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E-raamat: Lyapunov Functions in Differential Games

(Institute of Textiles and Light Industry, Moscow, Russia)
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Zhukovskiy (Russian Institute of Textile and Light Industry) examines the boundary of the theory of differential games, and develops a solution of dynamical games problems under uncertainty by means of the Bellman-Lyapunov function. The first of the two chapters describes the foundations of differential games under uncertainties and the notion of the vector guarantee. The second chapter proposes new guaranteeing solutions for differential linear quadratic games under uncertainty which are based on the equilibrium of objectives and counter-objectives as well as the active equilibrium. A detailed comparison is carried out with similar guaranteeing Nash equilibria. Annotation (c) Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

A major step in differential games is determining an explicit form of the strategies of players who follow a certain optimality principle. To do this, the associated modification of Bellman dynamic programming problems has to be solved; for some differential games this could be Lyapunov functions whose "arsenal" has been supplied by stability theory. This approach, which combines dynamic programming and the Lyapunov function method, leads to coefficient criteria, or ratios of the game math model parameters with which optimal strategies of the players not only exist but their analytical form can be specified. In this book coefficient criteria are derived for numerous new and relevant problems in the theory of linear-quadratic multi-player differential games. Those criteria apply when the players formulate their strategies independently (non co-operative games) and use non-Nash equilibria or when the game model recognizes noise, perturbation and other uncertainties of which only their ranges are known (differential games under uncertainty). This text is useful for researchers, engineers and students of applied mathematics, control theory and the engineering sciences.
Introduction to the Series ix
Preface xi
Notation xv
General Notions and Examples
1(100)
Introduction
1(1)
Basic Notions of the Theory of Differential Games under Uncertainty
2(15)
Aspects of games
2(3)
Dynamical aspects
5(4)
De principlis non est disputandum
9(1)
Economic interpretation of the game
10(3)
Content of the theory
13(4)
Game Problems in Economic and Mechanical Systems
17(8)
Competition of two economies
17(2)
Tracking problems
19(3)
Problem of approaching
22(3)
Vector Guarantees
25(25)
Ad narrandum, non ad probundum
25(4)
Formalization of the vector guarantees
29(6)
``Geometric'' interpretation of the vector guarantees
35(4)
Sufficient conditions
39(11)
The Vector Guarantees May Not Exist
50(11)
Statement of the problem
50(1)
Lemma for counter-examples
51(7)
The Bellman function
58(1)
The class of games in which the vector guarantees are absent
59(2)
Converse Problem
61(11)
Traditional approach
61(1)
Application of dynamical programming
62(9)
Comparison with the minimal guarantee
71(1)
The Nash Equilibrium for Uncertainty
72(29)
Formalization of the equilibrium
72(4)
The sufficient conditions
76(4)
The coefficient criteria
80(3)
The properties of the ensuring Nash equilibria
83(7)
Exercises
90(4)
Comments and References
94(7)
Objection and Counter-Objection Equilibrium under Uncertainty
101(134)
Introduction
101(1)
Peculiarities of the Nash Equilibrium
102(6)
The Nash equilibrium situation
102(1)
Properties
103(1)
Peculiarities
104(2)
The class of games in which the Nash equilibrium is absent
106(2)
Formalization and the Properties of Unimprovable Equilibria
108(17)
``Complete'' and ``incomplete'' counter-objections
108(1)
Solutions of the multicriteria problem
109(3)
Formalization of unimprovable equilibria
112(2)
The properties of the unimprovable equilibria
114(2)
Existence
116(9)
Comparison with the Nash Equilibrium
125(13)
Non-domination and unimprovability
125(1)
Class of games, where no Nash equilibrium exists, but the Geoffrione equilibrium of objections and counter-objections exists
125(4)
Relationship with the Nash equilibrium
129(2)
Examples
131(7)
Formalization of Unimprovable Equilibria in the Differential Game
138(13)
Mathematical model of the game
138(2)
Analogue of vector saddle point
140(4)
Properties
144(6)
Stability
150(1)
Auxiliary Assertions
151(9)
Coefficient criteria
152(4)
Reduction to non-cooperation game
156(2)
Properties of matrix linear convolutions
158(2)
Sufficient Conditions for the Analogue of a Saddle Point
160(15)
Application of dynamical programming
160(5)
Coefficient criteria
165(6)
Games with ``small'' perturbations
171(4)
Unimprovable Guaranteeing Equilibria (Analogue of the Vector Maximin)
175(21)
Counter-example
175(5)
Formalization of unimprovable equilibria
180(7)
Properties of USEOC
187(9)
Active Equilibrium under Uncertainty
196(39)
Formalization of solution
196(5)
Auxiliary assertions
201(4)
Construction of the set Zsu
205(4)
Determination of active equilibrium of the game (2.7.14)
209(7)
Existence conditions for UASE
216(4)
Example
220(6)
Exercises
226(6)
Comments and References
232(3)
Applications
235(14)
Some Results from the Theory of Differential Equations
235(2)
Results from the Theory of Quadratic Forms
237(2)
Results from Mathematical Programming
239(3)
Additional Auxiliary Assertions
242(7)
Answers and Solutions 249(18)
References 267(12)
Subject Index 279
Vladislav I Zhukovskiy