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E-raamat: International 'Criminal' Responsibility: Antinomies

(University of New England, Australia)
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International 'Criminal' Responsibility: AntinomiesSuurem pilt
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In the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, major offences committed by individuals have been subject to progressive systematisation in the framework of international criminal law. Proposals developed within the context of the League of Nations coordinated individual liability and State responsibility. By contrast, international law as codified after World War II in the framework of the United Nations embodies a neat divide between individual criminal liability and State aggravated responsibility. However, conduct of State organs and agents generates dual liability. Through a critical analysis of key international rules, the book assesses whether the divisive approach to individual and State responsibility is normatively consistent. Contemporary situations, such as the humanitarian crises in Syria and Libya, 9/11 and the Iraq wars demonstrate that the matter still gives rise to controversy: a set of systemic problems emerge. The research focuses on the substantive elements of major offences, notably agression, genocide, core war crimes, core crimes against humanity and terrorism, as well as relevant procedural implications.

The book is a useful resource for practitioners, policymakers, academics, students, researchers and anyone interested in international law and politics.

Foreword vii
Cases xvii
Documents xxiii
Abbreviations xxxix
Introduction 1(5)
Context
1(2)
Analysis
3(3)
1 From monism to dualism 6(56)
1.1 Monism: coordinating individual and State responsibility prior to World War II
7(11)
1.1.1 The dawn of criminal responsibility in international law: proposals for a universal criminal code (1860-1919)
7(1)
1.1.2 Interwar coordination (1920-1939)
8(10)
1.1.2.1 Triggering initiatives within the League of Nations
8(2)
1.1.2.2 Establishing the Fundamental Principles of an International Legal Code for the Repression of International Crimes
10(1)
1.1.2.3 Individual initiatives for a comprehensive International Criminal Code
11(2)
1.1.2.4 The ICLA's Draft Statute for a Criminal Chamber of the PCIJ and the Global Repressive Code
13(5)
1.2 Dualism: disjoining individual and State responsibility after World War II
18(44)
1.2.1 Between coordination and disjunction (1940-1960)
18(11)
1.2.1.1 Peace through law? UN procedures and the critical role of the Security Council
18(3)
1.2.1.2 The IMT, IMTFE, Nuremberg principles and Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind
21(5)
1.2.1.3 The Genocide Convention and the proposals for an international criminal jurisdiction
26(3)
1.2.2 Defining aggression, State crimes and underlying concepts (1960-1980)
29(8)
1.2.2.1 Non-institutional initiatives
29(1)
1.2.2.2 Peremptory norms (jus cogens), erga omnes obligations and State crimes
30(3)
1.2.2.3 State crimes under Article 19 of the ILC's 1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility
33(4)
1.2.3 Codifying dualism (1980-2001)
37(19)
1.2.3.1 The ICLA's Project for a comprehensive International Criminal Code
37(1)
1.2.3.2 Achieving the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
38(5)
1.2.3.3 Ad hoc international and hybrid tribunals
43(2)
1.2.3.4 Achieving the Statute of the International Criminal Court
45(5)
1.2.3.5 From 'State crimes' to 'serious breaches of peremptory norms' in the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility
50(6)
1.2.4 Genocide, aggression and terrorism still in search of identity (2001-2019)
56(7)
1.2.4.1 Genocide in the jurisprudence of the ICJ: the 'second death' of State crimes?
56(3)
1.2.4.2 Aggression and terrorism: developments in the ICC Statute and beyond
59(3)
2 Breach of a primary norm: offence 62(73)
2.1 Core substantive elements of the offence
63(25)
2.1.1 The obligations breached by State aggravated offences
63(16)
2.1.1.1 Serious breaches of peremptory norms (jus cogens: 2001 DASR 40)
63(3)
2.1.1.2 Linking jus cogens and erga omnes obligations (VCLT and VCLTIO Article 53 and 2001 DASR 40, 42, 48 and 54)
66(3)
2.1.1.3 Serious breaches of erga omnes obligations: 1996 DASR 19 and 40
69(3)
2.1.1.4 Fundamental obligations
72(5)
2.1.1.5 Jus cogens, erga omnes obligations and State responsibility in international case law
77(2)
