Preface |
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ix | |
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1 | (16) |
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1 | (5) |
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6 | (3) |
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9 | (2) |
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11 | (2) |
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13 | (4) |
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13 | (1) |
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14 | (3) |
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Knowledge, Belief, and Subjective Probability: Outlines of a Unified System of Epistemic/Doxastic Logic |
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17 | (16) |
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17 | (4) |
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21 | (3) |
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The Logic of (`Weak') Belief |
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24 | (2) |
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The Pragmatics of Epistemic Sentences |
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26 | (7) |
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30 | (1) |
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30 | (3) |
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A Second Generation Epistemic Logic and Its General Significance |
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33 | (24) |
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The Prima Facie Conundrum of Epistemic Logic |
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33 | (4) |
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37 | (9) |
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Promises Fulfilled by Means of the Notion of Independence |
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46 | (11) |
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54 | (3) |
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Economics and Economy in the Theory of Belief Revision |
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57 | (30) |
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57 | (1) |
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58 | (2) |
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Acting Economically, A Second View: ``Informational Economy'' |
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60 | (1) |
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Economic and Economical Considerations in Belief Revision Theory |
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61 | (4) |
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Informational Economy with Respect to Beliefs: What has been done? |
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65 | (3) |
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Informational Economy with Respect to Beliefs: What should be done? |
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68 | (1) |
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Conservatism with Respect to Belief-Revision Guiding Structures: What has been done? |
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69 | (2) |
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Conservatism with Respect to Belief-Revision Guiding Structures: What should be done? |
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71 | (3) |
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Rational Choices and Logical Properties: What has been done? |
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74 | (2) |
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Rational Choices and Logical Properties: What should be done? |
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76 | (3) |
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79 | (8) |
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80 | (3) |
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83 | (4) |
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Common Knowledge Revisited |
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87 | (18) |
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87 | (1) |
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88 | (2) |
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Common Knowledge and Uncertainty |
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90 | (1) |
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91 | (4) |
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95 | (1) |
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96 | (2) |
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Approximations of Common Knowledge |
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98 | (3) |
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101 | (4) |
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102 | (1) |
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103 | (2) |
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Concurrent Dynamic Epistemic Logic |
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105 | (40) |
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105 | (2) |
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107 | (12) |
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119 | (11) |
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130 | (6) |
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136 | (4) |
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140 | (5) |
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141 | (4) |
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Laws, Facts, and Contexts: Foundations of Multimodal Reasoning |
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145 | (40) |
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Replacing Possible Worlds with Contexts |
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145 | (2) |
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147 | (2) |
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Contexts by Peirce and McCarthy |
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149 | (6) |
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155 | (2) |
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157 | (8) |
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165 | (9) |
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The Intended Interpretation |
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174 | (11) |
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183 | (2) |
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185 | (14) |
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The General Idea of Referential Semantics |
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185 | (1) |
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186 | (1) |
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Components of Referential Semantics |
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187 | (1) |
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187 | (1) |
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188 | (1) |
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188 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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Four Principles of Logical Analysis |
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190 | (2) |
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192 | (1) |
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A Few Comments on the Peculiar Status of the Identity Predicate |
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192 | (1) |
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General Properties of Consequence Operations |
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193 | (1) |
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The Truth Preserving Consequence Operations |
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194 | (1) |
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194 | (1) |
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Self-Extensional Consequence Operations |
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195 | (1) |
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195 | (1) |
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The Need for Referential Semantics |
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195 | (2) |
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197 | (2) |
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198 | (1) |
Index |
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199 | |