| Preface |
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1 | (2) |
| Introduction |
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3 | (4) |
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Chapter 1 The Rational Actor Model |
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7 | (13) |
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Example 1 Truman's Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb on Japan, 1945 |
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7 | (5) |
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Example 2 Reagan's Decision to Bomb Libya, 1986 |
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12 | (4) |
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Example 3 Bush's Decision to Halt Operation Desert Storm, 1991 |
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16 | (4) |
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Utility of the Rational Actor Model |
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18 | (2) |
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Chapter 2 Prospect Theory |
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20 | (13) |
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Example 1 Washington's Decision to Attack Trenton, 1776 |
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20 | (3) |
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Example 2 Meade's Decision Not to Pursue Lee After Gettysburg, 1863 |
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23 | (5) |
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Example 3 Clinton's Decision to Withdraw from Somalia, 1993 |
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28 | (5) |
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Utility of the Prospect Theory |
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31 | (2) |
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Chapter 3 Poliheuristic Theory |
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33 | (17) |
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Example 1 Eisenhower's Decision Not to Intervene in Hungary, 1956 |
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34 | (3) |
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Example 2 Kennedy's Authorization of the Bay of Pigs, 1961 |
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37 | (5) |
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Example 3 Johnson's Decision to De-escalate US Involvement in Vietnam, 1968 |
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42 | (8) |
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Utility of the Poliheuristic Theory |
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49 | (1) |
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Chapter 4 The Bureaucratic Model |
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50 | (16) |
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Example 1 The Confederate Departmental System's Impact on the Vicksburg Campaign, 1862-1863 |
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51 | (3) |
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Example 2 The Army-Air Force Helicopter Rivalry, 1950s-1960s |
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54 | (6) |
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Example 3 The Department of State and the Department of Defense and the Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Beirut, 1982 |
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60 | (6) |
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Utility of the Bureaucratic Model |
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65 | (1) |
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Chapter 5 The Organizational Process Model |
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66 | (15) |
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Example 1 Strategic Formulation in the Vietnam War, 1960s-1970s |
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66 | (5) |
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Example 2 The Decision to Abort the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission, 1980 |
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71 | (4) |
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Example 3 The Federalization of the California Army National Guard During the Los Angeles Riot, 1992 |
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75 | (6) |
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Utility of the Organizational Process Model |
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80 | (1) |
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Chapter 6 The Small Group Model |
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81 | (16) |
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Example 1 The Blockade Board in the Civil War, 1861 |
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81 | (6) |
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Example 2 The Executive Committee During the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 |
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87 | (4) |
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Example 3 The Restricted Interagency Group in Developing a Strategy Toward Nicaragua, 1980s |
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91 | (6) |
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Utility of the Small Group Model |
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96 | (1) |
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Chapter 7 The Elite Theory |
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97 | (18) |
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Example 1 The Influence of the Congressional Black Caucus in the Decision to Intervene in Haiti, 1993 and 1994 |
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97 | (7) |
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Example 2 The Role of the Media in the Decision to Intervene in Somalia, 1992 |
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104 | (5) |
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Example 3 The Agenda of Secretary of State Madeline Albright in the Decision to Intervene in Kosovo, 1999 |
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109 | (6) |
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Utility of the Elite Theory |
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114 | (1) |
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Chapter 8 The Pluralist Model |
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115 | (22) |
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Example 1 Conscription in the Confederate Army, 1861-1864 |
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115 | (7) |
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Example 2 The Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers in the Midst of the Iran-Iraq War, 1987-1988 |
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122 | (7) |
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Example 3 The Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, 1995 |
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129 | (8) |
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Utility of the Pluralist Model |
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135 | (2) |
| Epilogue |
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137 | (2) |
| Chapter Notes |
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139 | (14) |
| Bibliography |
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153 | (8) |
| Index |
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161 | |
Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta