This book is about the nature of informal governmental power in Hungary and Poland. It highlights the key differences and similarities between the Orbán regime and the Kaczyski regime to show how they make societies dependent on the ruling elite. The monograph explains how the coercive practices of these governments could avoid scrutiny of the European Union (EU) and unpacks the underlying reasons for the ineffectiveness of the EU in the context of the changing geopolitical environment and the war in Ukraine.
Chapter
1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose of the book
1.2. Contribution
1.3. Case selection and method
Chapter
2. Informal power, democratic backsliding, and the constraining role
of the EU
2.1. Informal power in CEE - theoretical expectations
2.2. The sanctioning role of the EU
Chapter
3. Authoritarian remodelling in Hungary and Poland
3.1. Preconditions for authoritarian remodeling
3.2. Traits of populism
3.3. How democracy died in Hungary and got distorted in Poland
3.3.1. Hollowed out the democratic institution by capturing the referees
3.3.2. Sidelined key players to undermine the opposition
3.3.3. Rewrote the electoral rules and democratic process to create an uneven
political playing field
3.4. Democratic backsliding during the COVID-19 pandemic
Chapter
4. Informal power in action
4.1. Clientelist corruption in Hungary and Poland
The coercive monopolization of the state and economy
Monopolies, concessions
Private property is not protected, coercion is key
NGOs, state funds as key instruments
Opening towards Russia and China - a strategy to extend clientelist
corruption
Informality around the PiS headquarter
Re-centralization, and the role of Polish state-owned companies
Nepotism and misused state funds
Low-intensity coercion and the role of the special funds
4.2. Media Capture
Unprecedented centralization of media ownership
Weaponized state funds in the Orban regime
Repolonization of the media
Weaponization of state funds in the Kaczynski regime
4.3. Electoral clientelism and beyond
Economic and policy coercion
PiSs clientelistic tactics to win elections
Chapter
5. Two faces of informal power: systemic differences
Poland on a different democratic trajectory
Chapter
6. The constraining role of the EU: a decade of appeasement.
6.1. The toolbox
Rule of law framework
Preventative Annual Rule of Law Reports and other monitoring tools
The European Semester
Article 7(1) procedure
Infringement procedures
Freezing EU funds The Rule of Law conditionality Mechanism and the Enabling
conditions
The Media Freedom Act
6.2. Why did the EU react differently to democratic and rule of law
backsliding in Poland and Hungary?
6.3. Is withholding money an effective strategy?
6.4. Towards the politicization of EU strategies
7. Conclusion and recommendations for the European Union
7.1. Three lessons and a warning
7.2. Limitations of the book
7.3. Pathways towards a more efficient Europe
Edit Zgut-Przybylska is Assistant Professor at IFIS PAN, Warsaw and a Research Affiliate at the CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest. Her research examines informality, populism, democratic backsliding, and democratic innovations. She has published in the journals East European Politics (2020) and Problems of Post-Communism (2025).
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