercises
76(3)
Chapter 5 Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium
79(22)
5.1 Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
80(3)
5.1.1 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Matrix
81(2)
5.1.2 Evaluating the Nash Equilibria Solution
83(1)
5.2 Nash Equilibrium: Some Classic Applications
83(12)
5.2.1 Two Kinds of Societies
83(1)
5.2.2 The Tragedy of the Commons
84(3)
5.2.3 Cournot Duopoly
87(1)
5.2.4 Bertrand Duopoly
88(5)
5.2.5 Political Ideology and Electoral Competition
93(2)
5.3 Summary
95(1)
5.4 Exercises
95(6)
Chapter 6 Mixed Strategies
101(28)
6.1 Strategies, Beliefs, and Expected Payoffs
102(5)
6.1.1 Finite Strategy Sets
102(2)
6.1.2 Continuous Strategy Sets
104(1)
6.1.3 Beliefs and Mixed Strategies
105(1)
6.1.4 Expected Payoffs
105(2)
6.2 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
107(7)
6.2.1 Example: Matching Pennies
108(3)
6.2.2 Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors
111(2)
6.2.3 Multiple Equilibria: Pure and Mixed
113(1)
6.3 IESDS and Rationalizability Revisited
114(3)
6.4 Nash's Existence Theorem
117(6)
6.5 Summary
123(1)
6.6 Exercises
123(6)
PART III Dynamic Games of Complete Information
Chapter 7 Preliminaries
129(22)
7.1 The Extensive-Form Game
130(7)
7.1.1 Game Trees
132(4)
7.1.2 Imperfect versus Perfect Information
136(1)
7.2 Strategies and Nash Equilibrium
137(8)
7.2.1 Pure Strategies
137(2)
7.2.2 Mixed versus Behavioral Strategies
139(4)
7.2.3 Normal-Form Representation of Extensive-Form Games
143(2)
7.3 Nash Equilibrium and Paths of Play
145(2)
7.4 Summary
147(1)
7.5 Exercises
147(4)
Chapter 8 Credibility and Sequential Rationality
151(24)
8.1 Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction
152(1)
8.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Concept
153(6)
8.3 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Examples
159(10)
8.3.1 The Centipede Game
159(1)
8.3.2 Stackelberg Competition
160(3)
8.3.3 Mutually Assured Destruction
163(3)
8.3.4 Time-Inconsistent Preferences
166(3)
8.4 Summary
169(1)
8.5 Exercises
170(5)
Chapter 9 Multistage Games
175(15)
9.1 Preliminaries
176(1)
9.2 Payoffs
177(1)
9.3 Strategies and Conditional Play
178(2)
9.4 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
180(4)
9.5 The One-Stage Deviation Principle
184(2)
9.6 Summary
186(1)
9.7 Exercises
186(4)
Chapter 10 Repeated Games
190(30)
10.1 Finitely Repeated Games
190(2)
10.2 Infinitely Repeated Games
192(4)
10.2.1 Payoffs
193(2)
10.2.2 Strategies
195(1)
10.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
196(5)
10.4 Application: Tacit Collusion
201(3)
10.5 Sequential Interaction and Reputation
204(5)
10.5.1 Cooperation as Reputation
204(1)
10.5.2 Third-Party Institutions as Reputation Mechanisms
205(2)
10.5.3 Reputation Transfers without Third Parties
207(2)
10.6 The Folk Theorem: Almost Anything Goes
209(5)
10.7 Summary
214(1)
10.8 Exercises
215(5)
Chapter 11 Strategic Bargaining
220(21)
11.1 One Round of Bargaining: The Ultimatum Game
222(2)
11.2 Finitely Many Rounds of Bargaining
224(4)
11.3 The Infinite-Horizon Game
228(1)
11.4 Application: Legislative Bargaining
229(6)
11.4.1 Closed-Rule Bargaining
230(2)
11.4.2 Open-Rule Bargaining
232(3)
11.5 Summary
235(1)
11.6 Exercises
236(5)
PART IV Static Games of Incomplete Information
Chapter 12 Bayesian Games
241(29)
12.1 Strategic Representation of Bayesian Games
246(6)
12.1.1 Players, Actions, Information, and Preferences
246(1)
12.1.2 Deriving Posteriors from a Common Prior: A Player's Beliefs
247(2)
12.1.3 Strategies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
249(3)
12.2 Examples
252(6)
12.2.1 Teenagers and the Game of Chicken
252(3)
12.2.2 Study Groups
255(3)
12.3 Inefficient Trade and Adverse Selection
258(3)
12.4 Committee Voting
261(3)
12.5 Mixed Strategies Revisited: Harsanyi's Interpretation
264(2)
12.6 Summary
266(1)
12.7 Exercises
266(4)
Chapter 13 Auctions and Competitive Bidding
270(18)
13.1 Independent Private Values
272(10)
13.1.1 Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
272(3)
13.1.2 English Auctions
275(1)
13.1.3 First-Price Sealed-Bid and Dutch Auctions
276(3)
13.1.4 Revenue Equivalence
279(3)
13.2 Common Values and the Winner's Curse
282(3)
13.3 Summary
285(1)
13.4 Exercises
285(3)
Chapter 14 Mechanism Design
288(15)
14.1 Setup: Mechanisms as Bayesian Games
288(4)
14.1.1 The Players
288(1)
14.1.2 The Mechanism Designer
289(1)
14.1.3 The Mechanism Game
290(2)
14.2 The Revelation Principle
292(3)
14.3 Dominant Strategies and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
295(4)
14.3.1 Dominant Strategy Implementation
295(1)
14.3.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
295(4)
14.4 Summary
299(1)
14.5 Exercises
299(4)
PART V Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Chapter 15 Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information
303(15)
15.1 The Problem with Subgame Perfection
303(4)
15.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
307(5)
15.3 Sequential Equilibrium
312(2)
15.4 Summary
314(1)
15.5 Exercises
314(4)
Chapter 16 Signaling Games
318(21)
16.1 Education Signaling: The MBA Game
319(4)
16.2 Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence
323(9)
16.2.1 Separating Equilibria
324(6)
16.2.2 Pooling Equilibria
330(2)
16.3 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games
332(3)
16.4 Summary
335(1)
16.5 Exercises
335(4)
Chapter 17 Building a Reputation
339(18)
17.1 Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
339(3)
17.2 Driving a Tough Bargain
342(7)
17.3 A Reputation for Being "Nice"
349(5)
17.4 Summary
354(1)
17.5 Exercises
354(3)
Chapter 18 Information Transmission and Cheap Talk
357(12)
18.1 Information Transmission: A Finite Example
358(3)
18.2 Information Transmission: The Continuous Case
361(4)
18.3 Application: Information and Legislative Organization
365(2)
18.4 Summary
367(1)
18.5 Exercises
367(2)
Chapter 19 Mathematical Appendix
369(16)
19.1 Sets and Sequences
369(2)
19.1.1 Basic Definitions
369(1)
19.1.2 Basic Set Operations
370(1)
19.2 Functions
371(2)
19.2.1 Basic Definitions
371(1)
19.2.2 Continuity
372(1)
19.3 Calculus and Optimization
373(5)
19.3.7 Basic Definitions
373(1)
19.3.2 Differentiation and Optimization
374(3)
19.3.3 Integration
377(1)
19.4 Probability and Random Variables
378(7)
19.4.1 Basic Definitions
378(1)
19.4.2 Cumulative Distribution and Density Functions
379(1)
19.4.3 Independence, Conditional Probability, and Bayes' Rule
380(2)
19.4.4 Expected Values
382(3)
References 385(4)
Index 389
Steven Tadelis is associate professor and Barbara and Gerson Bakar Faculty Fellow at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a Distinguished Economist at eBay Research Labs.