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E-raamat: Microeconomics of Market Failures

(Columbia University)
  • Formaat: PDF+DRM
  • Sari: The MIT Press
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Oct-2000
  • Kirjastus: MIT Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262282864
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  • Formaat: PDF+DRM
  • Sari: The MIT Press
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Oct-2000
  • Kirjastus: MIT Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262282864

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Bernard Salanie studies situations where competitive markets fail to achieve a collective optimum and the interventions used to remedy these so-called market failures.In this book Bernard Salanie studies situations where competitive markets fail to achieve a collective optimum and the interventions used to remedy these so-called market failures. He includes discussions of theories of collective decision making, as well as elementary models of public economics and industrial organization. Although public economics is traditionally defined as the positive and normative study of government action over the economy, Salanie confines himself to microeconomic aspects of welfare economics; he considers taxation and the effects of public spending only as potential remedies for market failures. He concludes with a discussion of the theory of general equilibrium in incomplete markets.
Introduction
1(10)
The Fundamental Theorems
1(5)
The Pareto Optimum
2(1)
General Equilibrium
2(1)
The Two Fundamental Welfare Theorems
3(3)
Return to the Hypotheses
6(2)
The Government's Role
8(3)
Bibliography
10(1)
I Collective Choice 11(56)
The Aggregation of Preferences
13(24)
Arrow's Theorem
17(5)
Noncomparable Cardinal Preferences
22(1)
Comparable Ordinal Preferences
23(1)
Comparable Cardinal Preferences
24(1)
Conclusion
25(1)
Appendix A: Proof of Arrow's Theorem
26(1)
Appendix B: Theories of Justice
27(10)
Utilitarianism
28(1)
Rawls's Difference Principle
29(2)
Recent Developments
31(2)
Nozick's Historical Approach
33(1)
Conclusion
34(1)
Bibliography
35(2)
Cost-Benefit Analysis
37(12)
Measures of Welfare
37(5)
First-Best
42(2)
Second-Best
44(5)
Shadow Prices
44(1)
Nonmarket Goods
45(1)
Incomplete markets
46(1)
Bibliography
46(3)
Implementation
49(18)
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
50(2)
Nash Equilibrium
52(5)
Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium
57(1)
Bayesian Equilibrium
58(1)
Appendix A: Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
59(4)
Appendix B: Proof of Maskin's Theorem
63(4)
Bibliography
65(2)
II Public Economics 67(60)
Public Goods
69(20)
The Optimality Condition
70(2)
Implementing the Optimum
72(11)
The Subscription Equilibrium
73(1)
Voting Equilibrium
73(1)
The Lindahl Equilibrium
74(1)
Personalized Taxation
75(1)
A Planning Procedure
76(2)
The Pivot Mechanism
78(5)
The Property of Public Goods
83(2)
The Importance of the Free-Rider Problem
85(1)
Local Public Goods
86(1)
Appendix: Characterization of VCG Mechanisms
86(3)
Bibliography
88(1)
External Effects
89(18)
The Pareto Optimum
90(2)
Implementing the Optimum
92(8)
The Competitive Equilibrium
92(2)
Quotas
94(1)
Subsidies for Depollution
94(1)
The Rights to Pollute
95(2)
Taxation
97(1)
The Integration of Firms
97(1)
A Compensation Mechanism
98(2)
Must Prices or Quantities Be Regulated?
100(2)
Coase's Theorem
102(5)
Bibliography
104(3)
Nonconvexities
107(20)
Consequences of Nonconvexities
107(5)
Nonconvex Preferences
107(2)
Nonconvex Sets of Production
109(3)
Convexification by Numbers
112(1)
Regulation of Natural Monopolies
113(11)
Marginal Cost Pricing
116(1)
Second-Best Pricing of Regulated Firms
117(7)
Deregulation
124(3)
Bibliography
125(2)
III Industrial Organization 127(76)
General Equilibrium of Imperfect Competition
131(10)
Three Difficulties
131(3)
The Firms' Objectives
132(1)
Price Normalization
133(1)
The Quasi-concavity of Profit
133(1)
Subjective Demand Equilibrium
134(1)
Objective Demand Equilibrium
135(2)
Equilibrium in Quantities
135(1)
Equilibrium in Prices
136(1)
Conclusion
137(4)
Bibliography
138(3)
Prices and Quantities
141(20)
Monopoly
141(7)
Social Distortion
143(1)
How to Avoid Distortions
144(2)
The Case of Durable Goods
146(2)
Price Discrimination
148(2)
First Degree
148(1)
Second Degree
148(2)
Third Degree
150(1)
Oligopoly
150(11)
Cournot's Oligopoly
151(1)
The Bertrand Equilibrium
152(1)
Sketches of Resolutions of the paradox
153(4)
Strategic Substitutes and Complements
157(1)
Bibliography
158(3)
Product Choice
161(18)
Definitions
161(2)
A Model of Vertical Differentiation
162(1)
A Model of Horizontal Differentiation
162(1)
Differentiation and Monopoly
163(4)
Optimal Quality Choice
163(2)
Nonobservable Quality
165(1)
Choice of Number of Products to Introduce
166(1)
Differentiation and Oligopoly
167(12)
The Maximal Differentiation Principle
167(3)
Entry and Number of Products
170(7)
Bibliography
177(2)
Long-Term Entery and Competition
179(14)
Sustainability and Contestability
179(4)
Preemption
183(3)
Limit Price and Predation
186(2)
Limit Price
186(1)
Predation
187(1)
Research and Development
188(5)
Bibliography
191(2)
Vertical Relations
193(10)
Double Marginalization
194(3)
Justifications of Vertical Constraints
197(2)
Retailer Effort Incentive
197(1)
Price Discrimination
198(1)
Tied Sales
198(1)
Reduction of Price Competition
199(1)
Comparison of Different Practices
199(2)
Elements of Law
201(2)
Bibliography
202(1)
IV Incomplete Markets 203(18)
Elements of the Theory of Incomplete Markets
205(16)
The General Framework
205(5)
Existence of Equilibrium
210(1)
Inefficiency of Equilibrium
211(2)
Equilibria with Production
213(2)
Application to International Trade
215(1)
Conclusion
216(1)
Appendix: Nominal Assets
216(5)
Bibliography
218(3)
Index 221