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E-raamat: Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning

  • Formaat: 352 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 01-Aug-2015
  • Kirjastus: Cornell University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781501700415
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  • Formaat: 352 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 01-Aug-2015
  • Kirjastus: Cornell University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781501700415
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What is it for a sentence to have a certain meaning? This is the question that William P. Alston, one of America's most distinguished and prolific analytic philosophers, addresses in this major contribution to the philosophy of language. His answer focuses on the given sentence's potential to play the role that its speaker had in mind—what he terms the usability of the sentence to perform the illocutionary act intended by its speaker.Alston defines an illocutionary act as an act of saying something with a certain "content." He develops his account of what it is to perform such acts in terms of taking responsibility, in uttering a sentence, for the existence of certain conditions. In requesting someone to open a window, for example, the speaker takes responsibility for its being the case that the window is closed and that the speaker has an interest in its being opened.In Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, Alston expands upon this concept, creating a framework of five categories of illocutionary act and going on to argue that sentence meaning is fundamentally a matter of illocutionary act potential; that is, for a sentence to have a particular meaning is for it to be usable to perform illocutionary acts of a certain type.In providing detailed and explicit patterns of analysis for the whole range of illocutionary acts, Alston makes a unique contribution to the field of philosophy of language—one that is likely to generate debate for years to come.

What is it for a sentence to have a certain meaning? This is the question that William P. Alston, one of America's most distinguished and prolific analytic philosophers, addresses in this major contribution to the philosophy of language. His answer...

Arvustused

"Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning makes a significant contribution to both speech-act theory and to speech-act semantics. It is exceptionally well organized and the level of discussion and argumentation is high. Part I contains some of the best and most detailed analyses of illocutionary acts since Austin, and Part II fills a large lacuna in the theory of meaning." Robert M. Harnish, University of Arizona

J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words was seen by many as a landmark in analytical philosophy... This lucid and comprehensive study provides a valuable starting point for anyone wishing to build on Austin's legacy.

(International Philosophical Quarterly) This book deserves all the attention it is bound to get.... It will stimulate a lot of discussion and should be read by any serious philosopher of language.

(Philosophical Quarterly) "This is an impressive book. It is clear, vigorously argued, admirably structured, with conclusions about the nature of meaning, which have retained their freshness, interest and relevance for present researchers, not only those working in speech-act theory but for those devoted to the broader topic of meaning-theory." Mind

Preface xi
Introduction 1(10)
PART I THE NATURE OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS
The Stratification of Linguistic Behavior
11(22)
Types of Speech Acts
11(2)
Illocutionary Acts
13(4)
Austin's Classification of Speech Acts
17(3)
Austin on the Rhetic-Illocutionary Distinction
20(3)
Austin on the Illocutionary-Perlocutionary Distinction
23(1)
Austin's Characterization of Illocutionary Acts
24(2)
Interrelations of Sentential and Illocutionary Acts
26(4)
Perlocutionary Acts and Other Speech Acts
30(3)
Perlocutionary Intention Theories of Illocutionary Acts
33(18)
Explicating Illocutionary Act Concepts
33(4)
Grice on Speaker Meaning
37(3)
Schiffer's Account of Illocutionary Acts
40(2)
Criticism of Schiffer's Account
42(3)
Counterexamples to Schiffer's Account
45(6)
The Nature of Illocutionary Acts
51(30)
Searle's ``Non-Defective'' Promising
51(3)
Taking Responsibility
54(2)
Epistemological Complexities
56(1)
Blameworthiness and Incorrectness
57(1)
The Crucial Role of Rules
58(6)
Further Modifications of Searle's Analysis
64(5)
A New Analysis of Promising
69(2)
Extension to Other Illocutionary Acts
71(2)
De Re and De Dicto
73(4)
How to Identify Conditions for Illocutionary Acts
77(1)
Illocutionary Rules
78(3)
Types of Illocutionary Acts: Commissives, Exercitives, Directives, and Expressives
81(33)
Prelude: Conventional and Normative Facts
81(4)
Commissives, Exercitives, and Verdictives: Preliminary
85(4)
The Final Model for Exercitives
89(6)
The Final Model for Commissives
95(2)
Directives
97(6)
Expressives
103(11)
Assertion and Other Assertives: Completing the Account
114(33)
The Problem of Assertion
114(2)
Assertion as Explicitly Presenting a Proposition
116(4)
How This Account Deals with Problems
120(1)
Assertive-Nonassertive Overlaps
121(4)
Kinds of Assertives
125(5)
Analysis Patterns for Illocutionary Act Types
130(4)
Restrictions on Sentential Vehicles
134(3)
Unintentional Illocutionary Acts
137(5)
Comparison with Perlocutionary Intention Accounts
142(5)
PART II AN ACCOUNT OF THE MEANING OF SENTENCES
The Problem of Linguistic Meaning
147(44)
Meaning: Preliminary
147(1)
The Concept of Meaning
147(5)
What I'm Looking for in a Theory of Meaning
152(2)
Use as the Key to Meaning
154(3)
Sentence Meaning as Primary
157(3)
Sentence Meaning as Illocutionary Act Potential
160(2)
Sentence Meaning and Perlocutionary Intentions
162(11)
Two Difficulties in the Illocutionary Act Potential Theory
173(2)
Intensifying the Difficulty
175(3)
Matching Illocutionary Act Types
178(12)
Illocutionary Rules
190(1)
Illocutionary Act Potential and Illocutionary Rules
191(60)
IA Potential as Subjection to Illocutionary Rules
191(1)
Linguistic Meaning as Rule Governance
192(3)
Some Versions of Semantic Rules
195(6)
Progressive Complication of Illocutionary Rules
201(6)
How to Handle Ellipticity and Singular Reference
207(10)
Reference, Ellipticity, and R'ing as Rule Subjection
217(5)
IA Analysis in Terms of Rule Subjection and in Terms of R'ing
222(7)
Some Additional Problems for IA Analysis
229(5)
IA's, I-Rules, IA Potential, and Sentence Meaning
234(4)
Sample I-Rules and IA Analyses
238(10)
How I-Rules Make Communication Possible
248(1)
Speaker Meaning
249(2)
The Status of Illocutionary Rules
251(24)
Summary of the Foregoing
251(1)
Regulative and Constitutive Rules
252(4)
Unformulated Rules
256(6)
Rules and Conventions
262(3)
Do I-Rules Exist?
265(3)
Drawing Boundaries around I-Act and I-Rule
268(4)
The Meaning of Subsentential Units
272(3)
The IA Potential Theory of Meaning and Its Alternatives
275(36)
Preview
275(1)
Initial Plausibility of the Theory
275(7)
Efficacy of the Theory in Application
282(1)
Replies to Objections
283(1)
Mapping Alternative Theories
284(2)
Words or Sentences as Fundamental
286(2)
Naive Referential Theories
288(2)
More Sophisticated Referential Theories
290(6)
Truth Conditional Approaches
296(4)
Attempts to Get Beyond Assertion I
300(7)
Attempts to Get Beyond Assertion II
307(2)
Conclusion
309(2)
Appendix 311(4)
Bibliography 315(4)
Index 319


The late William P. Alston was Professor Emeritus at Syracuse University. He is the author of many books, including A Realist Conception of Truth, The Reliability of Sense Perception, and Perceiving God, all from Cornell.