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1 | (28) |
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1 The Prosecutor's Promise |
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2 | (2) |
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2 The Effectiveness of International Criminal Justice |
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4 | (4) |
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8 | (4) |
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8 | (1) |
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9 | (2) |
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3.3 Assessing the ICC's Impact |
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11 | (1) |
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12 | (5) |
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4.1 The OTP and the End of Impunity |
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13 | (1) |
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4.2 The Ending of Impunity for Kenyans |
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14 | (2) |
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4.3 Assessing the End of Impunity |
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16 | (1) |
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5 Precursors for Positive Complementarity |
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17 | (3) |
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20 | (9) |
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24 | (5) |
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2 The Strategy of Positive Complementarity |
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29 | (18) |
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1 Origins of Positive Complementarity |
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30 | (2) |
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1.1 Complementarity and the Rome Statute |
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30 | (1) |
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1.2 The Birth of Positive Complementarity |
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31 | (1) |
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2 OTP's Understanding of Positive Complementarity |
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32 | (6) |
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2.1 The Two Dimensions of Complementarity |
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33 | (1) |
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2.2 Strategy for Encouraging Prosecutions |
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34 | (4) |
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3 Positive Complementarity in Practice |
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38 | (5) |
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3.1 Early Years and Negative Complementarity |
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38 | (2) |
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40 | (2) |
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3.3 The Shadow Side of Complementarity |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (4) |
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44 | (3) |
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3 Kenya's Post-Election Violence and History of Impunity |
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47 | (22) |
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1 Kenya's Post-Election Violence |
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48 | (5) |
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1.1 Disputed Presidential Elections and the Road to Violence |
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48 | (3) |
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1.2 Causes of the Violence |
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51 | (2) |
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2 History of Institutionalised Impunity |
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53 | (11) |
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53 | (2) |
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55 | (4) |
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2.3 The Institutionalisation of Impunity |
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59 | (2) |
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61 | (3) |
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64 | (5) |
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65 | (4) |
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4 From Nairobi to The Hague |
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69 | (22) |
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1 Phase One: Commencement of Preliminary Examinations (February 2008--July 2009) |
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70 | (4) |
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1.1 Monitoring the Situation |
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70 | (1) |
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1.2 The Waki Report and the Sealed Envelope |
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71 | (1) |
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72 | (2) |
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2 Phase Two: Encouragement of Domestic Prosecutions (June 2009--November 2009) |
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74 | (4) |
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2.1 The Complementarity Contract and the Delivery of the Sealed Envelope |
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74 | (1) |
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2.2 Strike Two and the Division of Labour |
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75 | (3) |
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3 Phase Three: ICC Investigations (December 2009--December 2010) |
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78 | (4) |
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3.1 Strike Three and Investigations Proprio Motu |
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78 | (2) |
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3.2 Continued Encouragement of Domestic Proceedings |
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80 | (2) |
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4 Phase Four: ICC Pre-Trial Stage (December 2010--March 2013) |
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82 | (4) |
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82 | (2) |
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84 | (1) |
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85 | (1) |
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86 | (5) |
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87 | (4) |
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5 Prosecuting Perpetrators |
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91 | (42) |
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1 A Yardstick for Success |
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91 | (2) |
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93 | (9) |
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2.1 Prosecutions by Numbers |
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95 | (4) |
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2.2 Prosecutions by Crimes |
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99 | (2) |
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101 | (1) |
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102 | (1) |
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4 The Foreign Affairs Facade |
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103 | (7) |
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4.1 The Special Tribunal and Motion Without Movement |
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104 | (2) |
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4.2 Justice Delayed but Justice Assured |
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106 | (2) |
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4.3 Investigating the Ocampo Six |
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108 | (2) |
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110 | (5) |
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5.1 Local Support for ICC Intervention |
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110 | (4) |
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114 | (1) |
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115 | (4) |
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7 The Shadow Side of Complementarity |
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119 | (6) |
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7.1 Increased Threats to Witnesses |
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119 | (2) |
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7.2 Politicisation of the ICC |
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121 | (4) |
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125 | (8) |
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127 | (6) |
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6 Don' t Be Vague, Go to The Hague! |
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133 | (50) |
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134 | (5) |
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135 | (1) |
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136 | (3) |
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139 | (17) |
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2.1 Not the Initial Impetus |
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139 | (3) |
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142 | (5) |
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2.3 Imminent but not Inevitable |
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147 | (4) |
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151 | (5) |
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156 | (13) |
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156 | (1) |
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3.2 Rescuing the Ocampo Six |
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157 | (1) |
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3.3 Withdrawal from the Rome Statute |
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158 | (1) |
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3.4 Security Council Deferral and Shuttle Diplomacy |
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159 | (1) |
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3.5 Article 19 Application |
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160 | (2) |
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3.6 East African Court of Justice |
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162 | (1) |
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3.7 African Court of Justice and Human Rights |
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163 | (1) |
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3.8 Motions Without Movement |
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164 | (1) |
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3.9 Obstructing Investigations |
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165 | (4) |
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4 The Shadow Side of Complementarity |
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169 | (5) |
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4.1 Discouragement of Local Prosecutions |
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170 | (1) |
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4.2 A Mechanism We Can Control |
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171 | (3) |
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174 | (9) |
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176 | (7) |
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7 Rule of Law Reforms: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc? |
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183 | (50) |
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1 The OTP and Rule of Law Reform |
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184 | (2) |
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2 The Tenth Parliament's Rule of Law Reforms |
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186 | (8) |
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188 | (1) |
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2.2 Criminal Justice System |
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189 | (2) |
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191 | (1) |
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2.4 National Reconciliation |
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192 | (2) |
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194 | (12) |
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3.1 The Ongoing Reform Process |
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194 | (4) |
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3.2 The Post-Election Violence |
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198 | (2) |
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3.3 Legacies and Campaigns |
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200 | (2) |
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3.4 International Pressures |
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202 | (2) |
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204 | (2) |
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206 | (10) |
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4.1 The International Crimes Act 2008 |
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206 | (2) |
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208 | (4) |
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4.3 Judicial and Security Sector Reforms |
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212 | (1) |
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4.4 Simultaneous but Separate |
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213 | (3) |
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5 The Shadow Side of Complementarity |
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216 | (7) |
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5.1 The Government of National Disunity |
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216 | (4) |
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5.2 Delays and Distractions |
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220 | (1) |
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221 | (2) |
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223 | (10) |
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225 | (8) |
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233 | (16) |
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1 Ending the `Culture of Impunity' |
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|
234 | (2) |
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|
236 | (3) |
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|
239 | (4) |
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4 The Shadow Side of Complementarity |
|
|
243 | (3) |
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|
246 | (3) |
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246 | (3) |
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249 | (8) |
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254 | (3) |
Appendix: Timeline |
|
257 | (8) |
Index |
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265 | |