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This new text book by Urs Birchler and Monika Butler is an introduction to the study of how information affects economic relations. The authors provide a narrative treatment of the more formal concepts of Information Economics, using easy to understand and lively illustrations from film and literature and nutshell examples.

The book first covers the economics of information in a 'man versus nature' context, explaining basic concepts like rational updating or the value of information. Then in a 'man versus man' setting, Birchler and Butler describe strategic issues in the use of information: the make-buy-or-copy decision, the working and failure of markets and the important role of outguessing each other in a macroeconomic context. It closes with a 'man versus himself' perspective, focusing on information management within the individual.

This book also comes with a supporting website (www.alicebob.info), maintained by the authors.

Arvustused

"If you teach advanced undergraduate microeconomics, you should be interested in this book. Birchler and Buetler have served up something genuinely novel and substantive here." - Matthew Ryan, New Zealand Economic Papers

List of figures
xii
List of tables
xiv
List of boxes
xv
List of problem sets
xvii
Preface xxi
Why study information economics?
1(4)
How to use this book
5(6)
The purpose of the book
5(1)
Ways of reading the book
6(2)
The structure of the book
8(1)
Using the book for teaching
8(1)
Solutions to problem sets and other supporting material
9(2)
PART I Information as an economic good
11(104)
What is information?
13(18)
Introduction
13(1)
Main ideas: The strangest good of all
14(3)
Theory: Describing, comparing and updating information
17(9)
Conclusions and further reading
26(1)
Problem sets: Medical and financial testing
27(4)
The value of information
31(30)
Introduction
31(1)
Main ideas: The source(s) of information value
32(5)
Theory: Knowledge is power
37(13)
Application: The resolution of uncertainty
50(3)
Application: The informational cost of mediocrity
53(3)
Conclusions and further reading
56(1)
Problem sets: Precious advice
56(5)
The optimal amount of information
61(22)
Introduction
61(1)
Main ideas: Is it worth the cost?
62(1)
Theory: Deciding at the margin
63(4)
Application: The central bank's inflation forecast
67(3)
Application: Search
70(9)
Conclusions and further reading
79(1)
Problem sets: Paying, searching, and waiting for information
80(3)
The production of information
83(32)
Introduction
83(3)
Main Ideas: Too little research or too much?
86(2)
Theory: The incentive to innovate
88(9)
Application: Creative destruction
97(8)
Application: Rating agencies
105(2)
Application: Why are banks supervised?
107(2)
Conclusions and further reading
109(1)
Problem sets: Produce or copy---sell or give away?
110(5)
PART II How the market aggregates information
115(138)
From information to prices
117(28)
Introduction
117(1)
Main ideas: Revealing information through prices
118(3)
Theory: The market as an information processor
121(14)
Application: Terrorism futures and prediction markets
135(2)
Application: Should bank supervisors look at market prices?
137(5)
Conclusions and further reading
142(1)
Problem sets: Two heads know more than one
143(2)
Knowing facts or reading thoughts?
145(28)
Introduction
145(1)
Main ideas: Fundamental versus strategic uncertainty
146(2)
Theory: Higher-order information
148(14)
Application: Keynes in the lab
162(3)
Application: Conformism and learning from debate
165(2)
Application: Betrayals and mediation
167(2)
Conclusions and further reading
169(2)
Problem sets: The art of outguessing others
171(2)
Coordination problems
173(30)
Introduction
173(1)
Main ideas: Red or white?
174(6)
Theory: Coordination and multiple equilibria
180(10)
Application: Bank runs
190(10)
Conclusions and further reading
200(1)
Problem sets: ``Should I stay or should I go?''
201(2)
Learning and cascades
203(24)
Introduction
203(2)
Main ideas: ``Always stand at the longest queue.''
205(2)
Theory: Observational learning
207(14)
Application: Learning in repeated games
221(3)
Conclusions and further reading
224(1)
Problem sets: A bath in the crowd
224(3)
The macroeconomics of information
227(26)
Introduction
227(1)
Main ideas: Who acquires information and why?
228(4)
Theory: Information is imperfect and costly
232(13)
Application: Central bank transparency
245(3)
Conclusions and further reading
248(1)
Problem sets: As time goes by
249(4)
PART III Asymmetric information
253(148)
The winner's curse
255(18)
Introduction
255(2)
Main ideas: How to lose by winning
257(3)
Theory: The importance of conditional expectations
260(6)
Application: The underpricing of IPOs
266(3)
Application: Prices and the winner's curse
269(1)
Conclusions and further reading
270(1)
Problem sets: Cursing winners
271(2)
Information and selection
273(32)
Introduction
273(1)
Main ideas: When information prevents trading
274(3)
Theory: The market for lemons
277(9)
Application: The insurance destruction effect
286(7)
Application: Annuities
293(7)
Conclusions and further reading
300(2)
Problem sets: Buying the cat in a bag
302(3)
Optimal contracts
305(36)
Introduction
305(2)
Main ideas: The economic lie detector
307(5)
Theory: Optimal contracts
312(10)
Application: Price-quality discrimination
322(6)
Application: Subordinated debt
328(6)
Conclusions and further reading
334(1)
Problem sets: Deal or no deal?
335(6)
The revelation principle
341(26)
Introduction
341(1)
Main ideas: Many lies, one truth
342(1)
Theory: The revelation principle
343(6)
Application: The debt contract
349(7)
Application: Auctions
356(4)
Application: Why Enron should not have happened
360(2)
Conclusions and further reading
362(2)
Problem sets: Know your value
364(3)
Creating incentives
367(34)
Introduction
367(2)
Main ideas: Delegation and moral hazard
369(2)
Theory: Incentive contracts
371(10)
Application: Bank deposit insurance and risk taking
381(8)
Application: Credence goods
389(6)
Conclusions and further reading
395(2)
Problem sets: Getting things done
397(4)
PART IV The economics of self-knowledge
401(32)
Me, Myself, and I
403(30)
Introduction
403(1)
Main ideas: Contracting with oneself
404(7)
Theory: Intertemporal choice and self-management
411(14)
Application: Soft paternalism
425(3)
Conclusions and further reading
428(2)
Problem sets: Tomorrow I will
430(3)
Notes 433(6)
Bibliography 439(10)
Index 449
Urs Birchler is Director at the Swiss National Bank and a former member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. He has taught at the universities of Zurich, Berne, St. Gallen and Leipzig.



Monika Butler is Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of St. Gallen, CESifo Fellow and CEPR affiliate.