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E-raamat: Making Medical Decisions for the Profoundly Mentally Disabled

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A legal and moral analysis of medical decision making on behalf of those with suchsevere cognitive impairments that they cannot exercise self-determination.



In this book, Norman Cantor analyzes the legal and moral status of people withprofound mental disabilities -- those with extreme cognitive impairments that prevent their exerciseof medical self-determination. He proposes a legal and moral framework for surrogate medicaldecision making on their behalf. The issues Cantor explores will be of interest to professionals inlaw, medicine, psychology, philosophy, and ethics, as well as to parents, guardians, and health careproviders who face perplexing issues in the context of surrogate medical decision making.Theprofoundly mentally disabled are thought by some moral philosophers to lack the minimum cognitiveability for personhood. Countering this position, Cantor advances both theoretical and practicalarguments for according them full legal and moral status. He also argues that the concept ofintrinsic human dignity should have an integral role in shaping the bounds of surrogate decisionmaking. Thus, he claims, while profoundly mentally disabled persons are not entitled to make theirown medical decisions, respect for intrinsic human dignity dictates their right to have aconscientious surrogate make medical decisions on their behalf. Cantor discusses the criteria thatbind such surrogates. He asserts, contrary to popular wisdom, that the best interests of thedisabled person are not always the determinative standard: the interests of family or others cansometimes be considered. Surrogates may even, consistent with the intrinsic human dignity standard,sometimes authorize tissue donation or participation in nontherapeutic medical research byprofoundly disabled persons. Intrinsic human dignity limits the occasions for such decisions anddictates close attention to the preferences and feelings of the profoundly disabled personsthemselves. Cantor also analyzes the underlying philosophical rationale that makes thesedecision-making criteria consistent with law and morals.

Series Foreword vii
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1(12)
1 The Moral Status of the Profoundly Disabled: Persons or Something Less? 13(20)
The Concepts of Personhood and Full Moral Status
13(4)
Criteria of Personhood
17(3)
The Legal and Moral Status of the Profoundly Disabled
20(6)
The Role of Intrinsic Human Dignity
26(7)
2 The Profoundly Disabled as Rights Holders: No Rights, the Same Rights as the Fully Capacitated, or Some Rights? 33(36)
Attributing the "Same Rights" to the Profoundly Disabled
33(8)
A Constitutional Claim to Appropriate Medical Options
41(2)
A Constitutional Right to Some Surrogate Decision on Behalf of the Disabled Person?
43(26)
3 Who Decides for the Profoundly Disabled? 69(32)
Minors Living with Their Parents
70(24)
Disabled Persons Living in Institutions
94(7)
4 Defining the Best Interests of Profoundly Disabled Persons 101(48)
The Focus on a Never Competent Patient's Well-Being
103(3)
The Problematic of Assessing Well-Being
106(7)
Quality of Life, Dignity, and Never Competent Persons
113(14)
Must Medical Decisions Be in the Best Interests of a Profoundly Disabled Person?
127(9)
Can the Interests of Others Be Included within a Person's Best Interests?
136(13)
5 Forced Altruism 149(54)
The Problematic of Surrogate Consent to Nontherapeutic Medical Handling
149(10)
Reliance on the Best Interests of the Profoundly Disabled Patient
151(3)
Discrimination against the Disabled
154(2)
The Kantian Imperative
156(3)
Existing Jurisprudence
159(10)
The Decided Cases on the Donation of Bodily Resources
159(5)
The Legal and Moral Frameworks Governing Nontherapeutic Medical Research
164(5)
Justifications for Seeking Sacrifice from Profoundly Disabled Persons
169(34)
Utilitarianism as a Rationale for Exploitation
169(4)
Ascribing Altruism to Never Competent Persons
173(5)
Parental Child-Rearing Prerogatives
178(8)
Social Fairness as a Justification for Using the Profoundly Disabled
186(5)
The Limits of a Surrogate's Imposition of Sacrifice
191(12)
6 The Voice of the Profoundly Disabled Person 203(12)
The Connection between Consultation and Well-Being
204(2)
Dignity-Based Reasons for Soliciting Input
206(1)
Limited Self-Determination
207(4)
Ambiguity of Expressions
211(4)
Notes 215(60)
References 275(18)
Index of Cases and Statutes 293(2)
Subject Index 295