2.1.2 Individual criminal responsibility, jus cogens and erga omnes obligations
79(3)
2.1.2.1 From criminals to crimes: erga omnes responsibility in the ICC Statute
79(1)
2.1.2.2 Erga omnes responsibility in the case law
80(2)
2.1.3 State aggravated responsibility, individual criminal responsibility, jus cogens and (non-severable) erga omnes obligations
82(6)
2.1.3.1 (Non-severable) erga omnes obligations as jus cogens
82(4)
2.1.3.2 State aggravated offences and individual criminal offences as breaches of (non-severable) erga omnes obligations
86(2)
2.2 Attribution of responsibility
88(17)
2.2.1 Dual conduct
88(9)
2.2.1.1 Attributing aggravated responsibility to the State based on conduct of its organs or agents: absolute identity?
88(4)
2.2.1.2 Individual responsibility for international crimes: mens rea
92(5)
2.2.2 Attributing individual criminal conduct to the State
97(8)
2.2.2.1 Individual mens rea versus State objective responsibility?
97(2)
2.2.2.2 Individual and State mens rea?
99(3)
2.2.2.3 Assessing State fault on a case-by-case basis under the ILC's DASR
102(3)
2.3 Dual erga omnes offences
105(30)
2.3.1 Aggression
105(7)
2.3.1.1 State conduct as a basis for individual conduct (and vice versa)
107(3)
2.3.1.2 Leadership and mens rea
110(2)
2.3.1.3 Self-defence as a dual excuse
112(1)
2.3.2 Core war crimes
112(5)
2.3.2.1 Individual conduct as a basis for collective responsibility
115(2)
2.3.2.2 Systemically proving individual mens rea
117(1)
2.3.3 Core crimes against humanity
117(5)
2.3.3.1 Systemic conduct
119(2)
2.3.3.2 Systemically proving individual mens rea
121(1)
2.3.4 Genocide
122(4)
2.3.4.1 Individual genocidal conduct without State responsibility?
123(1)
2.3.4.2 Collective specific intent as a basis for individual intent (and vice versa)
124(2)
2.3.5 Terrorism
126(10)
2.3.5.1 Political or ideological purpose as a distinguishing material element
129(3)
2.3.5.2 Specific intent and collective responsibility
132(3)
3 Secondary norms: dispute settlement, sanctions and enforcement 135(79)
3.1 Secondary and tertiary implications of dual erga omnes offences
136(31)
3.1.1 State aggravated responsibility
136(25)
3.1.1.1 Institutionalised and non-institutionalised (compulsory) universal invocation of responsibility: 2001 DASR 41(1), 42(b), 48(1)(b) and 59
136(3)
3.1.1.2 Non-punitive erga omnes sanctions? 2001 DASR 28-39 and UN Charter Articles 39-42
139(6)
3.1.1.3 Institutionalised and non-institutionalised universal enforcement: 2001 DASR 41(1), 54 and 59
145(4)
3.1.1.4 Rejecting compulsory jurisdiction
149(6)
3.1.1.5 Punitive erga omnes sanctions? 1996 DASR 41-46 and 52
155(3)
3.1.1.6 Universal punitive enforcement? 1996 DASR 53
158(3)
3.1.2 Individual criminal responsibility
161(6)
3.1.2.1 (Compulsory) universal jurisdiction and complementary international adjudication
161(3)
3.1.2.2 (Erga omnes) imprisonment, fines and forfeiture
164(1)
3.1.2.3 Domestic enforcement
165(2)
3.2 Procedural intersections
167(47)
3.2.1 Systemic patterns and inter-temporality
167(3)
3.2.2 The limits of UN procedures
170(10)
3.2.2.1
Chapter VII procedures: political and enforcement action for State aggravated responsibility?
173(4)
3.2.2.2 The limited role of consensual jurisdiction, particularly the International Court of Justice
177(3)
3.2.3 Decentralised State action under general international law
180(2)
3.2.4 A controversial practice
182(12)
3.2.4.1 Bosnian genocide
183(2)
3.2.4.2 Humanitarian crises in Kosovo, Libya and Syria
185(5)
3.2.4.3 Iraq wars
190(2)
3.2.4.4 Counter-terrorism in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq
192(2)
3.2.5 State and individual immunities as a bar to domestic jurisdiction?
194(4)
3.2.5.1 State and individual immunities?
194(2)
3.2.5.2 Intersections
196(2)
3.2.6 Ad hoc criminal jurisdictions: victors' justice?
198(6)
3.2.6.1 Power and organic dependence
198(4)
3.2.6.2 Ex post jurisdictions
202(2)
3.2.7 The independence of the International Criminal Court
204(10)
3.2.7.1 Permanency as a guarantee of independence?
204(1)
3.2.7.2 The UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court
205(5)
3.2.7.3 Jurisdictional autonomy over aggression?
210(4)
Conclusion 214(5)
Antinomies
214(2)
Ways forward
216(3)
Bibliography 219(22)
Index 241
Ottavio Quirico is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Law at the University of New England in Australia, an Honorary Lecturer at the Centre for European Studies of the Australian National University and an Alumnus of the European University Institute.
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